The University of Chicago

# ANTISTATISM: ESSAY IN ITS PSYCHIATRIC AND CULTURAL ANALYSIS

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
OF THE DIVISION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES IN
CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF
PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

1937

By
MOUSHENG HSITIEN LIN

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MOUSHENG HSITIEN LIN.

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# Antistatism

## Essay in its Psychiatric and Cultural Analysis

## Chapter I

## Introduction

WHAT is the state? Why is there antistatism or statism?

This essay is a study of antistatism, which presupposes both the fact and the idea of the state. What antistatism means is dependent upon what the state is. It is necessary to have a clear concept of the state, for without this we shall not be able to define the meaning of antistatism.

When one starts to think what the state signifies, one encounters at once a great diversity of opinion. The state means war to some, but peace and order to others. It imports a spiritual entity to some, but a temporal institution to others. To some it is a means to an end, to others an end in itself. To some it is a natural and rational society, to others an artificial and unreasonable organization. Some think that it is a moral order, while others believe that it is an evil, necessary or unnecessary. Some idealize it as the *summum bonum* of society, while others condemn it as "the flagrant negation of humanity." All these views of the state are valuational and are expressions of the desires for what ought to be.

Obviously for scientific purposes we have to define the state in a descriptive manner, to give the outstanding and necessary characteristics of the actual state in historical existence, instead of appraising the positive or negative values thereof. Of course we are not to attempt a rigid and sharp definition; we shall point out some characteristics that are important and indispensable for the political community.

In the first place, one notes that the state possesses a land. The body politic is generally housed in a more or less well defined territory. Even though there are nomadic societies in the wilderness and floating sovereign communities on the sea, and even though there may some day be a world state transcending physical boundaries, the state as understood in this essay is a territorial state.

In the second place, the state is a society of human beings. It is obvious that a land without human beings is not a state. There may be "political organizations" among other members of the animal kingdom or among angels and demons in the other world, but they are not states in our sense of the word. The state as we understand it is an aggregate of men and women who come to live together, of necessity or freedom, in a territory.

In the third place, the state is a government,[1] possessing a coercive power, which is legally supreme over any individual or

[1] Croce, Benedetto, *Elementi di Politica;* Bari, Gius, Laterza, and Figli, 1925 (117 pp.). Page 14: "The state is nothing other than the government." Sabine, George H., State. *Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences;* New York, Macmillan (1934), XIV: 328-32. In this article, Harold J. Laski is quoted as saying "The state is, for the purposes of practical administration, the government."

group within the territorial society, and which is exercised through a body of military and civil officials.[2] The expansion or contraction of the power may be measured according as social life is militarized and bureaucratized to a greater or less degree.[3] Generally the state may expand or contract its power as it sees fit. In times of social crisis, the state increases its power; in times of relative peace and order, the state decreases its military and bureaucratic authority. There is generally no fixed maximum or minimum of the power of the state.

Of all human organizations, the state is the most universal and comprehensive. Allegiance to the state is compulsive. With rare exceptions, every individual, by birth or by naturalization, is a member of some state, whether he likes it or not. The state is *sui generis* in this respect. No other human organizations have such a compulsive and all-inclusive character.[4]

Next, the state may be conceived as "the organization of organizations." [5] It is not identical with the hierarchy of social institutions,[6] nor is it the creator of all social associations.[7] It is to be understood as the power that criticizes and controls the entire structure of social life.[8]

To put it differently, we may say that the state is the power that maintains a general hierarchy of values, upon which social life is organized and of which social institutions are concrete embodiments.[9] Those values, with the maintenance of which the state is primarily concerned, are, according to the writer's opinion, property and prestige.[10] When human beings are organized politically in a territory, they cooperate with, as well as struggle against, one another for the acquisition of goods and services, or honors and deferences. Unequal in strength and intelligence, they are differentiated into several property and prestige classes, to maintain which the state, or the government, vested with coercive power, is organized.[11]

We may now attempt a comprehensive definition of the state. It is a territorial

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[2] Laski, Harold J., *The State in Theory and Practice;* New York, The Viking Press, 1935 (299 pp.). Page 8: "By the state I mean a society . . . . which is integrated by possessing a coercive authority legally supreme over any individual or group which is part of the society." Bosanquet, B., *The Philosophical Theory of the State;* London, Macmillan, 1920 (lxii and 320 pp.). Pages 184-85: "By the state, then, we mean society as a unit, recognized as rightly exercising control over its members through absolute physical power." Treitschke, Heinrich von., *Politik;* Leipzig, Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1897 (viii and 395 pp.). Pages 13-67. The author maintains that the essence of the state consists in its incompatibility with any power over it. Political thinkers both of the left and of the right recognize the fact that the state possesses a supreme coercive power.

[3] Ortega y Gasset, José, *The Revolt of the Masses;* London, G. Allen and Unwin, 1932 (204 pp.). Pages 132-33: "This is the gravest danger that to-day threatens civilization: state intervention; the absorption of all spontaneous social effort by the state, that is to say, of spontaneous historical action, which in the long run sustains, nourishes, and impels human destinies . . . . society begins to be enslaved, to be unable to live except in the service of the state. The whole of life is bureaucratized. What results? The bureaucratization brings about its absolute decay in all orders. . . . . This bureaucratization to the second power is the militarization of society. . . . ."

[4] Coker, Francis William, *Recent Political Thought;* New York, D. Appleton-Century Company, 1934 (ix and 574 pp.). Page 1.

[5] Lindsay, A. D., The State in Recent Political Theory. *Political Quarterly* (1914) 1:128-45. Page 140: "We may therefore define the state as the organization of organizations. . . . . It is comprehensive, therefore, in its scope as other organizations are selective."

[6] Laski, H. J., *Grammar of Politics;* New Haven, Yale University Press, 1925 (672 pp.). Page 29: "We must avoid the elementary error of identifying the state with the whole hierarchy of social institutions."

[7] Lindsay, *op. cit.,* p. 135: "It is absurd to think of the associations within a state as being created by the state. They and the state are equally the expressions of men's social nature and the outcome of their common interests. The state may be necessary to control them."

[8] Bosanquet thinks of the state as "the operative criticism of all social institutions." See Bosanquet, *op. cit.,* p. 140.

[9] Hetherington, H. J. W., and Muirhead, J. H., *Social Purpose;* New York, Macmillan, 1918 (317 pp.). Page 25: "The state is the concrete embodiment of the general scheme of values in accordance with which any community arranges its social life."

[10] Lasswell, H. D., *World Politics and Personal Insecurity;* New York, McGraw-Hill, 1935 (vii and 307 pp.). The author maintains that representative values of political community are safety, income, and deference.

[11] Oppenheimer, Franz, *The State;* Tr. by J. M. Gitterman, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1914 (v and 302 pp.). Page 5: "Every state in history was and is a state of classes, a polity of superior and inferior social groups, based upon the distinctions either of rank or of property. This phenomenon must, then, be called the 'state.'" It is important to note that even Oppenheimer, a Marxian writer, thinks that the state is based upon the distinctions of rank as well as of property. In general, Marxian scholars have underestimated the value of prestige, self-respect, self-pride, power, or influence, and overemphasized the importance of goods and services. Russell, Bertrand, *Practice and Theory of Bolshevism;* New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1920 (192 pp.). Pages 126-36. Veblen, Thorstein, *Theory of the Leisure Class;* New York, Macmillan, 1899 (400 pp.). Page 181.

human society which exercises through a government supreme coercive power over individuals and groups within it for the purpose of regulating and maintaining a general hierarchy of social values and institutions.

From this descriptive point of view, the historic state is rather a simple matter. Certainly it is neither a holy ghost nor a satan; neither a paradise nor an inferno; neither established by the grace of God nor ordained by the will of heaven. Why does one say that the state is produced simply "by our wickedness," [12] or "is begotten in aggression and by aggression?" [13] How may one affirm the state's being the Hobbesian mortal god, the Aristotelian highest good, or the Hegelian moral ultimate. Why is it that there are both rationalization and rejection of the state?

Is the state a mere creature of the political philosopher, a mere shadow of his sentiments and attitudes, his fears and hopes, his pain and pleasure, his hatred and love? [14] Is the theory of the state but "an externalization of the autobiography" of the theorist, or an exact analysis of the state? Why are there pros and cons of the state, romantic exaltations and condemnations of a prosaic fact such as the state really is?

We may ask another set of questions. Is the theory of the state a mere projection of class-consciousness, of class-hatred, class-fear, and class-antagonism, or an objective account of the political machinery? Is the defense of the state simply the defense of a class? And the attack upon the state the attack upon a class? Is the state invariably "the organized control of the minority over the majority"? [15] Is it the executive committee of the property-owning class? Or is it the expression of a common will? Must one oppose the dictatorship of the minority with Marx? Must one deny "the divine right of the majority" with Spencer? Or must one reject the dictatorship of the proletariat no less than that of the bourgeoisie with Proudhon? Is the state really the product of a community or a conflict of interests?

The philosopher of the state, it seems, is generally concerned with the construction of an ideal human order, an order which he himself desires. If he transfers the ideal order to the real state, and discovers no discrepancy between the ideal and the real, he becomes quite naturally a defender of the great Leviathan.[16] But if he sees that the theoretic purpose is not realized in actual administration, that what ought to be is not what is, he tends to become a dreamer or rebel, more or less out of sympathy or harmony with the existing order.

The history of political philosophy is saturated with influential ideal systems, such as the Confucian, the Platonic, the Hegelian. Many of them are simply read into political actualities. For instance, the Confucian believes that the state is a moral institution and the embodiment of the will of heaven; the Academician thinks that a republic, in which the philosopher, the soldier, and the producer, the slave being excluded, are properly placed, is the very realization of the principle of justice; Hegel manages to convince himself that the ideal of freedom, freedom for all, is most fully actualized in the Prussian autocracy. As they serve to maintain the status quo, these ideal systems may be called the reigning ideologies.

But there are other ideal systems, which have been unrealized or unreal-

[12] Paine, Thomas, *Common Sense;* Philadelphia, 1776 (54 pp.). Godwin, William, *An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice;* New York, A. A. Knopf, 1926 (2 vols.). Thomas Paine thinks that society is produced by our wants and government by our wickedness. William Godwin considers government, even in its best state, an evil.

[13] Spencer, Herbert, *The Man Versus the State;* London, Williams and Norgate, 1884 (133 pp.). Page 45: "Be it or be it not true that man is shapen in iniquity and conceived in sin, it is unquestionably true that government is begotten in aggression and by aggression."

[14] Merriam, Charles E., *Political Power;* New York, McGraw-Hill, 1934 (vii and 331 pp.). Page 155: "Is outward power the mirror of the life within, so that we may find the picture of the state in the struggle of the individual constitution the conflicts of which have been a little unveiled by the eye of the psychoanalysts; or is the life within the mirror of the power without so that we may say 'my mind to me a kingdom is,' or is the secret perhaps in their interaction?"

[15] Gumplowics, Ludwig, *Outlines of Sociology;* Tr. by F. W. Moore. Philadelphia, The American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 1889 (299 pp.). Page 188.

[16] Laski, *The State in Theory and Practice,* pp. 6-7.

izable, and which have inspired many disturbing collective wish-dreams, made martyrs, recluses, saints, sinners, and threatened many a political order. They are insurgent gospels or doctrines. Some of them radically and fundamentally reject the state, deny its coercive power and the social institutions and values which it maintains. These may collectively be called antistatism.

By antistatism, we mean, therefore, the theory that rejects the historic state,[17] the supreme coercive power that sanctions a hierarchical organization of social life in a territorial community. There are three aspects of the theory. In the first place, antistatism opposes the coercive power of the historic state, which is generally exercised through its military and civil officers. It opposes the militarization and bureaucratization of social life, and advocates a voluntary and spontaneous society. In the second place, antistatism rejects the hierarchial nature of the historic state, rejects the differentiation of society into higher and lower classes and ranks, and champions an equalitarian distribution of social values, especially of property and prestige. Finally, antistatism denies, or implies a denial of, the territorial basis of the historic state, and pleads for a universal community which transcends physical and national boundaries. These seem to be the significant aspects of antistatism, though there are others of less importance.

In this essay, we shall study five great antistate systems: the Taoist, the Cynic-Stoic, the liberal, the communist, and the anarchist. Laotzu and Zeno are chosen as representatives of the Taoist and the Cynic-Stoic systems respectively. For liberalism, we shall devote ourselves to the Rousseauan doctrines, even though other thinkers, such as Locke and Thomas Paine, were hardly less important. For communism, we shall examine primarily the doctrines of Marx and Engels, and secondarily the theoretical contributions of Lenin and Trotsky. For anarchism, we shall first enter into an analysis of the theories of Proudhon and then survey briefly the new anarchistic ideas of Bakunin, Kropotkin, and Tolstoi. There are of course other antistate theories, which owing to the limitation of time and knowledge are not included in this study. The choice of these men is determined mainly by their influence in the development of political thought and history. There were no greater anarchists in ancient China and Greece than Laotzu and Zeno. In modern times, few political thinkers are more powerful and at the same time more radical than Locke, Rousseau, Marx, Engels, Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tolstoi, Lenin, and Trotsky.

There are at least two ways of studying antistatism, the "philosophical" and the "scientific." [18] The former is concerned with what ought to be, with the condemnation of the historic state and the justification of the anarchistic utopia. The latter deals with what is, with the patterns of antistatism and with the conditions under which antistatism emerges and spreads. The "philosophical" procedure is both analytical and synthetic, dividing each antistate theory into its component parts and putting them together in an integrated whole. The "scientific" procedure is comparative and comprehensive, seeking to disclose cer-

[17] In order to discuss antistatism at all some limitation must be put upon "statism." For in one sense of the element common to the two terms, every antistatism is, by constructive reaction, a "statism." The reaction intends a better state. Our specific limitation of the statism involved in antistatism has this specific justification: the historic state is real in a peculiarly obstinate sense. Moreover, it is the reality of it that dooms as yet to irreality, if not unreality, all alternatives to it. Its obstinacy requires a reckoning.

All alternative utopias will prove "utopian" unless some potentiality can be found in the historic state which grounds them, either by evolution or revolution or by both. It is the fact that the historic state has developed so unideally (from primitive blessedness or in frustration of future happiness) which puts forever on the defensive those who oppose it. Explain that development and you will thereby disclose the grounds for future hope or foredoom present hope to complete fatuousness. But explain it you must. So by definition we begin with the historic state.

[18] Lasswell, H. D., *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How;* New York, McGraw-Hill, 1936 (ix and 264 pp.). Page 3: "The science of politics states conditions; the philosophy of politics justifies preferences." Catlin, G. E. C., *A Study of the Principles of Politics;* London, G. Allen and Unwin, 1930 (469 pp.). Page 428: "In political philosophy we are concerned with the world as idea; in political science our business is with the world as will."

tain fundamental uniformities and differences among the several antistate systems.

In the first part of this essay, we shall study separately the philosophy of each antistate system. We shall attempt to analyze the reasons of each theorist for rejecting the historic state and show why each theorist opposes the coercive power that sanctions the hierarchical organization of society. Next we shall try to disclose the principles of the utopia, be it a state of nature, a free state (*l'état libre,* in the Rousseauan sense), a stateless society, or a positive anarchy. Each antistate system, it will be shown, is a negation of the historic state, as defined above, and an affirmation of a stateless or anarchistic society, a voluntary and equalitarian society where there is absence of coercion and class distinctions. Each theory of antistatism necessarily has two aspects. The negative aspect is critical and destructive of the historic state, and the positive aspect deals with the creation of a utopia. It may be remarked that in real politics one rarely dwells in two such sharply differentiated worlds—an actual state that is all bad and an ideal state that is nothing but goodness itself. In pure reason, however, the utopian political philosopher does sometimes divide the world into incompatible units that mutually exclude each other.

It is by pure reason, therefore, that the philosopher who opposes the existing state creates a new society of his own. Thus, Laotzu, who rejects the feudal state of ancient China, exalts the primitive community; Zeno, who opposes the city state of Greece, returns to the natural state; Rousseau, who hates the ancient régime, idealizes the state of nature and the free state of contract; the communist, who fights against the class state, wishes to have a classless and stateless society; the anarchist, who opposes the involuntary and hierarchical organization of society, advocates a positive anarchy organized on the basis of a series of free contracts. In each case, we see the historic state and the utopia standing in sharp contrast; the former is inhuman, unnatural, and unreasonable, the latter is a kingdom of liberty and equality, if not the kingdom of heaven itself.

To limit the study of antistatism to a re-statement of its negative and positive aspects is hardly complete. In order to have a better understanding of the ideational structure of the antistate theory as a whole, it seems advisable to enter into its metaphysical and sociological foundations and assumptions. Thus, the anarchism of Laotzu may be seen as supported by his agnostic theory of knowledge and naturalistic conception of the world; the anarchism of Zeno, by his nominalistic theory of knowledge and monistic view of the universe; the political theory of Rousseau as based upon the fictions of the state of nature and of the social contract; and the political theories of the communist and the anarchist as fortified by certain dialectical and economic dogmas. Each antistatism is a philosophically integrated system. Whether the antistate theory is right or wrong hardly concerns us at all; whether its metaphysical or sociological bases are sound or unsound concerns us little; but it is important, according to the writer's opinion, to see the interrelatedness of the various theoretical components that go into the making of an antistate system.

So much for the philosophic treatment of antistatism. In the second part of the essay, we shall attempt to offer a scientific analysis of antistatism. The emergence and spread of an antistate theory presumably follows a series of laws and principles of which we are certainly not fully aware. The patterns and theoretical foundations of antistatism are also not improbably determined by certain conditions, which we are not able to define completely in our present stage of knowledge. It is assumed that no political theory originates in a social vacuum, nor does it seem to disseminate through the cross-section of society by a series of chances and accidents. True, political thought cannot be predicted with mathematical exactitude; true, the forms of anarchism or utopianism are numerous

and can scarcely be classified with any amount of certainty; true, our knowledge does not permit any gross generalizations about the great drama of politics; still, it is one of the tasks of the political scientist to attempt at every stage to formulate working hypotheses which will to some extent interpret the rise and spread of antistatism or of any other doctrine of the state. Every scientific investigator is at a certain stage driven to making some sort of hypothesis, however vague, about the ways in which ideas or things hang together, just as every philosopher will eventually come to pass moral judgments upon the world. The task of the philosopher of the state is to assert what ought to be; that of the political scientist to define the conditions in which a given phenomenon, be it a theory or a practice, takes place.

It is with the thought of formulating some general hypotheses of antistatism that the second part of this essay is written. It is to be emphasized that the general observations which we there make are not to be considered as "scientific laws" which are universally valid in all antistate cases; rather they should be treated as suggestions which may be of some use for the systematic study of political thought.

With the limitations indicated above, we shall endeavor to deal with three problems. The first problem is the patterns of antistatism. It is obvious that scientific procedure requires a systematic classification, in accordance with which theories may be grouped. A pattern of antistatism, it is proposed, consists of a goal and a method. Every pattern has a certain objective which is to be obtained through a certain mode of action. The goal of antistatism may be retrospectively or prospectively oriented. The gaze of the antistatist may be directed backward to some idealized era of remote antiquity or forward to some ideal society of posterity. The method whereby the goal may be realized may be either internalistic or externalistic; the former is characterized by some inward activity of the mind, the latter by some outward manipulation of the environment. Antistatism is, therefore, classified from the points of view of goal and method, of direction and action.

The second problem is the social conditions of antistatism. We shall compare the various historical backgrounds of antistatism, with a view to observing, if possible, the similar conditions in which antistatism emerges and spreads. We shall endeavor to describe the common factors in the diverse historical situations that are responsible for the rise and diffusion of antistatism. It is to be contended that in any given society antistatism generally emanates from the class or group that is blocked in its attempt to climb the social ladder. Here as elsewhere in nature birth follows the pains of blockages. Between the blocking and the blocked there is generally a severe tension. It is from the zone of severe tension that antistatism arises. If there is only one zone of tension in society, antistatism will be localized therein; but if there are other areas of strain, antistatism is likely to diffuse through them. Our effort is therefore to locate the tensional zone where the protest against the state originates and then to point out such other areas of strain as are readily susceptible to the insurgent gospel.

Finally, we shall study the psychological conditions of antistatism. It is assumed that the personality of the antistatist is best characterized by the way in which he meets social blockages. Four main forms of antistate reaction will be discussed. Frustrated by an external circumstance, the antistatist may return to an earlier stage of life, or may advance to a future stage of existence. The former type of reaction is regressive, the latter progressive. When confronted by a social blockage, the antistatist may withdraw into himself altogether, or may strive to change the external world. These two forms of reaction may be called introversive and extraversive. The aim of these reactions is, from the psychological point of view, to redeem the self-pride or self-regard which is wounded by social

blockages, or to put it differently, to bring about a condition of existence in which the ego will be secure.

Antistatism, as I have said, may be studied in two ways, the "philosophical" and the "scientific"; the one treats the ideational structures of the several antistate systems individually, the other examines in a comparative manner the patterns and the social and psychological conditions of the antistate systems. Both methods are non-valuational, and are not methods of conscious appraisal. In this essay, I shall endeavor to stand as aloof and disinterested as possible, realizing, however, that no less than any other human being I am prisoner of my experience and that in many passages I may indicate, quite unawares, my preferences for one or another political ideal and may erect my own maxim of action and thought into a universal law of humanity. My only excuse is, even scientists are men—yea, men as are philosophers.

# Chapter II

# The Taoist Theory of the State

## 1. The Philosophical Foundation

In the classical age of Chinese philosophy, there are three main schools of political thought, the Taoist, the Confucian, and the Mocian.[1] The fundamental positions of these may be succinctly stated as follows. Confucianism is essentially an apologia for the aristocracy and Mocianism a vindication of the priesthood, while Taoism constitutes a protest of those without status against the estates—each struggling for the paramount place in the total social-value pyramid. For the defense of its conservative tendency, Confucianism, resting upon its oars, appeals to the slow and steady flow of the stream of history; for the justification of its sacrosanct orientation, Mocianism relies upon the will of heaven and postulates the existence of gods; and, finally, as the basis of its anarchistic principle, Taoism formulates a system of ontology with an epistemological approach.

*The Tao Teh Ching,* a book of five thousand odd words, is supposed to have been written by Laotzu, the founder of the Taoist school. It is not a formal treatise on epistemology, ontology, or politics; but it contains a consistent body of principles which we shall attempt to analyze.

Taoist epistemology and ontology, though constructed apparently with a view to explaining the process of knowing and the nature of existence or non-existence, may be considered a fortification of the Taoist antistate pattern, the Taoist style of living "between heaven and earth." Taoist epistemology is, if one may say so, an agnosticism. Laotzu believes that ultimate reality is unknowable. *The Tao Teh Ching* begins with this sweeping and beautiful paradox:

> The reason that can be reasoned is not the eternal reason;
> The name that can be named is not the eternal name.[2]

It is generally assumed by the empirically minded that sense-data constitute the first elements of knowledge, but Laotzu denies the authenticity of the senses and hence the reliability of their data. For "the five colors the human eye will blind; the five notes the human ear will confound; the five tastes the human mouth offend."[3] Sense-data will then appear as confused and distorted pictures of the external world.

If one tries to describe the qualities or properties of the objects presented to his senses, he is only setting up an arbitrary standard which has no objective validity. Laotzu says: "Only when all in the world understand beauty to be beauty, then ugliness appears. Only when all understand goodness to be goodness, then badness appears."[4] Were there no such idea as beauty or goodness, there would be no idea of ugliness or badness. These conceptions are relative and are mutually conditioned. While constituting dialectical unities of themselves, they are but false notions born of the phenomenal world.

While objects of the phenomenal world may be perceived, albeit not clearly, and conceived, albeit arbitrarily, ultimate

[2] Laotzu, *The Tao Teh Ching;* Tr. by P. Carus, Chicago, Open Court, 1913 (209 pp.). Ch. i. The word "Tao" has been translated into "reason," "way," "logos," "god," "law of nature," etc. I have preferred "reason" to the others.

[3] *Ibid.,* ch. xii.

[4] *Ibid.,* ch. ii.

[1] Liang, Chi-chao, *History of Chinese Political Thought;* Tr. by L. T. Chen, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1930 (vii and 210 pp.). Tao, Hsi-sheng, *Chung-kuo Cheng-chih Szu-hsiang Shih* (*A History of Chinese Political Theories*); Shanghai, New Life, 1932 (2 vols.).

reality *per se* behind and beyond the appearances is not comprehensible. Says Laotzu: "We look at reason, but cannot see it; its name is colorless. We listen to reason, but cannot hear it; its name is soundless. We grope for reason, but cannot grasp it; its name is substanceless." [5] Reason is the ultimate reality of the noumenal world—the thing-in-itself, to use the Kantian terminology—which is beyond human comprehension.

Strictly speaking, agnosticism cannot but preclude the possibility of ontology, for as the noumenal world is not open to human understanding no theory of being or non-being is thinkable. But Laotzu's metaphysical craving drives him to speculate upon the eternal and universal that is behind the changing appearances of the "ten thousand existents." [6] Hence his ontology—ontology by incidence, if not by accident.

With an aphoristic style, and in accents dialectic, Laotzu proceeds to impart to us his inadvertent paradox—the knowledge of the unknowable. It is, first of all, "the image of the imageless, the form of the formless." [7] This paradox is more beautifully, if less explicitly, couched in the following verse.

> Vast virtue's form
> Follows reason's norm;
> And reason's nature
> Is vague and eluding.
> How eluding and vague,
> All types including!
> How vague and eluding,
> All beings including!
> How deep and obscure,
> It harbors a spirit pure.[8]

And this "vague and eluding" reality is, according to Laotzu, the cosmic force or energy, which is dynamic and permeates and transforms all existents without changing itself. In every instance of transformation, there is a dialectical interaction of two opposite principles, Yin and Yang, the negative and the positive. Every existent, according to the Taoist system, is a product of two forces, a unity of two opposites.

Even though dialectically transforming, the entire existence, Laotzu argues, is not teleological, but natural. Whereas Confucius and Mocius assume the moral and divine nature of existence, Laotzu does not ascribe human feeling or volition to the universe. "Heaven and earth," says Laotzu, "are not benevolent, for they treat the ten thousand existents merely as straw dogs." [9] In other words, the eternal being is a natural principle without emotional or volitional qualities.[10]

Confucianism emphasizes the relationship between man and man, and Mocianism centers its interest in the relation of man to heaven, but Taoism studies the place of man in nature,[11] which is considered neither moral nor teleological. It is this naturalistic world outlook that is a distinctive contribution of Taoism to Chinese philosophic thought.

### 2. Criticisms of the State

The Taoist theory of the state may be divided into two parts: a critique of the historic state, and a portrait of the ideal society. That knowledge is impossible is the major premise of the critique of the state, whose *raison d'être,* it appears to Laotzu, implies an understanding of good and evil. The naturalistic conception of being provides an impersonal and universal background for the ideal society. Into the Taoist antistate pattern, the theories of knowing and being are structurally and functionally integrated.

As a critique of the historic state, Taoism is violently articulate. Fundamentally, the critique is based upon the denial of any knowledge of good and evil, justice and injustice, and hence is a rejection of any standards or norms of behavior. Laotzu, choosing to be an agnostic, cannot consistently uphold the supremacy of any human law, the dictation of the powerful, or the interference or the indoctrination of the individual by the state. To him the state appears a

[5] *Ibid.*, ch. xiv.
[6] Hu, Shih, *Chung-kuo Che-hsueh Shih Ta-kan (The History of Chinese Philosophy);* Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1919 (iv and 398 pp.). Pages 55-59. Fung, Yu-lan, *Chung-kuo. Che-hsueh Shih (A History of Chinese Philosophy);* Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1934 (2 vols.). I, 218-23.
[7] Laotzu, *op. cit.*, ch. xiv.
[8] *Ibid.*, ch. xix.
[9] *Ibid.*, ch. v.
[10] Hu, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-68.
[11] Liang, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-75.

dogmatic human institution, which is without any epistemological method for justifying its being.

More concretely and specifically, the state involves the following things: law, war, taxation, and education. Let us see, seriatim, the reasons why he opposes the state.

In the first place, the state means law which is supposed to be for the administration of justice. But not knowing what justice is, the Taoist asks, how can the state administer it? There is one being, Tao itself, that governs all. Says Laotzu: "There is always an executioner who kills. Now to take the place of the executioner is taking the place of the great carpenter who hews. If a man takes the place of the great carpenter who hews, he will rarely, indeed, fail to injure his hand." [12] The incompetency of the state in the administration of justice will therefore bring serious consequences not only to the people (the hewed), but also to the state itself (the hewer, as it were). Furthermore, the operation of the law assumes the obedience of the people. But if the people are not obedient, how can the law function properly? Even capital punishment cannot demand the obedience of the unwilling. For "if the people do not fear death, how can they be frightened?" [13] Laotzu recognizes not only the incompetency of the state, but also the futility of the law itself.

In the second place, the state means war. Laotzu apparently opposes not only foreign and civil wars but also war itself. Concerning foreign wars, he says: "He who with reason assists the master of mankind will not with arms strengthen the empire. Arms invite retaliation. Where great armies are quartered, briars and thorns grow. Great wars unfailingly are followed by famines." [14] Laotzu seems to believe that war never ends war, and to be conscious of its economic consequences. Next, Laotzu opposes private militarization, which is conducive to civil war. "The more weapons the people have, the more troubled is the state." [15] As to war itself, Laotzu warns against the "enjoyment of the slaughter of men." The perfect man is he who is "conscious of being masculine but is content to be feminine," who is "in liberal sympathy with all creation and is not aggressive toward his fellow men."

Third, the state means taxation. Laotzu is probably the first economist of the *laissez-faire* school. He opposes interference in the economic life of the people by the state. "The people hunger," says Laotzu, "because their superiors consume too many taxes; therefore they hunger. The people are difficult to govern because their superiors are meddlesome; therefore they are difficult to govern." [16] He desires to see a natural economy free from all state interference.

Lastly, the state means education. To be stable and permanent the state must indoctrinate the people, must cultivate such virtues as "filiality," "loyalty," "saintliness," "prudence," "benevolence," and "justice." These virtues are arbitrary standards of behavior, which the state imposes upon the people through the instrumentality of its sages and saints. While sages and saints thrive, the Taoist declares, robbery and theft will never cease in the empire.[17] To abolish the state, education must go, and the people must return to nature.

Summarizing his indictments against the state, Laotzu says:

> The more restrictions and prohibitions there are in the empire, the more impoverished will the people be. The more weapons the people have, the more troubled is the state. The more there is cunning and skill, the more will abnormal things occur. The more laws and orders are issued, the more will thieves and robbers abound.[18]

This is the final anarchism of Laotzu, the all-denier.

According to Laotzu, there are four grades of government. "The best kind of government is that which is not felt by the people; next that which is loved and praised; the third, that which is feared,

[12] Laotzu, *op. cit.*, ch. lxxiv.
[13] *Ibid.*
[14] *Ibid.*, ch. xxx.
[15] *Ibid.*, ch. lvii.
[16] *Ibid.*, ch. lxxv.
[17] Compare Plato's statement to the effect that, until philosophers are kings, there will be no cessation of ills for states.
[18] Laotzu, *op. cit.*, ch. lvii.

and the fourth, that which is despised." [19] These grades of government correspond with the rules of virtue, benevolence, righteousness, and propriety respectively, all of which are conventional and artificial, and indicate "the loss of Tao," the absence of the law of nature.

### 3. The Taoist Utopia

In opposition to the state Laotzu proposes a society without government, which society, as indicated above, is portrayed upon an impersonal and universal background—impersonal in being neither moral nor teleological, and universal for embracing the entire world.

> In a small country with a few people let there be officers over tens and hundreds, but not in order to exercise power. Let the people be not afraid of death, nor desire to move a distance. Then even though there be ships and carriages, they will have no occasion to use them; even though there be armour and weapons, they will have no necessity to wear them. The people can return to the knotted cords for the records; they can delight in their food, be content with their dwellings, and rejoice in their customs. Neighbouring countries may look at one another; they may be so close that their cocks and dogs may be mutually heard; but the people may grow old and die before they visit one another.[20]

This is indeed a natural and spontaneous association of human beings, who are not corrupted by moral standards and who live for the sake of living rather than for any cosmic or divine purpose.

This ideal community is most beautifully depicted by Chuangtzu, the mystic poet of the Taoist school.

> Now I regard government of the empire from quite a different point of view.
>
> The people have certain natural instincts;—to weave and clothe themselves, to till and feed themselves. These are common to all humanity, and all are agreed thereon. Such instincts are called 'Heaven-sent.'
>
> And so in the days when natural instincts prevailed, men moved quietly and gazed steadily. At that time, there were no roads over mountains, nor boats, nor bridges over water. All things were produced, each for its own proper sphere. Birds and beasts multiplied; trees and shrubs grew up. The former might be led by the hand; you could climb up and peep into the raven's nest. For then man dwelt with birds and beasts, and all creation was one. Being all equally without knowledge, their virtue could not go astray. Being all equally without evil desires, they were in a state of natural integrity, the perfection of human existence.
>
> But when sages appeared, tripping people over charity and fettering with duty to one's neighbour, doubt found its way into the world. And then with their gushing over music and fussing over ceremony, the empire became divided against itself.[21]

There is hardly any better description of the original state of nature to which not only Laotzu and Chuangtzu, but also Rousseau, the European Taoist, wish to return.

There was another philosopher of the Taoist school, Yangtzu, the Max Stirner of the Orient, whose anarchism was based upon an extreme egoism. He was condemned by Mencius as the beast that preaches the doctrine of Wu-Chung (without-ruler). He would not injure a single hair, even if by doing so he could benefit the entire world; nor would he serve himself at the expense of others. "If no man would lose a hair, and if no man would benefit the world, the world would indeed have peace." He envisages a world of independent and isolated egos, among whom there is no mutual intercourse or interference.[22]

But Laotzu is not so extreme an egoist. He thinks that some social relations, though limited, are inevitable, and may be mutually beneficial if they are not based upon the principles of domination and submission. "The holy man hoards not: the more he does for others, the more he owns himself; the more he gives to others, the more will he himself lay up an abundance. Heaven's way is to benefit but not to injure; the holy man's way is to accomplish but not to strive." [23] In this passage is contained the essence of the art of living of the Taoist utopia.

Taoist antistatism, as indicated, is a protest against the political order. To systematize his antistatism, the Taoist

[19] *Ibid.*, ch. xvii.
[20] *Ibid.*, ch. lxx.
[21] Chuangtzu, *Chuang Tzu;* Tr. by H. A. Giles, Shanghai, Kelly and Walsh, 1926 (xxviii and 467 pp.). Pages 107-08.
[22] Yangtzu, *Yang Chu's Garden of Pleasure;* Tr. by Anton Forke, London, John Murray, 1912 (64 pp.).
[23] Laotzu, *op. cit.*, ch. lxxxi.

formulates an agnosticism and a naturalism, which are opposed to the ethical and theological doctrines of Confucianism and Mocianism. That knowledge is impossible shakes the epistemological assumption upon which the idea of the state is based, and that all existence is natural implies a denial of the moral or divine nature of the political order. This in essence is the philosophical system of Taoist antistatism.[24]

[24] Into the historicity of Laotzu, I cannot enter here. The reader is referred to the following works. Lo Keng-tze (ed.), *Ku Shih Pien* (*Symposium on Ancient History*); Peiping, Po-she, 1933 (xxiv and 698 pp.). Hu, Shih, A Criticism of Some Recent Methods Used in Dating Laotzu. *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* (1937) 2:373-97.

# Chapter III

# The Cynic-Stoic Theory of the State

## 1. The Philosophical Foundation

If Æschylus and Pindar composed their dramatic poems and lyric odes for the glorification of the Eleusinian mysteries and the Delphic priesthood, and if Plato and Aristotle expended their energies for the restoration of the aristocracy which was declining with the rise of the commercial democracy, Zeno the Cynic-Stoic, like Laotzu the Taoist, was rather inclined to identify himself with those who did not "belong," the plebeian classes of the Hellenistic world. Coming to Athens at a time when neither the Lyceum nor the Academy could be said to have much intellectual vigor, Zeno turned to the Cynic school and then "back to Socrates" for spiritual inspiration as well as for practical guidance.[1] Following the Socratic tradition, Zeno the Cynic-Stoic believes that virtue is the highest good. But to the question, "what is virtue?" Socrates simply dictates that "virtue is knowledge," without entering into the problems whether knowledge is possible and of what knowledge consists. It remained for Zeno to formulate a theory of knowledge in order to guarantee the perfection of virtue, and to search for the first cause of the universe in order to find the final goal of life.

While the critical spirit of Laotzu denies the attainability of truth, the moral consciousness of Zeno demands the possibility of knowledge. Were knowledge impossible, virtue would appear impossible. There seems to be a "moral impulse" that forces Zeno to a dogmatic theory of knowledge.

In conformity with his nominalistic tendency, Zeno holds that all knowledge is of the particular. Ideas or universals exist neither outside of things as Plato teaches, nor in things as Aristotle believes; they are abstractions of thought having no real objective existence.

The soul at birth, Zeno holds, is like a clear tablet. It acquires knowledge only empirically, through perceiving and conceiving individual objects of the phenomenal world. When the soul perceives an object, it receives an impression or a "picture." If the picture agrees with the object represented, the soul gives its "assent" to the picture and "conceives" the object directly. The picture then becomes a "conceptual-picture," which constitutes a unit of knowledge, and is stored up in the memory. When many units are grasped and combined, they form "scientific knowledge." In this way, according to Zeno, knowledge is possible.[2]

If the theory of knowledge stated above gives Zeno a cognitive certainty, the "first principles of the universe" from which he can deduce the reason for his own being will unquestionably offer him a cosmic assurance. He conceives the entire universe as forming "a single, unitary, living, connected whole." In his treatise on the Universe, he declares that the world is one, a veritable *uni*-verse. This monism stands in contrast with Platonic-Aristotelian dualism. Accordingly, Zeno proceeds to overcome the contradictions between matter and form, body and mind, between natural necessity and rational, purposive action.

In the first place, Zeno says that the world is material. Corporeal objects constitute the only reality. Not only all

[1] Hicks, R. D., Stoics. *Encyclopaedia Britannica;* London, The Encyclopaedia Britannica Company, 14th ed., 1929. XXI, 428-32.

[2] Diogenes Laertius, *The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers;* Tr. by C. D. Yonge, London, H. G. Bohn, 1853 (viii and 488 pp.). Bk. VII. Ueberweg, Friedrich, *A History of Philosophy;* Tr. by G. S. Morris, New York, Scribner, Armstrong and Company, 1876 (2 vols.). I, 191-93.

substances, but also all qualities, are corporeal. But are corporeal objects rational and purposive? Is the material universe mental? Zeno solves this dilemma by inventing two principles, the passive and the active. "The passive is matter, an existence without any distinctive quality. The active is the reason which exists in the passive, that is to say, God." [3] Like all that is real, God is corporeal. The divine is the original force, the final world-cause, the primitive and creative fire, the perfect reason or logos, which permeates, animates, and transforms all things. Two propositions follow: first, as the universe is matter, it acts in accordance with the law of natural necessity; second, as it is reason, it is purposive and teleological.

Man, according to Zeno, is consubstantial with the universe, and is unitary. In him, the two principles also function, the passive being the body, the active the soul. As both the body and the soul are corporeal, man is a unity. Therefore, by a simple identification of the contradictory conceptions, the Stoa believes that the Platonic-Aristotelian dualism is at last unified.

The Cynic-Stoic ontology has been paradoxically called "concrete spiritualism pure and simple," as well as "pantheistic materialism." The universe of Zeno is a unity, but a unity of two opposites, matter and soul, nature and reason. The insistence upon the unity of the universe seems to be dictated by an earnest quest for the highest or final goal of man, whose security depends upon the substantiality no less than the rationality of the universe. So much for the metaphysical ideas of Stoicism.

### 2. Criticisms of the State

"The much admired *Republic*" of Zeno was said to have been "written on the dog's tail," i.e., while he was a Cynic, and in polemics against Plato's work bearing the same title. It is probably the first treatise on anarchism in the western world. It contained many "unbecoming doctrines and assertions," which proved a stumbling-block to later Stoicism, and which were expurgated by Athenodorus the Stoic. Little wonder the entire book finally went out of existence!

Perhaps better than any other works, the *Republic* shows what the man Zeno was. It seems that even in his mature years Zeno did not deviate from the Cynic pattern of life. After writing the *Republic,* he studied dialectics and metaphysics at Megara and in the Academy, only to find a more comprehensive philosophic justification for his anarchism than what primitive and intuitive Cynicism could offer.

The Cynics were the forerunners of the Stoics. The Cynic teachers, such as Antisthenes, Diogenes, and Crates, were canonized by the Stoics. Zeno, the last of the great Cynics and the founder of Stoicism, formed the personal and theoretical link between the two schools.

The antistate ideas of Zeno seem to have been derived from Diogenes, the Cynic. The latter was a classical anti-authoritarian personality. Once while he was sitting in the sun, the legend goes, Alexander the Great was standing by and said to him, "ask any favor you choose of me." Diogenes replied, "cease to shade me from the sun." On another occasion, Alexander came and stood by him, and said, "I am Alexander the great king." "And I," said Diogenes, "am Diogenes the dog." He was a very defiant person, refusing to submit to any authority or restrictions and wanting to be absolutely free and independent. Above all he prized freedom of speech, which he said is "the most excellent thing among men." He was unwilling to be a citizen of Athens and subject to its jurisdiction, but preferred calling himself a citizen of the world. These ideas of Diogenes were further developed by Zeno.

In a spirit truly Cynic, Zeno wrote his *Republic,* which, according to traditional reports, is in direct opposition to Plato's *Republic;* the latter moralizes and rationalizes the "Atticized Sparta," [4] whereas the former ridicules practically every

[3] Diogenes, *op. cit.,* p. 308.

[4] Dunning, William A., *A History of Political Theories, Ancient and Medieval;* New York, Macmillan, 1902 (xxv and 360 pp.). Page 97.

institution and convention of the state. The main points of Zeno's anarchism are stated below.

In the first place, Zeno is opposed to the idealistic or monistic idea of the state. For him, the individual alone is real and important,[5] while the state is nominal and indifferent. If the philosopher-king of Plato or the political animal of Aristotle has to find "the key to good life in a scientifically organized state," [6] the itinerant mendicant hopes to realize his supreme virtue in separation from the political community. "In ancient Greece the accepted principle was that the citizen belonged neither to himself nor to his family, but to his city." [7] But Zeno thinks that the individual belongs to himself.

Secondly, Zeno is opposed to the territorial or national state. In the City of Zeus, no man would say, "I am of Athens," or "of Sidon," but he would say, "I am a citizen of the world." This is in contrast to the Platonic and Aristotelian theories.[8] While the Republic of Plato was to have not more than 5,040 citizens, the City of Zeus was to embrace no less than the entire world. While difference in worth between Hellenes and Barbarians was maintained by Aristotle, all racial distinctions would be abolished by Zeno. The root principle of the Stoic utopia is that it is world-wide, a cosmopolis.

Thirdly, from the formal standpoint, Zeno is opposed to the legal institution and to regulation by the state. There should be no statutes made by man; nor should there be law-courts, for the practice of hearing both sides of a dispute in a court is unreasonable and superfluous.[9]

Next, from the sociological standpoint, Zeno is opposed to the class state. While both Plato and Aristotle justify the differentiation among the several classes of free citizens and the institution of slavery, Zeno says that people should not be divided into classes. According to Plato, the philosopher-king is to govern the other classes of people, just as the mind is to control the body. But to Zeno, there is to be no plurality of masters and men, even as there is no disunity between mind and body.[10]

Finally, Zeno is opposed to the institutions of education and religion, two spiritual instruments of the state. There shall be no gymnasia for the training of the youth in grammar and music. There shall be no images or temples, nor shall sacrifices be offered.[11] In other words, all the pantheon of Greece, including Apollo and Dionysos, shall be demolished. One needs only to recall the role of education and religion in Greek political life to appreciate the revolutionary significance of these proposals of Zeno.

### 3. The Cynic-Stoic Utopia

So much for the opposition to the state. As to the positive aspect of the anarchism of Zeno, there are two extreme doctrines to be considered. These are individualism and cosmopolitanism. To Zeno, society and nature appear to be antithetical. Separation from society and harmony with nature constitute the fundamental equation of the Cynic-Stoic life. The first term idealizes the atomistic existence of the individual, and the second contemplates a mystic unity of the cosmos.

The Cynics were the "Rousseaus of Antiquity." Much of their paradoxical popularity was due to the fact that they attempted to live in the most civilized city as if they were in the state of nature. They tried to return to nature literally, by adopting the simplest mode of living and being indifferent to, and even contemptuous of, all human civilization, all riches, glories, power, and prestige. It was symbolic of the school that Antisthenes called himself "Haplocyon," "the down-right dog." All Cynics were proud of their presumptuous caninity. This

[5] Zeller, Eduard, *The Stoics, Epicureans and Skeptics;* Tr. by O. J. Reichel, London, Longman, 1870 (xix and 548 pp.). Pages 301-10.

[6] Dunning, *op. cit.,* p. 102.

[7] Spencer, *The Man Versus the State,* p. 66.

[8] Dunning, *op. cit.,* p. 47. Aristotle, *The Politics;* Tr. by H. Rackham, London, Heineman, 1932 (xxiii and 683 pp.). Bk. I, ch. vi; Bk. VII, ch. vii. Plato, *The Republic;* Tr. by Benjamin Jowett, New York, Cooperative Publishing Society, 1901 (xciv and 329 pp.). Bk. V.

[9] Diogenes, *op. cit.,* Bk. VII, sec. 33. Arnold, E. V., *Roman Stoicism;* Cambridge, The University Press, 1911 (IX and 468 pp.). Page 276.

[10] Plato, *The Laws;* Bk. V. Aristotle, *op. cit.,* Bk. I. Diogenes, *op. cit.,* Bk. VII, sec. 33.

[11] Diogenes, *op. cit.,* Bk. VII, sec. 32. Arnold, *op. cit.,* p. 275.

radical attitude is effectively expressed in Diogenes' motto, "I recoin current values."

According to Zeno, the aim of man's life is to unfold the innermost germ of his own individual essence. To do so, he must know himself and be himself. There are no nobler achievements than self-knowledge and self-realization, which are to be obtained by rational and purposive effort in complete separation from the state and society. Through self-knowledge and self-realization, the individual may reach a state of *apathia,* a condition of internal rationality of the soul, over which the external has no power. Only then does the individual become a wise man and the real master of himself. Zeno thinks that a wise man, though a beggar, is truly king. That every man is king unto himself is the ideal of the Republic of Zeno. This is a form of extreme individualism.

On the other hand, to live in harmony with nature is to be one with the active cosmic power, the logos. As the nature of man is consubstantial with universal nature, the entire world may therefore form a great rational structure, a *politkon sustema,* of which all gods and men are citizens. Its laws are prescribed by nature, dictated by reason. It recognizes no bounds of nationality or of the historic state. It is a community of independent and rational egos, a spiritual unity of knowledge and will.[12]

[12] Windelband, Wilhelm, *History of Philosophy;* Tr. by J. H. Tuft, New York, Macmillan, 1893 (xv and 726 pp.). Pages 172-76.

We see, then, the two extreme doctrines of individualism and cosmopolitanism converging in the system of Zeno. These are originally Cynic doctrines, which are embodied in the following formulae: *homo sum,* i.e., I am first of all a man; and I am a citizen of the world. Zeno holds fast to these formulae, and his *Republic* gives a concrete and systematic elaboration of them.

The superiority of Zeno to Antisthenes and Diogenes lies in that his theory of the state is consistently related to his theories of knowing and being.[13] The negative attitude toward the state finds a logical ratification in the denial of the reality of the Platonic-Aristotelian idea or universal, and an ontological confirmation in the rejection of the Platonic-Aristotelian dualism of mind and body. On the positive side, Zeno's epistemological nominalism is a cognitive implementation of his individualism, and his pantheism is no less than a cosmic fortification of his cosmopolitanism. Herein lies the essence of the systematic nature of Zeno's anarchistic theory.[14]

[13] For the systematic nature of Stoicism, see Zeller, *op. cit.,* ch. xiv, pp. 381-402.

[14] This construction of the anarchistic theory of Zeno is based chiefly upon the works of Diogenes Laertius and upon my understanding of the general ideological and philosophic trends of the Hellenistic age. I cannot dwell upon the problem of the authenticity of the life and works of Zeno, which problem is to be solved, if ever, by historians. I refer the reader to the following works. Zeller, *op. cit.* Hope, Richard, *The Book of Diogenes Laertius;* New York, Columbia University Press, 1930 (xiv and 241 pp.).

# Chapter IV

# The Liberal Theory of the State

## 1. The Modern Antistatist

There are at least three main types of modern antistatism—liberal, communist, and anarchist—which we shall discuss in this and the following two chapters. We shall take Rousseau as the representative of liberal antistatism. In the chapter on the communist theory of the state, we shall deal primarily with Marxism and to a less extent with Leninism and Trotskyism. In the chapter on anarchism, we shall first enter into the political theory of Proudhon, who is generally considered the father of modern anarchism, and next discuss certain contributions of Bakunin, Kropotkin, and Tolstoi to anarchism.

The modern antistatist, whether liberal, communist, or anarchist, is a rationalist who, seeing that the historic state is unjust and unreasonable, thinks that an ideally constructed society can be brought about by certain rational processes. He reasons in terms of the universal and the eternal. By pure reason he creates the free state, the stateless society, or the positive anarchy, presumably based upon certain natural or dialectical laws.[1]

On the other hand, Rousseauism, Marxism, and Proudhonism are not only rationalistic, but also romantic; they are extraordinary compounds of crystal clear intellectualism and dynamic emotionalism. In Rousseauism, one sees the fusion of such varied elements as the Arcadian and pastoral strains in classical and Latin art, the new cult of primitivism, and the glacial summit of pure reason. In Marxism and Proudhonism, one sees the mighty syntheses of the felicific calculus of the economic man and the triple-timed progression of the universal symphony. In all three systems, the intellectual and the sentimental elements of man seem equally expressed. Not merely by pure reason, but perhaps primarily by the innermost desires of the heart, are the idyllic state of nature and the utopia of the free state created. The stateless society and positive anarchy may be considered in the same way. They are not only rational deductions of economic and historical sciences, but also works of human passion and fantasy. In fine, all three systems, enlightened and extravagant at one and the same time, are products of rationalism and romanticism.

Generally speaking, Rousseauism, Marxism, and Proudhonism constitute a series of ideological revolutions of modern man against the historical state. The revolutions are born in different situations. The historic state is attacked from different standpoints, by different methods, and for different reasons. It is the purpose of this and the next two chapters to see how they are systematically formulated, and toward what ultimate goals they are heading.

## 2. Locke, the Predecessor of Rousseau

Before studying Rousseau, the philosopher of the French revolution, we shall first indicate briefly the political philosophy of John Locke, the philosopher of the "glorious revolution." It was to Locke that Rousseau owed many of his political principles, just as it was against Hobbes that Rousseau reformulated the doctrine of the social contract.

The whole temper of the Lockian philosophy "is individualistic in the sense

[1] Spengler, Oswald, *The Decline of the West;* Tr. by C. F. Atkinson, New York, A. A. Knopf, 1932 (2 vols.). II, 185, 305-06, 400-01. Ortega y Gasset, José, *The Modern Theme;* Tr. by James Clough, London, C. W. Daniel Company, 1931 (152 pp.). Begin page 34.

in which individualism is opposed to organized social action. It held to the primacy of the individual over the state not only in time but also in moral authority." [2] The fundamental assumption of Locke is that the state is made for man, not man for the state.

In explaining the source of political community, Locke starts with the conception of a state of nature. In contradiction to Hobbes, he holds that the state of nature is not a state of war, but a condition in which peace and reason prevail, and in which man possesses certain natural rights. These rights are, according to Locke, life, liberty, and property.[3] The preservation of life is of course the strongest motive of man. Every man is entitled to the right of self-preservation. Liberty means exemption from every rule save the law of nature, which is not a limitation of human liberty, but on the contrary an essential condition of it. Property means the right to own any object in which the individual has incorporated his labor. These are the natural rights of man in the state of nature.[4] Underlying all these rights, there is the fundamental fact of equality in the state of nature. Every individual in the state of nature is entitled to same natural rights, of life, liberty, and property, and every individual respects the rights of every other individual.

The difference between the state of nature and the civil state lies in that in the former each is to interpret and execute the natural law according to his own reason whereas in the latter a common organ, created through a social contract, is to protect the natural rights of life, liberty, and property. By the social contract, each gives up his right of executing the natural law, but not his rights of life, liberty, and property. The civil state is to guarantee those natural rights, which are inherent in individuals independent of social organization.

In the Lockian system, the state is not the final embodiment of power; this is reserved by the community as a whole. Locke says: "The community perpetually retains a supreme power of saving themselves from the attempts and designs of anybody, even of their legislators, whenever they shall be so foolish or so wicked as to lay and carry on designs against the liberties and properties of the subject." [5] The state may be dissolved, when either the legislature or executive acts contrary to the law of nature, or when it ceases to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizen. The dissolution of the state does not mean the dissolution of the community, which may reorganize itself into another state. The state is therefore neither the final embodiment of power nor a permanent and indissoluble entity. In the following pages we shall see how the dominant features of the Lockian system were taken up and developed more fully by the Genevan Rousseau.

### 3. The State of Nature

In the history of the theory of the state, Rousseau stands uniquely like a Janus figure. On the one hand, he represents the climax of the jusnaturalistic and individualistic thought, and, on the other, he presides over the romantic and idealistic current. This antimony is due in part to the paradoxical nature of his own doctrines,[6] and in part to the divergent perspectives of his interpreters.

The political works of Rousseau seem to plead for individual liberty as well as for absolute submission to the state, and have been considered an individualism that augurs anarchy as often as an absolutism that will bring the final despotism.[7] Kant learned from Rousseau to respect

[2] Dewey, John, *Liberalism and Social Action;* New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1935 (viii and 93 pp.). Page 5. Smith, Thomas Vernor, *Beyond Conscience;* New York, McGraw-Hill, 1934 (xv and 373 pp.). Pages 149-51.

[3] Locke, John, *Two Treatises of Civil Government;* London, J. M. Dent and Sons, 1936 (xx and 242 pp.). Page 158: "Man . . . . hath by nature a power . . . . to preserve his property—that is, his life, liberty, and estate. . . . ."

[4] Dunning, W. A., *A History of Political Theories, from Luther to Montesquieu;* New York, Macmillan, 1905 (x and 459 pp.). Pages 346-47.

[5] Locke, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

[6] Rousseau himself said that he "likes better to be a man of paradoxes than to be a man of prejudices."

[7] Wright, Ernest Hunter, *The Meaning of Rousseau;* London, Oxford University Press, 1929 (vi and 168 pp.). Pages 1-2, 101-03. Vaughan, C. E. (ed.), *The Political Writings of Rousseau;* Cambridge, University Press, 1915 (2 vols.). I: 80.

the dignity of man, whereas Bosanquet saw in the writings of the Genevan the absorption of the individual in the state. Some have thought that the *Social Contract* is "a charter for individual license," but others have deemed it "one of the most potent implements of tyranny that maniac ever forged."

The most important matter to be considered in any study of Rousseau, it appears to the writer, is that this ideological father of the French Revolution in all his political writings was searching for what ought to be, rather than what was.[8] This is in great contrast with the method of Montesquieu, who was primarily concerned with political institutions and conventions. Montesquieu was a political scientist, who used observation to get data and facts about the actual state.[9] Rousseau was a political philosopher, who relied upon reason pure and simple in order to construct an ideal society, and demanded a radical leveling of the political pyramid that had been built in the long course of history. Seated on the high *a priori* throne, "the grand pontiff of the Jacobins" issued solemnly, in language abstract and general, the severest indictments against the brutality of the state, against slavery, inequality, and property —in fact, against civilization as a whole, and "against the human race." [10]

The political philosophy of Rousseau may be divided into three parts: the original state of nature, the historic state, and the free state of contract. To eliminate the confusion over the word "state," we may distinguish these three states by calling them the natural society, the historic state, and the rational society.[11]

The natural society and the rational society, constructed by pure reason, are not supposed to be historical facts. They are pure ideas of reason, working concepts reached by abstraction from the historic state. The one represents what the original state of nature ought to have been, and the other what the free state of contract ought to be. Both are opposed to the historic state as it is.

"Forgetting time and place," by pure reason, Rousseau creates a delightful paradise of the remotest antiquity. In that state, man is happy and free, "wandering up and down the forests, without industry, without speech, and without home, an equal stranger to war and to all lies, neither standing in need of his fellow creatures nor having any desire to hurt them, and perhaps not even distinguishing them from one another." [12] All his wants are satisfied; and his days flow in all tranquillity and innocence.[13]

The natural man, Rousseau says, is neither good nor bad. He knows no moral, social, and much less political obligations, has no conception of justice or injustice, and is a stranger to vanity, deference, esteem, and contempt. In fact, he is rather an isolated being, and by nature a non-political animal.[14]

In the natural society, man is directed by two instincts or feelings which are original in his nature. The first is self-respect (*amour de soi*), similar to what we call the instinct of self-preservation, without which man as an individual would have perished at the start. The second instinct is compassion, or what we call the gregarious instinct, without which man as a species could not have existed. Rousseau is careful to distinguish self-respect from egoism. Self-respect is

[8] Rousseau, Jean Jacques, *The Social Contract and Discourses;* Tr. with an Introduction by G. D. H. Cole, London, J. M. Dent and Sons, 1935 (Introduction, xlvii; *The Social Contract,* 1-124; *A Discourse on the Arts and Sciences,* 125-54; *A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality,* 155-246; and *A Discourse on Political Economy,* 247-287). Page 175: "Let us begin then by laying facts aside, as they do not affect the question. The investigation we may enter into, in treating this subject, must not be considered as historical truths, but only as mere conditional and hypothetical reasonings, rather calculated to explain the nature of things, than to ascertain their actual origins. . . . ."

[9] In the fifth book of *Emile,* Rousseau himself stated how he differed from Montesquieu: "Montesquieu did not intend to treat of the principles of political right; he was content to treat of the positive right (or law) of established governments."

[10] In thanking Rousseau for a presentation copy of *The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality,* Voltaire called it Rousseau's "second book against the human race," the first book being *The Discourse on the Arts and Sciences.*

[11] The term "the rational society" is suggested by Cole in his Introduction to Rousseau's *Social Contract and Discourses.*

[12] Rousseau, *The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality,* p. 203.

[13] No wonder after reading the *Discourse* Voltaire said that he itched to go on all fours.

[14] Rousseau, *The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality,* p. 200.

"a natural feeling which leads every animal to look to its own preservation, and which, guided in man by reason and modified by compassion, creates humanity and virtue." [15] But egoism is a relative and factitious feeling, arising in the state of society. This amounts to loving oneself at the expense of others, and causes all the mutual damage men inflict upon one another. By nature, man does not want everything for himself and nothing for others; he desires only to be treated as one among others, to share equally. In pursuing his own welfare, he does not want to see a fellow creature suffer. The natural man therefore acts instinctively on the principle of equality.

In the natural society, Rousseau believes, there is no private property, for "the fruits of the earth belong to all, and the earth itself to nobody." [16] There is no distinction whatever between *meum* and *tuum* for everybody can enjoy the gift of nature equally and freely. This absence of private ownership in primitive society, it is interesting to observe, is the common belief of the communist and the anarchist alike, who assume that, prior to the appropriation of land, man gets the fruits of the earth without having to pay rent. This view of the primitive life is one of natural right, rather than of historical fact; is a useful idea of reason, arrived at by abstraction from the existing system of private ownership. That the earth belongs to nobody is a fundamental assumption of Rousseauism, Marxism, and Proudhonism, and is in fact a starting point for rejecting the historic state.

Before the dawn of civilization, the life of the noble savage, man, is uniform and simple, according to Rousseau. The inequality of mankind is hardly felt. Every man "lives on the same kind of food and in exactly the same manner, and does exactly the same things." [17] Even though there is difference in strength and intelligence, there is no distinction of fortune or of rank, and the condition of equality is uniformly obtained.

Not only are men equal to one another in the natural society, they are also independent of one another. No one can be reduced to a situation in which he cannot do without the help of others; no one can be made a slave. The strong have no power to subdue the weak, and the weak have no necessity to obey the strong. In such an independent existence, every one is, therefore, "his own master, and the law of the strongest is of no effect." [18]

The natural society, as briefly outlined above, stands in sharp opposition to the civil state. It is a condition of existence in which the noble savage by his own good nature loves himself as much as he respects others, in which the institution of private property and the law of the strongest are unknown, and in which the principles of equality and liberty are naturally realized. We shall next see how this blissful existence is replaced by the civil state.

### 4. The Historic State

The state of nature being what it is, how does the state of society come into existence? The beginning of the civil society is described by Rousseau in this most dramatic and effective passage.

> The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of saying *this is mine,* and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society. From how many crimes, wars and murders, from how many horrors and misfortunes might not any one have saved mankind, by pulling up the stakes, or filling up the ditch, and crying to his fellows, "beware of listening to this imposter; you are undone if you once forget that the fruits of the earth belong to us all, and the earth itself to nobody." [19]

But unfortunately no one did. Consequently the earth was divided and appropriated; consequently property was established. Following the distribution of land, the condition of equality was destroyed, and society divided into the rich and the poor. "The destruction of equality was attended by the most horrible disorders. Usurpations by the rich, robbery by the poor, and the unbridled passions of both, suppressed the cries of natural compassion and the still

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 197, n. 2.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 207.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 204.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 205.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 207.

feeble voice of justice, and filled men with avarice, ambition and vice." [20] The acquisitions of land were accomplished in two ways, by force and by occupancy. Then the law of the strongest and the title of the first occupier were established, between which, however, there arose perpetual conflicts ending in battles and bloodshed. "The new-born state of society thus gave rise to a horrible state of war."

It is obvious that such a state of war was not of advantage to the rich, who "conceived at length the profoundest plan that ever entered into the mind of man"—the establishment of the state. They said to the poor:

> Let us join to guard the weak from oppression, to restrain the ambitious, and secure to every man the possession of what belongs to him: let us institute the rules of justice and peace . . . . Let us, in a word, instead of turning our forces against ourselves, collect them in supreme power which may govern us by wise laws, protect and defend all the members of the association, repulse their common enemies, and maintain eternal harmony among us.[21]

This then was the way the historic state came into being, according to Rousseau. It was presumably in the interest of all, but in reality was to legitimatize and protect the property of the rich against the perpetual threat from the poor. It is interesting to note that Adam Smith, a great contemporary of Rousseau, held the same view as to the origin of the state. He declared that "civil government . . . . is in reality instituted for the defense of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none at all." [22] It is also important to note that the Rousseauan theory of the origin of the state was substantially incorporated in Marxian and Proudhonian political theories and forms a fundamental assumption of modern antistatism.

The consequences of the establishment of the state, according to Rousseau, were as follows. The state

> bound new fetters on the poor, and gave new powers to the rich; . . . . irretrievably destroyed natural liberty, eternally fixed the law of property and inequality, converted clever usurpation into unalterable right, and, for the advantage of a few ambitious individuals, subjected all mankind to perpetual labour, slavery and wretchedness.[23]

As more and more states were thus organized, there arose among them "wars, battles, murders, and reprisals, which shock nature and outrage reason." These were the inevitable consequences of the institution of the historic state.

The historic state, as conceived by Rousseau, appears to be the institution that authorizes by positive right an hierarchical organization of society, in which there are "a few rich and powerful men on the pinnacle of fortune and grandeur, while the crowd grovels in want and obscurity." [24] Rousseau opposes such organization of social life, for "it is plainly contrary to the law of nature, however defined, . . . . that the privileged few should gorge themselves with superfluities, while the starving multitudes are in want of the bare necessities of life." [25]

Furthermore, Rousseau believes that "man is naturally good," but has become actually wicked and vicious. As a noble savage, man has the natural feelings of self-respect and compassion, the love of self being modified by the love for others; but, as a citizen of the state, the political man has become a beast of prey. "Thus it is," says Rousseau, "that we find our advantage in the misfortunes of our fellow-creatures, and that the loss of one man almost always constitutes the prosperity of another. But it is still more pernicious that public calamities are the objects of the hopes and expectations of innumerable individuals." [26] The natural man has lost his natural goodness in the civil state. What is then to be done? In answering this problem, Rousseau proposes a new society, in which the rational will of the whole may find an echo in the heart of the natural man.

### 5. The Free State

Now the Garden of Eden having been lost, and despotism having established

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 219.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 221.
[22] Smith, Adam, *The Wealth of the Nations;* London, J. M. Dent and Sons, 1930. Bk. V, chs. i and ii.
[23] Rousseau, *The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, p. 221.
[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 233-34.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 238.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 240.

itself, Rousseau could not return to the state of nature any more than he could be reborn. There was no use in merely lamenting, "man is born free, but everywhere he is found in chains." As he grew into maturity, Rousseau became concerned with the possibility of a rational society, and was in search of the true society which would leave men "as free as before." Hence *The Social Contract.*

It is highly important to remember that, in *The Social Contract,* as in *The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality,* Rousseau was concerned with the ideal society rather than with the actual state.[27] He took men as they were and laws as they might be,[28] while Montesquieu took laws as they were. In *The Discourse,* Rousseau created a state of nature, but in *The Social Contract* he built an ideal society, *état libre*—both out of pure reason. The rationalization of the ideal state, just as the glorification of the state of nature, should be considered a veritable indictment against the actual historic state, against the absolutism and despotism of the eighteenth century, and against the *ancien régime* itself.

At the beginning of *The Social Contract,* Rousseau sets himself to solving an extremely difficult problem, namely, "to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone and remain as free as before." [29] This is perhaps the most fundamental problem of the communal life of man—the reconciliation of human freedom with the universal law, the reconciliation of the individual with the whole. In tackling this, Rousseau begins by assuming a social contract, whereby "each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole." [30] And this whole is the body politic which is known from various points of view as state, sovereignty, and power, but which, in the writer's opinion, may be better called a rational society, as distinguished from the actual historic state.

It may be proper first to note that the social contract of Rousseau eliminates the dualism of *populus* and *rex* as two separate contracting persons,[31] as well as obliterates the unilaterality of the original contract of the Leviathan.[32] For the first time in the development of the contract theory, the state, the ideal state, is conceived as the sovereign community of free individuals.

Before attempting to see how Rousseau reconciles the conception of the sovereign community with the idea of the free individuals, let us observe two underlying assumptions of the social contract, and two important clauses governing the making and dissolution of the same. The first assumption is that the individual is prior to the state. Before the founding of the state, Rousseau assumes, the individual was his own sovereign in the state of nature. He possessed the inalienable rights of man as man. This original sovereignty of the individual is held to be the only source of all subsequent political authority, and is more fundamental and sacrosanct than the derivative sovereignty of the state.

The second assumption follows the first, and is that the state is created, or more correctly, the state ought to be created, for the individual, not the individual for the state. By joining the state, the individual is not only to remain as free as before, but also to gain a more abundant life. He does not lose himself thereby. We have learned from Rousseau, Lindsay says, "that political institutions are made for man, not man for them." [33] In other words, the state is to be an institutional instrument for the sake of enriching man's life and realizing man's freedom.

Of the two clauses under which the

[27] Smith, T. V., *op. cit.,* pp. 162-68.
[28] Rousseau, *The Social Contract,* Bk. I, ch. i.
[29] *Ibid.,* ch. vi.
[30] *Ibid.*

[31] Gierke, Otto Friedrich von, *Natural Law and the Theory of Society;* Tr. by E. Barker, Cambridge, University Press, 1934 (2 vols.). I, 50-61.
[32] Hobbes, Thomas, *Leviathan;* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1929 (xxxi and 557 pp.).
[33] Lindsay, Alexander Dunlop, *Karl Marx's Capital;* London, Oxford University Press, 1925 (128 pp.). Page 113.

social contract is made, the first is that the contract is "the most voluntary of all acts." From this clause it follows that the individual can cease to be a member of the state and move elsewhere as freely as he may enter into it. If he is prevented legally or economically from leaving the state and is detained against his will, he is no longer a free citizen and the state is no longer a free state.[34] Furthermore, as the social contract is "the most voluntary of all acts," it cannot be made once for all. The continuation of its validity depends upon the perpetual renewal, tacit or explicit, of the parties thereto. For, says Rousseau, "it is absurd for the will to bind itself for the future, nor is it incumbent on any will to consent to anything that is not for the good of the being who wills." [35] In this way, the "voluntary clause" tends to destroy the permanent, binding nature of the social contract and leaves the continual existence of the state to the willingness of its members.[36] By making the state a purely voluntary association Rousseau anticipates the anarchistic ideal of Proudhon, which is a régime of free contract. This is the reason why Bluntschuli says that the contract theory of Rousseau "is to be considered a theory of anarchism rather than a political doctrine." [37]

The second clause governing the concluding and dissolving of the social contract is that the free state of contract is to be under the direction of the general will only. As soon as it is controlled by the particular will, "the social union would evaporate instantly and the body politic would be dissolved." [38] In other words, as soon as the general will ceases to legislate or act for the common interest of all, that is to say, as soon as it ceases to be itself, the state *ipso facto* comes to an end. For "violation of the act by which it exists would be self-annihilation." [39] When the state is thus dissolved, the individual "regains his original rights and resumes his natural liberty." [40] He is no longer bound by the union. The omnipotence of the general will is therefore purchased at the extravagant price of a permanent danger of dissolution.[41]

Having stated the two underlying assumptions of the contract and the two clauses governing the making and dissolution thereof, we shall now examine the central problem of Rousseauism, namely, the reconciliation between the sovereignty of the community and the freedom of the individual. The problem may be put in two paradoxical forms. The first is how by totally alienating himself to the whole community a man may remain as free as before. Or, to put it in another way, how may he, in giving himself to all, give himself to none? The second paradox is how the sovereign community may control all its members without really controlling them at all. That is to say, how is the community to be "an authority that is no authority"? These are very difficult problems; they appear incompatible, but they are not really self-contradictory.

The sovereign community, according to Rousseau, possesses a general will, which is inalienable, indivisible, infallible, and

[34] Rousseau says: "When the state is constituted, residence constitutes consent." But the validity of this statement depends entirely upon its footnote, which reads: "This should of course be understood as applying to a free state; for elsewhere family, goods, lack of refuge, necessity, or violence may detain a man in a country against his will; and then his dwelling there no longer by itself implies his consent to the contract or to its violation." See *The Social Contract,* Bk. IV, ch. ii, n. Compare Catlin, *A Study of the Principles of Politics,* p. 396.

[35] Rousseau, *The Social Contract,* Bk. II, ch. i.

[36] It is interesting and instructive to compare this view with that of Burke, a severe critic of Rousseau, who says: "Society is indeed a contract. Subordinate contracts, for objects of mere occasional interest, may be dissolved at pleasure; but the state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and calico or tobacco, or some other such low concern to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with other reverence; because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection. As the end of such partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born." Burke, Edmund, *Reflections on the Revolution in France;* London, J. Dodsley, 1790 (iv and 356 pp.).

[37] Bluntschli, J. K., *The Theory of the State;* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1892 (xxv and 550 pp.). Page 297.

[38] Rousseau, *The Social Contract,* Bk. III, ch. i.

[39] *Ibid.,* Bk. I, ch. vii.

[40] *Ibid.,* Bk. I, ch. vi.

[41] Gierke, *op. cit.,* I, 150.

indestructible. What the general will is is one of the most disputed questions in the entire history of political philosophy. Much of the dispute, however, is due to the failure to recognize that the general will is a purely rational idea, or a purely rational will, and is far from being identical with the actual sovereignty exercised by any historic state. The general will is fully realized in the ideal free state. In the actual state, sometimes the will is more general, sometimes less general. Only in a pure republic or a pure democracy can the general will be completely the sovereign power.

It is essential to consider first the territorial basis and the size of the population of the ideal state, in which the general will may be realized. In *The Social Contract,* Rousseau has in view the city-state and not the nation-state.[42] In fact, Rousseau even thinks that a city is too large, for "the union of several towns in a single city is always bad." [43] The ideal state is a very small community "where the people can readily be got together and where each citizen can with ease know all the rest." [44] Only in a very small community can there be a general will which concerns itself with all members equally, and not with a particular interest or class. It is obvious that "a city may often generalize where a nation must particularize," [45] and that a town may often generalize where a city must particularize. The smaller the territory, the smaller the population, the more general the will is likely to be.

Even in a small community with a few people, the general will may indeed not prevail, Rousseau seems to suggest. He says that unless the people were of gods, the community, strictly speaking, would not be governed by the general will and the government would not be purely democratic. And "it would take gods to give men laws" that are authentic acts of the general will. It is therefore quite legitimate to consider the ideal state of Rousseau as a utopia, which the historic state may only approximate.[46]

But Rousseau is generally more optimistic than this. Once he even proposes a confederation of states. Unfortunately, the manuscript of his sixteen chapters on the proposal is no longer in existence. It seems fairly safe to assume that his ideal is a free confederation of numerous small independent republics. The confederation itself will be a voluntary contract, into which each republic may freely enter, and from which withdraw at will.[47]

Each republic is organized with the unanimous consent of its members, is dissolved as soon as the general will ceases to exist, and may be reorganized whenever desirable. Every individual may enter into any social union freely, may leave it at will, and join another union which he chooses. Such a general confederation of small republics, each of which is a voluntary union of free individuals, seems to be the ultimate aim of Rousseauan political philosophy. And it also appears to be the general aim of the communist-anarchist movement of recent times.

Let us further study the nature of the general will. The general will, according to Rousseau, tends always to the preservation and welfare of the whole and of every part, is always for the common good and for the common interest. The greatest common good may be reduced to two terms, liberty and equality,[48] which are complementary, for liberty cannot exist without equality, and *vice versa.*

To Rousseau, liberty means civil and moral liberty, which is the consequence of the fundamental bond of union between man and man. Civil liberty does not mean license or absence of all restraint; on the contrary, true liberty consists in complete submission to the general will,

[42] Cole, Introduction, *The Social Contract and Discourses,* p. xxviii. Catlin, *op. cit.,* pp. 388, 396, and 422.
[43] Rousseau, *The Social Contract,* Bk. III, ch. xiii.
[44] *Ibid.,* ch. iv.
[45] Cole, Introduction, p. xxviii.
[46] Rousseau, *The Social Contract,* Bk. II, ch. vii; Bk. III, ch. iv.
[47] Referring to the influence of Rousseau upon the French Revolution, Burke remarked: "You cannot but perceive in this scheme (of federalism) that it has a direct and immediate tendency to sever France into a variety of republics, and to render them totally independent of each other." The scheme of federalism, according to Burke, is a resolution to break the country into separate republics. Burke, *op. cit.*
[48] Rousseau, *The Social Contract,* Bk. II, ch. xi.

to the most rational and universal will of the community. In a most illuminating chapter, Rousseau says:

> The passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a very remarkable change in man, by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and giving his actions the morality they had formerly lacked. What man loses by the social contract is his natural liberty . . . . ; what he gains is civil liberty . . . . which is limited by the general will . . . . we might, over and above all this, add to what man acquires in the civil state, moral liberty, which alone makes him truly master of himself; for the mere impulse of appetite is slavery while obedience to law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty.[49]

This passage contains the essence of the meaning of liberty in the rational society. A man is truly free, when he acts in accordance with his own rational will which coincides with the rational will of all. Or to put it in the terminology of Kant, who further developed Rousseauian politics and ethics, we may say that a man is truly free when he acts as if the maxim of his action were to become by his will a universal law of nature.[50] The essence of liberty lies in the complete obedience to one's own rational will and hence to the general will, not in fulfillment of one's blind impulses.

When the state is under the direction of the supreme general will, it is in fact under the direction of the most purely rational will of each and every one of its members. Cole says in his admirable Introduction to *The Social Contract:* "The interest of the state, in so far as it is directed by the general will, must be the interest of every individual, in so far as he is guided by his *real* will, that is, in so far as he is acting universally, rationally and autonomously." [51] Therefore in obeying the general will, one obeys only himself and remains as free as ever; and in commanding all the members of the community, the general will commands nobody and is an authority that is no authority at all. For the interest of the community and the interest of each of its members are completely identical.

In the light of this interpretation, we come to the position that it is active will, not force, that is the basis of the ideal state of Rousseau.[52] All the members of the state must will rationally, universally, and autonomously, in order that they may be free citizens of the free state. If, however, there is a man who refuses so to will, he "will be forced to be free" by the general will.[53] For he who does not will rationally is in chains, in blind subjection to his own lower nature. He shall be forced to be free, as Kant might say, by the universal mandate of his own higher, more real, and more rational will.

When man acts in accordance with reason he is in harmony with the universal reason, which is the very essence of the law of nature. But, Rousseau argues, reason alone is not a sufficient motive force of human action. The precepts of reason should be "graven in the heart of man in characters that cannot be effaced," [54] and it is there that man finds the fountain of his natural and spontaneous sentiment of compassion for humanity. "Man is born good"; he is corrupted in the historic state that is based upon hate, fear, and force; he should be restored to his natural goodness in the ideal community that is directed by the universal reason. "Man is born free"; he is enslaved by the historic state and bound in chains; he should be emancipated and should recover his natural liberty in a truly rational community.

So much for the theory of civil liberty. We must not forget that "liberty cannot exist without equality," [55] according to Rousseau. "There is hardly any inequality," says Rousseau, "in the state of nature, all the inequality which now prevails owes its strength and growth to the development of our faculties and the advance of the human mind, and becomes at last permanent and legitimate by the establishment of property and laws." The historic state therefore maintains and sanctions the inequality of mankind. It is precisely because the sovereignty of the

[49] *Ibid.*, Bk. I, ch. viii.
[50] Kant, Immanuel, *Critique of Practical Reason;* London, Longman, 1883 (lxiv and 368 pp.).
[51] Cole, Introduction, p. xxxviii.
[52] *Ibid.*
[53] Rousseau, *The Social Contract,* Bk. I, ch. vii.
[54] Rousseau, *The State of War* (an unfinished essay), quoted by Cole in his Introduction, p. xi.
[55] Rousseau, *The Social Contract,* Bk. II, ch. xi.

historic state perpetuates the hierarchical organization of social life that the general will of the ideal state should always tend to the restoration and maintenance of equality, to the common good of all the people alike.

Theoretically and formally, the historic state is sometimes supposed to be based upon the principle of equality. But this equality "is only apparent and illusory: it serves to keep the pauper in his poverty and the rich man in the position he has usurped. In fact, laws are always of use to those who possess and harmful to those who have nothing." [56] In the ideal state, laws are different. They are the authentic acts of the general will, which tends to bring about real equality, allow neither rich men nor beggars. "These two estates, which are naturally inseparable, are equally fatal to the common good; from the one come the friends of tyranny, and from the other tyrants. It is always between them that public liberty is put up to auction; the one buys and the other sells." [57]

Not only should there be material equality, but also equality in prestige and power. The social contract "is not a convention between a superior and an inferior, but a convention between the body and each of its members." So long as they submit to the general will equally, they are neither masters nor men.

It is to be observed that Rousseau does not mean that "the degrees of power and riches are to be absolutely identical for everybody." The ideal state is not a condition of mechanical equality in which each member is to enjoy exactly the same food, clothes, houses, or to perform the same authority or duty. But it is important, according to Rousseau, that "power shall never be great enough for violence," and shall always be exercised in accordance with the general will. And in the matter of riches, it is essential that no one shall be so wealthy that he can buy another or so poor that he is forced to sell himself. These are the minimum conditions of equality.[58]

[56] *Ibid.*, Bk. I, ch. ix, n.
[57] *Ibid.*, Bk. II, ch. xi, n.
[58] *Ibid.*, Bk. II, ch. xi.

Fundamentally, the principle of equality is inherent in the natural instincts of self-respect and compassion. If a man is guided by reason, he will respect himself and at the same time will respect others as much. In this way, the mandate of the rational man finds a sympathetic response in the heart of the natural man; to be rational and to be natural are identical, are to be human. Kant learned the principle of self-respect from Rousseau, and formulated, in the most purely rational manner, the moral imperative, which bids man to "so act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of others, in every case as an end, never only as a means." [59]

Here we arrive at the summit of the Rousseauan and Kantian moral philisophy, on the pure glacial heights of absolute ethics. Through all the logical contradictions of the Rousseauan régime of contract and through all the metaphysical labyrinth of the Kantian "intelligible world," it is this idea of the supreme worth and dignity of man, at once purely rational and purely natural, that gleams eternally and serenely as the guiding star of modern humanity.

We see now that liberty and equality, the two terms that constitute the greatest common good, are not only political principles of the free state, but also moral ideals of humanity as a whole. When the general will prevails in a community, social relationships among its members are characterized by true freedom and by mutual respect. Such a community is a true kingdom of liberty and equality, is the very negation of the historic state. It is not only a stateless society where class struggles are over; it is not only a positive anarchy where economic antinomies are permanently harmonized; it is a community of purely rational beings who act naturally and spontaneously in accordance with the universal law of nature and reason. This philosophy of the state and society is the work of the future, but in origin it stretches far into the past, and is deeply rooted in man as

[59] Kant, I., *The Metaphysics of Ethics;* Tr. by J. W. Semple, Edinburgh, Clark, 1871 (xx and 315 pp.).

man. The Rousseauan idea of nature goes back to Laotzu and Zeno alike, and his idea of reason, in ruder forms, is expressed as Tao by Laotzu and as Logos by Zeno. In looking forward, Rousseauism, full of apparent contradictions and paradoxes, is a political and moral philosophy of lasting value and will be a guide for a long time to come for the progressive realization of the kingdom of liberty and equality.

### 6. Summary

We may summarize the above arguments as follows:

1. That Rousseauism is a negation of the historic state. It opposes the coercive authority that legalizes and sanctions a hierarchical organization of society in which there are "a few rich and powerful men on the pinnacle of fortune and grandeur, while the crowd grovels in want and obscurity."

2. That Rousseauism is an utopian philosophy. There are in fact two utopias, the state of nature and the free state of contract. In the original society, man is a noble savage, happy and free. He is directed by two natural instincts, self-respect and compassion, and is by nature good. As the earth belongs to nobody, there is no private property. There are no social and political relations. In the rational society of the future, man is to remain as free as ever and to be his own sovereign. The society will be under the direction of the general will, which tends to the greatest common good, liberty and equality. In an ideal situation, the rational mandates of the general will are in harmony with the natural instincts of every member. The rational man of the rational society will then recover the natural goodness of the natural man.

3. That Rousseauism is a compound of rationalism and romanticism. In creating, by pure reason, the two utopias and in criticising the historic state with these logical fictions, Rousseauism is rationalistic. On the other hand, in so far as the vital source of such re-consideration of the *raison d'état* lies in the innermost desires of the heart, rather than in the pure thought of the mind, Rousseauism is romantic.

# Chapter V

# The Communist Theory of the State

## 1. The Romanticist Reaction

Between the liberal movement and the communist-anarchist, there was a romanticist intermezzo.

The period of enlightenment having ended, a new humanity grew into maturity under the shadow of a great disillusionment during the first quarter of the nineteenth century. A new romanticist movement was staged with the explicit purpose of restoring the *status quo ante bellum,* under the political Mephistopheles, Metternich.

The age of romanticism was one of monarchism and theocratism, a reaction (or a revolution)

> against the respectability of the bourgeois temper, and against a universal equalitarian ethic . . . . against the whole of the mathematic-mechanical spirit of science in western Europe, against a conception of natural law which sought the bare abstraction of a universal and equal humanity.[1]

Of the romantic era, Hegel may be said to be the *doctor universalis,* a spirit both rich enough and concentrated enough to mirror its self-consciousness.[2] Postulating that the form of world evolution is dialectical, Hegel maintains that the divine idea reveals itself progressively first in the Orient, where only one is free, next in the Greco-Roman world, where some are free, and finally in the Teutonic world, where all are free under the monarchical régime. It follows therefore that the Prussian state is the final expression of the divine idea, a "perfect rationality," an "absolute, fixed end-in-itself." [3]

But history has refuted his finality. According to his own dialectics, there can be no final synthesis, and every thesis is doomed to produce its own opposite. Even during the heyday of romanticism, a new generation began to turn itself against the absolutist state, against the shadow-figures that were acting in the ghostly theater of the Holy Alliance, and against the very master of the romantic movement, Hegel himself. By his own disciples, especially Marx and Proudhon, Hegel was out-Hegeled.

The influence of Hegel, however, has been profound and abiding. Since his time, all the great political movements

[1] Troeltsch, Ernst, The Idea of Natural Law and Humanity in World Politics. Appendix I in E. Barker's English translation of Otto Gierke's *Natural Law and the Theory of Society.*

[2] For the role of Chateaubriand and the French romantics, and Coleridge and the English conservatives, see the following work. Hearnshaw, F. J. C. (ed.), *The Social and Political Ideas of Some Representative Thinkers of the Age of Reaction and Reconstruction;* London, Harrap, 1932 (219 pp.); Chs. ii and iv.

[3] Hegel, G. W. F., *Philosophy of Right,* Tr. by S. W. Dyke; London, G. Bell and Sons, 1896 (365 pp.). *Philosophy of History,* Tr. by J. Sibree; New York, Colonial Press, 1890 (xvi and 457 pp.).

have been baptized with the Hegelian spirit. Communism and anarchism are Hegelianism "stripped of its mystical husk." And in the temple of fascism or nazism, Hegel is restored to his former dignity. Such comedy of Hegel suggests a tragic side of all mighty ideas.

The "dead dog" has lived again in manifold apparitions. Hegel is dead: long live Hegel!

### 2. The Philosophical Foundation

Marxism is primarily a political doctrine and program, the aims of which are the negation of the historic state and the creation of the stateless society, rather than a science of pure economics or a philosophy of universal history. The Marxian theories of value and of dialectics are two Herculean propellers, as it were, which are to lead the ship of the historic state into the Atlantis of the stateless society.

Marxism is the heir to the German historical philosophy and the English classical economics, a legitimate yet rebellious child of romanticism and rationalism. But unlike the German philosophy, which is concerned with the universal law of evolution, and the English economics, which deals with the general concept of value, Marxism should be understood as a fruitful canon to interpret the class-struggle epoch of history,[4] and a particular view of the process of capitalist production—it is neither a philosophy of universal history nor a pure economic science. For the *forma mentis* of Marx, unlike those of Hegel and Ricardo, are concrete and particular rather than abstract and universal.[5]

Following Hegel, Marx believes that history progresses in a dialectical rhythm through negations and through negations of negations. This evolutionary movement is best described by Marx himself:

> The yes becoming no, the no becoming yes, the yes becoming at once yes and no, the no becoming at once no and yes, the contraries balance themselves, neutralize themselves, paralyze themselves. The fusion of these two contradictory thoughts constitutes a new thought which is the synthesis of the two. This new thought unfolds itself again in two contradictory thoughts which are confounded in their turn in a new synthesis.[6]

Roughly speaking, the main difference between Hegel and Marx is that, whereas the former regards the real world as the reflex of the idea, the latter regards the idea as the reflex of the real world; the dialectic process is the same. Marxian materialism is best stated in the following celebrated passage:

> The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society—the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness.[7]

It must be realized that Marx does not confine historical movement strictly within the realm of cause-effect. His view that history is progressing to a final classless society is thoroughly teleological. Dialectic materialism is not therefore a pure and formal theory of history, but a purposive and vital doctrine profoundly concerned with the meaning of human action and the goal of social evolution. In fine, it is a teleological interpretation of history.

Of the three phases in the dialectics, Marx seems particularly interested in the second, namely, the antithesis. It is the contradiction within any historical situation that is of special significance to Marx. While he does not ignore the first and

[4] The dictum that history is a class-war precludes the consideration of the "primitive communism" and the future "classless society" within the general frame of historical dialectics.

[5] Croce, Benedetto, *Historical Materialism and the Economics of Karl Marx*, Tr. by C. M. Meredith; New York, Macmillan, 1914 (xxiii and 188 pp.); Pages 48-120. Duhring, Eugen, *Kritische Geschichte der Nationalökonomie und der Sozialismus;* Berlin, T. Grieben, 1871 (xii and 591 pp.).

[6] Marx, Karl, *Poverty of Philosophy*, Tr. by H. Quelch; Chicago, C. H. Kerr, 1910 (277 pp.). Page 117.

[7] Marx, Karl, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Tr. by N. I. Stone; Chicago, C. H. Kerr, 1904 (314 pp.). Pages 11-13. Bober, Mandell M., *Karl Marx's Interpretation of History;* Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1927 (x and 370 pp.). Chs. i and ii.

third moments, Marx appears to lay stress upon the antithetical aspect of historical progression. In ancient society it is the conflict between the patrician and the plebeian that is profoundly meaningful to Marx; in mediaeval society, it is the contradiction between the feudal lord and the serf; in modern society, it is the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In occupying himself with the class struggle, Marx turns the theory of dialectics, which in its pure form seems a neutral description of historical progression, into a political doctrine, a doctrine that tends to magnify the importance of the class struggle and serves as a logical foundation of the communist antistate theory and strategy.[8]

### 3. The Economic Foundation

Just as Marxian dialectics is not a philosophy of universal history, Marxian economics is not a pure theory of value; it is a particular interpretation of the process of capitalistic production.

If Marxian dialectics amounts to Hegelian dialectics put "right side up," Marxian economics may be said to be Smithian economics carried to its logical extreme. The point of departure of Marxian economics is the labor theory of value,[9] which is fundamentally a theory of natural right and is interested in what labor ought to get rather than what it actually does get. Whereas Ricardo, "a bourgeois economist," finds it not an unthankful task to rationalize the profit of capital and the rent of land in an abstractly mathematical manner, Marx, "a child of sorrow," is doomed to discern a discrepancy between the wages of labor and the value of its product. And to explain this discrepancy, Marx ingeniously formulates the theory of surplus value, which is the unearned increment drawn by capital from the unpaid surplus product of labor. As labor is the sole source of value, Marx thinks, it should get all its produce. In reserving the surplus value for himself, the capitalist really steals what belongs to labor. Hence the Marxian slogan, "down with capitalism!"

Starting from the theory of value and surplus value, Marx forecasts the polarization of society, with the accumulation of capital on the one hand and with the increase of the industrial reserve army on the other. The further and faster capital accumulates, the larger will be the reserve army, both absolutely and relatively, and the more violently will the resultant social crisis precipitate the downfall of the capitalistic state. The sharpening of the social conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat hastens the dissolution of the existing order and the emergence of a new society that is the antithesis of the present thesis. The basic assumption of this chain of reasoning is the romantic philosophy that history progresses toward a definite goal through negations and through negations of negations.

Ultimately, the Marxian labor theory of value is "a statement of the conditions under which the producer would get his just reward."[10] It is a moral theory, which demands that labor should get what it produces, challenging the capitalist who is the usurper of the surplus value. It is, moreover, based upon the belief that the wealth of the nation should be distributed justly and equitably, and springs from the profound faith in the equality of men and in the right of every man to live and enjoy his life.

### 4. The Historic State

Neither dialectics nor economics, it seems, constitutes the heart of the Marxian system. Marxism is above all a political program that aims at the final liquidation of the historic state and the realization of the stateless society.

In order to convince himself of the inevitability of the stateless society, Marx appeals to the temple of romanticism and the altar of rationalism for a divine or cosmic revelation. After years of devotion, Marx arrives at the conclusion that

[8] Hecker, Julius F., *Moscow Dialogues;* London, Chapman and Hall, 1933 (xvi and 284 pp.). Brameld, Theodore B. H., *A Philosophic Approach to Communism;* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1933 (xi and 242 pp.).

[9] Marx, *Capital,* Tr. by E. Aveling and S. Moore; Chicago, C. H. Kerr, 1907-09 (3 vols.). Vol. I.

[10] Lindsay, *Karl Marx's Capital;* pp. 79-80.

both the natural rhythm of dialectics and the iron law of economics are on his side in his polemic against the great monstrous Leviathan.

Marxian political theory may be divided into three parts: the historic state, the proletarian dictatorship, and the stateless society. The first part deals with the nature of the historic state; the second with the transition from the bourgeois to the proletarian state; and the third with the disappearance or withering away of the state.

Let us now consider, in the first place, the nature of the historic state. Marx declares that the state is "the official form of antagonism (of classes) in civil society." [11] Elaborating this thesis, Engels says that the state is "an organization of the particular class which is *pro tempore* the exploiting class." [12] In ancient times, it is "the state of slave-owning citizens; in middle ages, the feudal lords; and in our own, the bourgeoisie." [13]

Such being the nature of the state, it is obvious that in the primitive or future communistic society, there can be no state. The state comes into being only when society is divided into irreconcilable classes. Engels said: "The state . . . . did not exist from all eternity. There have been societies without it, that had no idea of any state or public power. At a certain stage of economic development, which was of necessity accompanied by a division of society into classes, the state became the inevitable result of this division." [14] In other words, the state is "the product of the irreconcilability of class antagonism."

The function of the state is the creation of order which legalizes and perpetuates the oppression of one class by another. The state is "for the purpose of forcibly keeping the exploited classes in the condition of oppression." [15] As a rule, the powerful economic class becomes also the ruling political class and uses both economic and political means of exploiting and subduing the lower classes. "The antique state was, therefore, the state of the slave owners for the purpose of holding the slaves in check. The feudal state was the organ of the nobility for the oppression of the serfs and dependent farmers. The modern representative state is the tool of the capitalistic exploiters of wage labor." [16] In the *Communist Manifesto,* Marx and Engels declared that the modern state is "but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie." In any state, therefore, the class that is economically dominant is also politically powerful and in general controls the government.

It has often been contended that the state is for the promotion of the general welfare of its citizens, or that it represents a community, rather than a conflict, of interests. But this view is implicitly rejected by Marx and Engels in their definition of the state as the official form of class antagonisms. Engels does not deny that there may be some primitive state in which classes are not sharply differentiated and hence not very hostile to each other, and in which the general welfare of its citizens may be promoted by the government.[17] History shows, according to the communist, that the greater the antagonism between the classes and the greater the conflict of interests between them, the more the state becomes an instrument of the dominant class and suppresses the exploited classes.

It has often been argued that the state represents a power that balances the interests between the struggling classes. Engels admits that at certain periods the state may pose as a mediator between different social groups. Thus the absolute monarchy balanced the nobles and the burghers against one another; the Second Empire played the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and *vice versa;* but in general, the communist maintains, the state is par-

[11] Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy,* p. 190.
[12] Engels, Friedrich, *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific,* Tr. by E. Aveling; Chicago, C. H. Kerr, 1908 (139 pp.). Page 127.
[13] *Ibid.,* p. 128.
[14] Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State,* Tr. by E. Unterman; Chicago, C. H. Kerr, 1902 (217 pp.). Page 211.
[15] Engels, *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific;* p. 127.
[16] Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State;* p. 209.
[17] Engels, F., *Landmarks of Scientific Socialism,* Tr. by Austin Lewis; Chicago, C. H. Kerr, 1907 (266 pp.). Page 207.

tisan and represents the interest of the economically powerful class.[18]

For the successful execution of its function, the state needs a military force and an efficient bureaucracy. When social conflict becomes acute, military force should be strong and bureaucracy authoritative in order to maintain the *status quo.* In its military aspect, the state appears to be the "concentrated and organized force of society," [19] or the "special repressive force," [20] or "the organization of violence for the purpose of holding down some class." And this organized force becomes stronger and stronger as class struggles become more violent. A conspicuous example is modern Europe, where the class struggles and wars of conquest have nursed the public power to such a size that it threatens to swallow the whole society and the state itself.[21] In its bureaucratic aspect, the state becomes exalted above society, a power divorced from society, an authority sacred and inviolable. The bureaucracy exercises various powers, such as taxation and police, which interfere daily with the ordinary life of the people. When class struggles are more serious, the bureaucracy assumes greater arbitrary authority in order to suppress the lower classes. Thus the stronger the military force and the greater the bureaucratic authority, the more oppressive the state.[22]

This Marxian conception of the state dismisses the fiction of the Hegelian divine idea. Engels says: "The state, then, is by no means a power forced on society from outside; neither is it the 'realization of the ethical idea,' 'the image and the realization of reason' as Hegel maintains." [23] Marxism is a realistic attempt to analyze the nature of the historic state in the light of class relations and compositions, and for this reason may be called a sociological theory of the state.[24]

[18] Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State;* p. 209.
[19] Marx, *Capital;* I, 822.
[20] Engels, *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific;* p. 128.
[21] Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State;* p. 207.
[22] Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses;* pp. 132-33.
[23] Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State;* p. 206.
[24] Gumplowics, *Outlines of Sociology;* p. 118 ff. Oppenheimer, *The State;* pp. 1-15.

### 5. The Proletarian State

We shall now concern ourselves with the transformation of the bourgeois state into the proletarian. It is this thesis that distinguishes the communist political theory from the anarchist.[25] The communist believes that the abolition of the bourgeois state and the establishment of the proletarian are necessary, yea, inevitable, steps in the evolution of the modern state, while Proudhon, the anarchist, is equally convinced that "the first act of social revolution shall be the abolition of all authority." [26] The anarchist opposes the dictatorship of the proletariat no less than that of the bourgeoisie.

In the modern world there are two types of state, bourgeois and proletarian, according to the communist. A state dictated by the bourgeoisie is a bourgeois state, whether it is monarchical or republican in its form of government; while a state dictated by the proletariat is a proletarian state. Each is a state because it is an official form of class antagonism, an organ of oppression of one class by another.

The avowed object of communism, in its destructive aspect, is the violent overthrow of the bourgeois state. In the *Communist Manifesto,* Marx declares:

> The communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a communistic revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win.

Both Marx and Engels think that, in order to destroy the bourgeois state and to establish the proletarian, force is necessary. Says Marx: "Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one." [27] Again he says: "It is to force that in due time the workers will have to appeal if the dominion of labor is at long last to be established." [28] Engels

[25] Stekloff, G. M., *History of the First International,* Tr. by E. and C. Paul; New York, International Publishers, 1928 (vi and 463 pp.).
[26] Engels, Über das Autoritatsprinzip. *Neue Zeit.* (1913-14) 32:39.
[27] Marx, *Capital;* I, 824.
[28] Quoted in Stekloff, *History of the First International;* p. 20.

thinks that, when the suppressed proletariat is finally driven into a revolution, the communists shall defend the cause of the proletariat with their deeds as well as with their words. They do not believe that peaceful methods, such as universal suffrage and direct legislation, will be effective in overthrowing the bourgeois state.

The necessity and inevitability of such a revolution is dialectically inherent in the process of capitalist production. This is due to the antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, to the "antagonism between the organization of production in the individual workshop and the anarchy of production in society generally," [29] which antagonism will necessarily force the existing social relations to break down. Therefore, the communist believes that the bourgeoisie produces its own grave-diggers, that is, the proletarians, who will meet the organized violence of the bourgeoisie with an equally organized violence and will eventually overthrow the existing order. The *Communist Manifesto* says: "The development of modern industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable."

On the constructive side, communism aims at the establishment of the proletarian state, which marks the transitional stage between the capitalistic and the communistic systems of society. This new state "can be nothing else but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat." [30] The purpose of this dictatorship is to establish socialism, to put an end to the division of society into classes, to make all members of society workers, to make the exploitation of one human being by another forever impossible.

[29] Engels, *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific;* p. 110.

[30] Marx, K., *Criticism of the Gotham Program,* Tr. by D. De Leon; New York, Socialist Labor Party, 1922 (64 pp.). Page 48.

### 6. The Stateless Society

The third part of the Marxian political theory deals with the withering away of the state. During the transitional stage of the proletarian dictatorship, there is "the highest intensification of the principle of the state," [31] for the sake of suppressing the remnant bourgeoisie and controlling socialized production and distribution; but when "the higher phase of communism" is reached, that is, when class antagonism disappears altogether, the state as an organ of oppression has no longer any *raison d'être* and will naturally "wither away." This third thesis is a logical inference of the first and the second discussed above.[32]

The withering away of the proletarian state is most brilliantly described by Engels, who envisages the entire process of the emergence of the stateless society.

> . . . . *The proletarian seizes political power and turns the means of production into state property.*
>
> But in doing this, it abolishes itself as proletariat, abolishes all class antagonisms, abolishes also the state as state. . . . . The first act by virtue of which the state really constitutes itself the representative of the whole of society—the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society—this is, at the same time, its last independent act as a state. *State interference in social relations becomes, in one domain after another, superfluous,* and then withers away of itself; the government of persons is replaced by the administration of things, and by the conduct of the processes of production. The state is not *"abolished." It withers away.*[33]

The most important characteristic of the stateless society is the absence of class distinctions. As the state is the official form of class antagonism, naturally it ceases to exist when class differences disappear. The next important characteristic is the absence of coercion. The communist maintains that the coercive force of the historic state is for the purpose of protecting the rich against the poor and that,

[31] This is a remark of Leon Trotsky, quoted by H. J. Laski, *Communism;* London, Williams and Norgate, 1927 (256 pp.). Page 157.

[32] Chang, Sherman H. M., *The Marxian Theory of the State;* Philadelphia, 1931 (xv and 230 pp.). Pages 125-39.

[33] Engels, *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific;* pp. 127-29. Italics his.

consequently, with the disappearance of class distinctions, the coercive force will gradually become unnecessary. The stateless society is then an equalitarian society in which there is no organization of force.

Instead of the political association, there will be economic organizations in which the people will voluntarily cooperate in production and will share the goods and services of the community equally. Instead of political control of man by man, there will be scientific administration of things, simplification of public affairs, rationalization of public functions. Furthermore, there will be an abundance of wealth, which will make the anarchist formula, "from each according to his ability and to each according to his need," a social fact.

The communist theory of the state stresses the principle of equality and considers that freedom can be realized only when there is complete equality. The communist argues that there is no freedom in the bourgeois state, in the modern democratic state. Says Lenin: "Freedom in capitalist society always remains more or less the same as it was in the ancient Greek republics, that is, freedom for the slave owners." [34] Only when class differences are completely abolished, can one speak of freedom. It is well to remember the dictum of Rousseau to the effect that without equality—in property and in rank—there will be no liberty. Here one finds a common ground for Rousseauism and Marxism. In a real sense, Marxism is a further development of the political theory of Rousseau.[35]

When the final stage is realized, the machinery of the state will be transferred "into the museum of antiquities by the side of the spinning wheel and the bronze axe." [36] When the final state is realized, "then for the first time, man, in a certain sense, is finally marked off from the rest of the animal kingdom, and emerges from mere animal conditions of existence into really human ones. . . . . Only from that time will man himself, more and more consciously, make his own history. . . . . It is the ascent of man from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom." [37]

### 7. Lenin's Contributions to the Communist Theory of the State

Leninism has been aptly defined as "Marxism in the epoch of imperialism and of the proletarian revolution." It is "the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution in general, the theory and tactics of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular." [38] After Marx and Engels, Lenin is probably the greatest theoretician of communism. We shall deal briefly with what is distinctive and new in the works of Lenin, which he contributed to the general communist theory of the state.

The philosophic and economic bases of Leninism are essentially Marxian. In his *Materialism and Empirico-Criticism,* Lenin enters into a militant polemic against attempts at philosophic revisions of Marxism and elaborates the theory of dialectic materialism in its relation to other philosophical systems.[39] And in his *Imperialism,* Lenin uses the Marxian method to analyze the contradictions between labor and capital, between the various financial groups and the imperialist powers, and between the oppressor nations and the oppressed peoples.[40] Both in philosophy and in economics, Lenin proves himself a most worthy and brilliant successor of Marx and Engels.

In the theory of the state, Lenin has made even more important contributions than in philosophy and economics. In his *State and Revolution,* not only does he put the political ideas of Marx and Engels, scattered in their writings, into a coherent system, but also develops fully the theory of the proletarian revolution with a view to its practical application.[41] To under-

[34] Lenin, V. I., *The State and Revolution;* New York, International Publishers, 1933. Page 92.
[35] Lindsay, "Marx and Rousseau," *Karl Marx's Capital.*
[36] Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State;* p. 212.
[37] Engels, *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific;* p. 135.
[38] Stalin, Joseph, *Leninism;* New York, International Publishers, 1933 (2 vols.). I, 14.
[39] Lenin. *Materialism and Empirico-Criticism. Collected Works;* Vol. XIII, New York, International Publishers, 1927.
[40] Lenin, *Imperialism, The Highest State of Capitalism;* New York, International Publishers, 1933 (127 pp.).
[41] Lenin, *The State and Revolution.*

stand Lenin's contributions, it is necessary to bear in mind the historical situations out of which Leninism arose. According to Stalin, Leninism originated when the proletarian revolution had become an immediate question owing to the sharpening of imperialist contradictions, and because it was necessary to refute the opportunism and chauvinism of the leaders of the Second International.[42] Lenin formulated his theories in response to these new social factors with which Marx and Engels were not confronted.

Lenin is first of all opposed to the theory of social revolution as advocated by the Second International, the theory of "productive forces" and the theory of "spontaneity," the theory that denies the conscious leadership and revolutionary character of the proletarian movement, the theory that "justifies everything and conciliates everybody," the theory that turns dialectic materialism, which is a philosophy of transforming the world no less than explaining it, into a mechanistic and fatalistic world-outlook. Rejecting the "opportunistic and chauvinistic" theory of the Second International, Lenin advocates the staging of the proletarian revolution, the conscious and deliberate changing of the world. Through an economic analysis of the world situation, Lenin concludes that "imperialism is the eve of the social revolution," and urges immediate action.[43] This is the first contribution of Leninism.

As to the question, where the proletarian revolution will begin, the reply used to be "where industry is more developed, where the proletariat forms the majority, where culture is more advanced, where there is more democracy."[44] But Lenin's answer is different. He thinks that the proletarian revolution does not necessarily begin where industry is more developed, and so forth; rather that the revolution will burst out where "the chain of imperialism is weakest." For the proletarian revolution is the result of the breaking of the chain of the imperialist world front at its weakest link. In 1917, the chain was weaker in Russia than in the other countries, and hence the revolution burst out there. The proletarian revolution does not have to wait for the development of industry and democracy. This is the second important contribution of Leninism. The theoretician of the Second International believes that there is a great chasm, a veritable Chinese wall, between the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the proletarian revolution, but Lenin thinks that the proletariat must carry out to the end the democratic revolution and must also accomplish the social revolution, these two revolutions being two links of the same chain.[45] The Russian revolution, according to the Leninist, shows how the bourgeois revolution grew into the proletarian without interruption.

The third distinctive feature of Leninism is the theory of the proletarian dictatorship. Marx speaks of the transitional socialist state as "nothing else but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat."[46] He says that "the proletarian movement is the conscious movement of the immense majority in the interest of the immense majority,"[47] and seems to suggest that the dictatorship of the proletariat consists in the fact that the majority governs by rules of its own, designed for its own requirement, and in defiance of the desires of the minority aggressively hostile to it.[48] On the other hand, Lenin thinks that the communist party, the vanguard of the toilers, the class-conscious section of the proletariat, is to assume the responsibility in training the masses. The dictatorship of the proletariat is then the dictatorship of the communist party, which includes in its ranks the most class-conscious and devoted workers and leaders.[49] Lenin defines the dictatorship of the proletariat as a state "that is democratic in a new

[42] Stalin, *Leninism;* I, 14-15.
[43] Lenin, *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism.*
[44] Stalin, *Leninism;* I, 33.
[45] Lenin, *Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Bourgeois-Democratic Revolution;* New York, International Publishers, 1933. Ch. xii.
[46] Marx, *Criticism of the Gotham Program;* p. 48.
[47] Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto.*
[48] Hillquit, Morris, *From Marx to Lenin;* New York, Hanford Press, 1921 (151 pp.). Pages 132-33. Coker, *Recent Political Thought,* pp. 174-75.
[49] Lenin, *Soviet at Work;* New York, Rand School of Social Science, 1919 (48 pp.). Trotsky, Leon, *Défense du terrorisme;* Paris, Editions de le Nouvelle revue critique, 1936 (189 pp.).

way—for the proletariat and the poor in general—and dictatorial in a new way—against the bourgeoisie." [50] In another place, he says, it is "a state not in the ordinary sense of the word," but a dictatorship, resting "not on the law, not on the formal will of the majority, but on direct and open force." [51] In other words, the dictatorship of the proletariat is the dictatorship of the communist party, consisting of the most class-conscious proletarians rather than of "the immense majority," a dictatorship untrammeled by law and based upon violence and on behalf of the toiling and exploited masses.[52]

Finally, another new feature of the Leninist theory of the state may be mentioned. It is that the soviet power is the state form of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Marx, mindful that the transitional socialist state is a rule by the general body of manual laborers, does not suggest the soviet form of government. The soviet system is a distinctive development in Russia. According to Lenin, "the republics of soviets of workers', soldiers' and peasants' deputies is not only the form of higher type of democratic institution . . . . but is also the only form capable of ensuring the least painful transition to socialism." [53] The Leninist thinks that the soviet power is a new form of state organization different from the old bourgeois-democratic and parliamentary form, a new type of state adapted, not to the task of exploiting and oppressing the toiling masses, but to the task of emancipating them from all exploitation and oppression.

These are a few distinctive contributions of Lenin to the general communist theory of the state. They are concerned with the transitional socialist state. Lenin accepts the Marxian concept of the historic state and the Marxian ideal of the stateless society. It is primarily to the ways and means whereby the historic state may wither away that Leninism devotes itself. The new theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution and dictatorship grew out of the new international situations in general and out of the Russian political conditions in particular.

### 8. Trotsky's Contributions to the Communist Theory of the State

If Leninism is a refutation of the "opportunism and chauvinism" of the Second International, Trotskyism may be considered as a rejection of the "defeatism" of the Third International.[54] If Lenin and Kautsky were two great personalities in the polemics over the tactics of communism in the beginning of the present century, Trotsky and Stalin are two symbols of the struggle between the October revolution and the Thermidorean reaction.[55] Just as Lenin denounces the "super-imperialism" of the leaders of socialism, Trotsky condemns the absolutism and despotism of the official bolshevik party.

To Lenin, the Second International errs in separating the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the proletarian revolution by a great chasm; to Trotsky, the Third International ceases to be Marxian in separating mechanically the proletarian revolution in one country and the world revolution. Consequently, Lenin established the Third International for the purpose of carrying out the democratic and the proletarian revolution simultaneously, and Trotsky organized the Fourth International in order to transform the revolution in one country into a world revolution. Marxism, Trotsky argues, is essentially international in character, and aims at the complete liquidation of all class society and at the establishment of a world-wide stateless community. It does not stop with the proletarian revolution of one country; it is a theory of the permanent revolution—permanent, until

[50] Lenin, *The State and Revolution;* p. 177.

[51] Lenin, *The Revolution of 1917. Collected Works;* Vol. XX, New York, International Publishers, 1927. Pages 124, 203, 225, 230, and 281.

[52] Stalin, *Leninism;* I, 46. Luxemburg, Rosa, *Die russische Revolution;* Berlin, Gesselschaft und Erziehung, 1922 (v and 120 pp.). In this book, the authoress criticizes the Leninist narrow interpretation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. She holds that the dictatorship should be of the proletarian class, not of a party or faction within it.

[53] Stalin, *Leninism;* I, 51. Coker, *Recent Political Thought;* pp. 171 and 175.

[54] Trotsky, *L'internationale communiste après Lenine, le grand organisateur de la défaite;* Paris, Editions Rieder, 1930 (438 pp.).

[55] Stolberg, Benjamin, October into Thermidor. *The Nation* (1937)114:15.

the entire world becomes a classless and stateless community. Therefore, Trotskyism may be called Marxism of the permanent revolution.

The source of the "permanent" theory is to be found in the *Address to the Communist League* (1850) by Marx who says:

> While the democratic petty bourgeois wish to bring the revolution to a conclusion as quickly as possible . . . . it is our interest and task to make the revolution permanent, until all more or less possessing classes have been displaced from domination, until the proletariat has conquered state power and the association of proletarians, not only in one country, but in all the dominant countries of the world, has advanced so far that the competition among the proletarians of these countries has ceased and that at least the decisive productive forces are concentrated in the hands of the proletarians.[56]

It is primarily from this source that Trotsky develops his theory of the permanent revolution.

There are three aspects of the theory of the permanent revolution as formulated by Trotsky. "First, it embraces the problem of the transition of the democratic revolution into the proletarian." There is no interruption between the democratic revolution and the proletarian, the former growing into the latter. The second aspect of the theory "characterizes the proletarian revolution as such." The process is political in character, developing through collisions of various groups of society in transformation, through revolutions in economy, technique, science, morals and usages. The third aspect of the theory is the international character of the proletarian revolution. The proletarian revolution begins on national grounds, but it cannot be completed on these grounds. The maintenance of the proletarian revolution within a national framework can only be a provisional state of affairs. Remaining isolated, a proletarian state must finally become a victim of "internal and external contradictions." "The way out for it lies only in the victory of the proletariat of the advanced countries. Viewed from this standpoint a national revolution is not a self-sufficient whole; it is only a link in the international chain." The ultimate goal of the permanent revolution is the establishment of a world brotherhood of classless and stateless societies through a world revolution.[57]

The Third International, Trotsky says, "was born of an indignant protest against social patriotism." It was established with the avowed objective of setting up an international society of classless and stateless societies.[58] But since Lenin died, Trotsky contends, the International has given up its objective and committed itself to the theory of socialism in a single country.[59] Stalin has frequently denied that he has plans or intentions in regard to world revolution. "The idea of exporting a revolution is nonsense," says the Russian dictator. "Every country if it wants one will produce its own revolution, and if it doesn't, there will be no revolution."[60] It appears therefore that the Third International has retreated from its former international front.

The primary cause of this retreat, according to Trotsky, is that the ruling class in Russia has become a privileged minority, an almighty bureaucratic and military group, a powerful caste of specialists in distribution, and has found it necessary to defend its own existence against the poverty-stricken majority as well as against the danger of invasion from without.[61] The ruling class consists of the bureaucratic and military officials, who constitute what Lenin calls "a parasite on the body of bourgeois society." It is this class of people that have maintained the machinery of the state for the sake of oppressing and exploiting the majority. In his *Opposition Platform,* Trotsky says: "We have a worker's state with bureaucratic distortions, the swollen

[56] Stalin, *Leninism;* I, 38.

[57] Trotsky, L., *The Permanent Revolution,* Tr. by Max Schachtman; New York, Pioneer Publishers, 1931 (xlviii and 157 pp.).

[58] The Third International, *Theses and Statutes Adopted by the Second Congress, 1920;* Moscow, Publishing Office of the Communist International, 1920. *Theses and Resolutions Adopted at the Third World Congress, 1921;* New York, Contemporary Publishing Association, 1921.

[59] Trotsky, *L'internationale communiste après Lenine.*

[60] Trotsky, Leon, *The Revolution Betrayed,* Tr. by Max Eastman; New York, Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1937 (vii and 308 pp.). Page 202.

[61] *Ibid.,* pp. 53-60, 115-23.

and privileged administrative apparatus devours a very considerable part of our surplus value." [62] In other words, what prior to the revolution constituted the profits of the capitalists is now being paid in salaries to a privileged bureaucracy. And this is the reason, Trotsky argues, that at the end of its second decade of existence the soviet state, "has not only not died away, but not begun to die away." [63] "The soviet state is prevented not only from dying away, but even from freeing itself of the bureaucratic parasite." [64] It cannot begin to wither away, so long as "the plenipotentiaries of the working class" remain bureaucratized and the bureaucracy remains above the new society.

The aforesaid is a brief statement of the contributions of Trotsky to the communist political theory. Trotskyism, as a recent development of Marxism, is an answer to the "decadence" of the Third International, just as Leninism is a reaction to the "opportunism and chauvinism" of the Second International. Both Trotsky and Lenin accept the Marxian concept of the historic state and the Marxian ideal of the stateless society; their contributions are related to revolutionary strategies and tactics by which the stateless society may become an historical reality.

[62] Nomad, Max, *Rebels and Renegades;* New York, Macmillan, 1932 (vii and 420 pp.). Page 239.
[63] Trotsky, *The Revolution Betrayed;* p. 51.
[64] *Ibid.,* p. 55.

### 9. Summary

We may now summarize this chapter as follows:

1. Marxism is primarily a political program, the aims of which are the destruction of the historic state and the establishment of the stateless society.

2. The philosophical foundation of Marxism is dialectic materialism, which is a Marxian method, not only of explaining, but also of transforming, the world.

3. The economic foundation of Marxism is the labor theory of value, from which is deduced the theory of surplus value. Marxian economics is less a pure scientific theory of what is, than a moral theory of what ought to be.

4. The historic state is the official form of class antagonisms.

5. The proletarian state is the transitional stage between the bourgeois regime and the stateless society, and is to be brought about by violent revolution.

6. The proletarian state will gradually wither away, and will become a classless and stateless society, in which the government of men will be replaced by the administration of things.

7. Leninism is Marxism in the epoch of imperialism. Lenin develops the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution.

8. Trotskyism is Marxism of the permanent revolution, the aim of which is to establish a world-wide society of stateless and classless societies.

# Chapter VI

# The Anarchist Theory of the State

## 1. The Philosophical Foundation

Communism and anarchism arose simultaneously in the middle of the nineteenth century. Marx was the founder of the communist discipline; Proudhon was the progenitor of the anarchist system. Proudhon was not only the first man to call himself an anarchist,[1] but also the first thinker to formulate the fundamental principles of modern anarchism, upon which the theories of other great anarchists, such as Bakunin, Kropotkin, and, to a less extent, Tolstoi, were based. This is why Bakunin called Proudhon "the great master of us all," and Kropotkin named him the real father of modern anarchism. Accordingly we shall first enter into an analysis of the anarchism of Proudhon and then make a brief survey of the contributions of Bakunin, Kropotkin, and Tolstoi to the development of the anarchistic system.

The sources of Proudhonism are three in number: the Bible, Adam Smith, and Hegel.[2] Mainly through Karl Marx, Proudhon learned Hegelian dialectics which to a great extent governed the form or style of his thinking. Before Hegel gave the form, however, Smith had already determined the main substance. The labor theory of value was as completely accepted by Proudhon as by its own author. Proudhonism, like Marxism, was thus a legitimate, though rebellious, son of the Hegelian philosophy of history and the classical economic theory, the romantic and the rational modes of thought of his age.

Proudhonism, like Marxism again, is primarily a political program rather than a philosophical or economic theory. It is a virtual war declared against the historic state, the dialectics and economics being serviceable intellectual weapons. The ultimate goal of the anarchist is the realization of the principle of justice, which, according to Proudhon, is best embodied in the following famous adage of the Bible: "Do unto others as you would they do unto you."

As early as 1841 Proudhon almost spontaneously employed a dialectical method in his *Memoires* on property. In 1843 Proudhon formulated the law of series against the law of syllogism and Bacon's law of inductions.[3] A series contains at least two unities, a thesis and an antithesis, a coming and a going, the opposites, the extremes, the polarity, the equilibrium, the good and the evil, the yes and the no, the me and the non-me.[4] The relations of the unities constitute the series, or the synthesis. When in 1844 he learned Hegelianism, he became convinced that historical progression, of all orders, in all lands and ages, follows strictly a dialectical law.

In his *Système des contradictions économique,* Proudhon attempts to establish a system of economic categories by means of the dialectical method. Methodically and almost rhythmically he traces ten phases of economic evolution and shows the contradiction in each of them, its credit and debit. In his opinion, society seeks in formula after formula, in institution after institution, that equilibrium which always escapes it. It is the high ambition of Proudhon to discover a syn-

[1] Proudhon, Pierre Joseph, *What Is Property?,* Tr. by Benjamin Tucker; Philadelphia, 1888 (xli and 457 pp.). Page 272: "I am, in the full sense of the word, an anarchist."

[2] *Ibid.,* p. xxi.

[3] Diehl, Karl, *P. J. Proudhon, seine Lehre und seine Leben;* Jena, G. Fischer, 1888-96 (3 vols.), Pages 155-56.

[4] Proudhon, P. J., *De la création de l'ordre dans l'humanité. Oeuvres Complètes;* Vol. III, Bruxelles, 1868-76. Page 94.

thetic union of economic and social antitheses, or to use his own words, "a scientific, legal, immortal and inseparable combination." While recognizing the contradictory forces in society, Proudhon seems primarily interested in its harmonious development. He is concerned less with the mutual annihilation of the antitheses than with the maintenance of an equilibrium between them. His position is most clearly stated in the following sentence:

> I believe that I am the first person possessed of a full knowledge of the phenomena in question who has dared to uphold the doctrine that instead of restraining economic forces whose strength has been so much exaggerated we ought to try to balance them against one another in accordance with the little known and less perfectly understood principle that contraries, far from being mutually destructive, support one another just because of the contrary nature.[5]

That society is founded upon antitheses, Proudhon repeatedly affirms, but the solution of social problems, he emphasizes, lies in synthesis. He is in search of a method by which the contradictory forces within society will balance themselves. He thinks that the antimonial terms in society do not cancel each other; that they are procreative causes of motion, life, and progress. The problem is to discover an equilibrium between them.[6]

It must be added that Proudhon does not think that there will be a permanent or eternal equilibrium. To him, progress is the law of humanity. There are no absolute or fixed laws except the law of movement. The universe is perpetually changing, even as society. Every age has its contradictions and has to seek for its own equilibrium. There is no static state. The equilibrium is constantly moving and varying with the progress of mankind.[7] This idea of perpetual movement is best expressed by Proudhon in his letter to Romain Cornut in 1853.

> Rien ne subsiste, disaient les anciens sages. Tout change, tout coule, tout devient; par conséquent tout s'enchaîne, par conséquent encore, tout est opposition, balancement, équilibre, dans l'univers. It n'y a rien, ni en dehors, ni en dedans de cette danse éternelle; et le rythme qui la commande, forme pure des existences, idée suprême à lacquelle aucune réalité ne saurait répondre, est la conception la plus haute à lacquelle puisse atteindre la raison.[8]

This supreme conception of change constitutes a basic assumption of Proudhonian political theory.

The dialectic doctrine, in our study of anarchism, has at least three important implications. We note first that Proudhon in his *Memoires* suggests that property and communism are two mutually-denying terms, antitheses, which should be synthesized in anarchy. Hence anarchy is a condition of equilibrium in which *laissez-faire* individualism and authoritarian and centralistic communism are harmonized. Another application, related to the first, is the balance between freedom and order. Freedom is realized by revolution, and order by government. By its nature, Proudhon argues, government cannot be revolutionary; it is instituted to keep the world in discipline and order. But the people can revolutionize itself and express its free will in a rational manner. The highest consummation of society is found in the union of order and freedom. In the third place, we observe that consistent with his emphasis upon the synthetic, rather than the antithetic, aspect of dialectics, Proudhon seeks to realize the utopia of positive anarchy by peaceful and gradual methods, rather than by violent means. This point of the relationship between his dialectics and politics is all the more important because it has been almost uniformly neglected by political historians. It seems that the chief difference between Marxian and Proudhonian dialectics is that the former stresses the contradiction between antitheses while the latter stresses the equilibrium between them. The dialectics of Marx leads logically to the politics of class struggle, to the belief that "a society founded upon class oppositions should culminate in crass contradiction, in a collision of man with man, as ultimate out-

[5] Proudhon, P. J., *De la justice dans la révolution et dans l'église. Oeuvres Complètes;* Vols. XXI-XXVI, Bruxelles, 1868-76. I:294.
[6] Proudhon, *Justice;* I:364-365.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 51.
[8] Proudhon, P. J., *Philosophie du progrès. Oeuvres Complètes;* Vol. XX, Bruxelles, 1868-76. Page 14.

come." [9] The dialectics of Proudhon is in harmony with the politics of federalism, of reciprocity and mutuality.

### 2. The Economic Foundation

Proudhon has been accused by Marx as regarding real history as the succession of ideas, categories, and principles and undermining the material force. While it is true that Proudhon sometimes maintains that progress is the movement of ideas, it is also undeniable that he believes that the economic laws are the laws of history. The *Memoires* on property show that the economic life of the people is the basic fact in social evolution.[10]

Furthermore, Proudhon sees clearly the difference between political illusions and economic realities. "Over and above the political phantoms which captivate our imagination, there are the phenomena of social economics which, by their harmony or discord, produce the good or the evil in society." [11] Throughout his works Proudhon constantly emphasizes the primary importance of economics. In fact, he thinks that the disappearance of the historic state depends upon the economic reorganization of society.

The alpha and omega of the economics of Proudhon is the labor theory of value. Faithful disciple of Adam Smith, Proudhon accepts the theory that labor is the source and measure of value; but being more rigidly logical than his master, he comes to the fateful consequence that labor is entitled to its entire produce. In this both the communist and the anarchist are in general agreement.[12]

Perceiving the discrepancy between the wage of labor and the value of its product, Marx formulates the theory of surplus value. The explanation of profit, according to Proudhon, is slightly different. He says that there is a continual miscalculation between master and men. The master pays each worker daily wages but reserves for himself the product which results from the collective force of all.[13] This is a fundamental idea of Proudhonian economics, which has been rather overlooked by historians of economics.[14] It is due to this miscalculation between master and men that capital is able to usurp the resultant product of the collective work and labor unknowingly is robbed of its proper share.

Proudhon considers labor as productive and capital as unproductive. According to him, society is built up in the following way. All the raw material required is gratuitously supplied by nature, so that in the economic world every product is really begot of labor and capital must be considered as unproductive.[15] Under the influence of the division of labor property has become a link in the chain of circulation, and the proprietor himself "a kind of toll-gatherer who demands a toll from every commodity that passes his way." [16] Therefore, property is really theft. Just as Marx formulates the theory of surplus value for the sake of protesting against the bourgeois class, so Proudhon creates the slogan that property is theft in order to denounce the proprietor. Both start with Adam Smith, and, through different paths, arrive at the rejection of the capitalistic order.

It is important to know exactly the meaning of the word "property." Property is defined by Proudhon as "the right to enjoy the fruits of industry, or of the labor of others, or to dispose of those fruits to others by will." [17] It is attacked because it gives its owner the right to an income for which he has not worked. "It is not property as such, but the right to escheat, that forms the butt of Proudhon's attack." [18] In his opinion, not all property,

[9] Ruhle, Otto, *Karl Marx, His Life and Work*, Tr. by E. and C. Paul; New York, Cornwall Press, 1928 (419 pp.). Page 116.

[10] Bouglé, C., *La Sociologie de Proudhon;* Paris, A. Colin, 1911 (xviii and 333 pp.). Pages 66-70.

[11] Proudhon, P. J., *Idée générale de la révolution au XIXème siècle, Oeuvres Complètes;* Vol. X, Bruxelles, 1868-76. Page 42.

[12] I am not unaware of the differences between Smith, Marx, and Proudhon as to their ideas of the duration, quality, and value of labor but it is not here convenient to explicate these differences.

[13] Proudhon, *Qu'est-ce que la propriété? Oeuvres Complètes;* Vol. I, Bruxelles, 1868-76. Page 94.

[14] Saint-Beuve, Charles A., *P. J. Proudhon, sa vie et sa correspondance;* Paris, Michel Levy frères, 1872 (352 pp.). Page 90.

[15] Proudhon, *Qu'est-ce que la propriété?;* pp. 131-32.

[16] Proudhon, P. J., *Banque du peuple. Oeuvres Complètes;* Vol. VI, Bruxelles, 1868-76.

[17] Proudhon, *Qu'est-ce que la propriété?;* p. 133.

[18] Gide, Charles, and Rist, Charles, *Histoire des doctrines économiques;* Paris, Recueil Sirey, 1926 (xiv and 814 pp.). Pages 340-51.

but only that which is unearned, is theft. In fact, all property that comes from labor is far from being robbery. Such property is liberty, says Proudhon.

It remains to reiterate the dialectical terms which lead directly to anarchism. The first term in social development is communism, the thesis; the contradictory term is property, the antithesis. The third term, the synthesis, which Proudhon sets himself to discover, is possession pure and simple, which is the right of property with no claim to unearned income. His idea is as follows: Get rid of property, but retain the right of possession, and this very simple change of principle will result in an alteration of the laws, the method of government, and the character of a nation's economic institutions.[19]

### 3. The Historic State

As indicated above, Proudhonism is primarily a political program: its dialectics governs the form of political rationalization and its economics determines the nature of political activity. The main objective of Proudhonism is the final negation of the historic state. Assuming the dialectical form of social progress, Proudhon believes anarchy to be the most complete synthesis of political contradictions; and upon the labor theory of value, he proposes to reorganize the economic life of society in such a manner that the historic state will naturally "fall of itself by its very uselessness." [20]

The political theory of Proudhon may be conveniently divided into three parts: the nature of the historic state, the dissolution of the state and the establishment of the positive anarchy. This section will deal with the nature of the historic state. The next section will discuss the process or method whereby the historic state may be dissolved or disintegrated. The section after the next will be devoted to the principles of the positive anarchy.

Proudhon's idea of the state may be expressed as follows: The state is the involuntary and hierarchical organization of society. It is based upon the principles of inequality and slavery, whether monarchical, aristocratic, or democratic in form. It is an instrument of tyranny, sanctioned by law, maintained by force, financed by taxes, and managed by bureaucracy.

Anarchy is the direct antithesis to hierarchy; it rejects the state absolutely, without any qualifications.[21]

Historically, Proudhon asserts, society has passed through three stages. The first period was that of equality, in which men were equal, socially and economically. There was no private property and there were no distinctions in rank. Men were all independent producers. Then came the period of military conquest, when the strong became the masters and the weak were taken prisoners of war and made slaves or serfs. This was the beginning of the historic state, in which the people were divided into two classes: the master class composed of nobles and priests, who were skillful in war and devoted to the altar; and the slave class, who were concerned with producing goods and rendering services for their masters. The third period was that of economic exploitation, in which the bourgeois class arose. This class grew so strong that eventually it displaced the master class and became the dominant power in the state. Just as the older state was divided into the master and slave classes, so the newer state was divided into the bourgeois and proletarian classes.[22] The evolution of the state shows that the state is based upon the distinction of castes,[23] and the subordination of the masses to the privileged classes.[24] The political order is nothing more than the inheritance of the dominant groups. The state is useful only to the hierarchy, the nobles, the clergy, the prince, and the bourgeoisie. In other words, the historic state is a class state. By its nature, the state cannot create a

[19] Proudhon, P. J., *L'Organization du crédit et de la circulation. Oeuvres Complètes;* Vol. VI, Bruxelles, 1868-76. Page 131. *Qu'est-ce que la propriété?* p. 202.

[20] Proudhon, P. J., *Les confessions d'un révolutionaire. Oeuvres Complètes;* Vol. IX, Bruxelles, 1868-76.

[21] Eltzbacher, Paul, *Anarchism,* Tr. by S. T. Byington; New York, B. R. Tucker, 1908 (xxi and 309 pp.). Page 72.

[22] Proudhon, *Justice;* VI, 87-89.

[23] *Ibid.,* I, 64-65.

[24] *Ibid.,* II, 23.

social unity; it divides society into two hostile camps, the strong versus the weak, the rich versus the poor.[25]

Structurally the state may be monarchical, aristocratic, or democratic. From the functional point of view, it may appear now as might, then as law, again as eminent domain, or as bureaucracy. Proudhonism opposes the state in all its forms and functions. Monarchy is the reign of one over all. Its social basis is the caste system. It is the enemy of progress and of mankind; it is arbitrary and illegitimate. Next, aristocracy, whether of talents or fortunes, is a regime of the few over the many. The history of aristocracy is the martyrdom of the masses. Third, democracy is the tyranny of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie: it is "the idea of the state raised to the Nth power." [26] In whatever form it may appear, "the government of man by man is illegal and absurd." [27] Under whatever name it may be concealed the government of man by man is servitude, is the reign of will, of caprice, and of oppression. Whether monarchical, aristocratic, or democratic, the state, as long as it is not the organ of a society of equals, will be a hell and a damnation.[28]

"What is the state?" Proudhon asked. "The state is the army, the police, the judiciary, the public treasury, the budget, the customs duty, the public debt, the money, the liquidation, etc." [29] The state is without and above the people or society.[30] Anarchism denounces the military control, the legal regulation, the taxation, and the red-tape domination of the people by the state. In other words, the militia, the laws, the eminent domain, and the bureaucracy are all instruments of oppression and suppression, contrary to the principles of justice, liberty, and equality.

[25] Proudhon, *Idée générale;* p. 298.
[26] Proudhon, P. J., *La solution du problème sociale. Oeuvres Complètes;* Vol. VI, Bruxelles, 1868-76. Page 86.
[27] *Ibid.,* pp. 1-87.
[28] Proudhon, P. J., *Système des contradicions économiques. Oeuvres Complètes;* Vols. IV and V, Bruxelles, 1868-76. I, 267.
[29] Proudhon, P. J., *Mélanges. Oeuvres Complètes;* Vols. XVII-XIX, Bruxelles, 1868-76. III, 18-19.
[30] *Ibid.,* III, 76.

The Proudhonian idea of the state is not much different from the Marxian. The following statement of Proudhon might indeed have been written by Marx himself. "The very existence of the state implies antagonism or war as the essential or inevitable condition of humanity, a condition that calls for the intervention of a coercive force which shall put an end to the struggle continually waging between the weak and the strong." [31] The only importance difference lies in that, whereas the communist opposes the bourgeois state yet maintains the historical necessity of the proletarian dictatorship, the anarchist rejects absolutely without any qualifications the tyranny of the minority as well as that of the majority. To express the idea in economic terms, Proudhon is opposed to the system of property as well as the communist plan, for both are based upon the principle of exploitation. "Communism," he declares, "is merely an inverted form of private property. Communism gives rise to inequalities, but of a different character from those of property. Property is the exploitation of the weak by the strong, communism of the strong by the weak." [32] Both private property and communism are conditions of class war that call for the intervention of a coercive power, which above all things Proudhon would abolish.

### 4. The Dissolution of the State

Proudhon proposes several simultaneous methods whereby the historic state may be dissolved or disintegrated. All the methods Proudhon proposes are peaceful and legal. He strongly opposes the idea of class war and claims that his plan is one of general conciliation, a treaty of permanent peace between different conflicting groups.[33] He declares emphatically: "There is no greater crime in my eyes than the excitation to civil war." [34] To him, the dissolution of the historic

[31] *Ibid.,* III, 23.
[32] Proudhon, *Qu'est-ce que la propriété?;* p. 204.
[33] Proudhon, P. J., *La justice poursuivie par l'église. Oeuvres Complètes;* Vol. XX, Bruxelles, 1868-76. Page 244.
[34] Proudhon, P. J., *Correspondance;* Paris, 1875 (14 vols.). V, 381.

state is not a question of class war, but a question of searching for an equilibrium between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, both of which "must be reciprocally blended into a higher consciousness."

Revolution, to Proudhon, means extraordinary acceleration of movement in the continuous progress of humanity.[35] It does not mean class war, which only accentuates class antagonism and cannot bring about social equilibrium. This position is most clearly expressed in the *Confessions du révolutionnaire.* "A revolution is an explosion of organic forces, an evolution spreading from the heart of society through all its members. It can only be justified if it be spontaneous, peaceful, and gradual. It would be as tyrannous to try to suppress it as to bring it about through violence."[36] Here we see another main difference between anarchism and communism. Whereas communism aims to bring about the stateless society through violent revolution, anarchism hopes to realize its positive anarchy by peaceful evolution.

There are three important methods, which should be used simultaneously in order to realize the positive anarchy. The first is the most fundamental, and is an economic reorganization. The second is administrative decentralization. The third is propaganda and education in the knowledge of anarchism. All three methods should be pursued peacefully and legally.

In the first place, Proudhon holds that anarchy can be realized only when the economic life of society is so reorganized that the mutual interests of producers and consumers will be balanced and harmonized. To this end, Proudhon proposes the institution of the People's Bank, which is to work without capital, having as its basis the gratuitousness of credit and exchange, as its object the circulation of value, and as its means the consent of the producers and consumers. The consequences of a bank like this will be great. Not only will capital be freely placed at the disposal of everyone, but class distinctions will disappear and the state itself will become useless. The Bank is the key to the solution of all social problems, first by destroying the polarization of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and finally by dissolving the state whose usefulness in maintaining class antagonism will no longer be necessary.[37] "Once capital and labor are identified," says Proudhon, "society will subsist of its own accord, and there will no longer be any need for government," which "has its origin and its whole being immersed in the economic system."

From the administrative point of view, Proudhon believes the surest way to come to the stage of anarchy is by decentralization. The affairs of the state should be gradually simplified and reduced to the minimum and then entrusted to local self-governing units. "After having denied the state, we ought to make it understood that the question in point is to carry on a simplification of the state to the vanishing point, not to realize an immediate anarchy."[38] Proudhon sees more than clearly that anarchism is not a kingdom of heaven that will come to earth suddenly. Anarchism is "to dissolve or otherwise cause the disappearance of the political or governmental system by reducing or simplifying, by decentralizing and suppressing the whole machinery of the state."[39] In *Du principe fédératif,* Proudhon sets forth the view that the main claim of anarchism should be restricted to the reduction of the compulsory functions of the state, as far as possible, by growing decentralization and by a fostering of independent group life.[40]

Finally, Proudhon believes firmly that, until the people are educated in the knowledge of the desirability and possibility of anarchism, they will not work for its realization. Anarchism must come from below, be spontaneous and natural; it cannot be imposed upon the people from above. Hence the paramount im-

[35] Proudhon, *Mélanges;* II, 18.
[36] Proudhon, *Confessions;* p. 61.
[37] Proudhon, *Banque du peuple.*
[38] Proudhon, *Correspondance;* III, 96.
[39] Proudhon, *Idée générale;* pp. 253-304.
[40] Proudhon, P. J., *Du principe fédératif. Oeuvres Complètes;* Vol. VIII, Bruxelles, 1868-76. Jaszi, Oscar, Anarchism. *Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences;* New York, Macmillan, 1932. II, 48-53.

portance of popular instruction and propaganda. Proudhon maintains that "as soon as the (anarchist) idea is popularized," the historic state will of itself pass away, and the pure republic will be founded.

These formulas or keys to the new society are all rational ideas. Proudhonism is essentially a rationalism, an heroic attempt to translate logical concepts into political realities. It aspires to accomplish perhaps the greatest revolution of mankind by possibly the purest rational means.

### 5. The Positive Anarchy

Proudhonism is not only a rejection of the historic state but also a formula of the pure republic or the positive anarchy.

The supreme principle of the positive anarchy is justice, which "is respect, spontaneously felt and mutually guaranteed, for human dignity, in whatever person and under whatever circumstances we find it compromised, and to whatever risk its defence may expose us." [41] This respect for human dignity is possibly the most fundamental principle of all modern antistatism.

Justice, according to Proudhon, is not merely an idea of human association or an abstract notion of metaphysics. It is immanent in the human soul; it is human, all human, nothing but human; it is a fact of consciousness, an impulse of the soul, a faculty organic and positive; it is born of emotion and intellect combined; it is universal life and reason. Just as Rousseau believes that man is born with natural feelings that are good, so Proudhon has a strong faith in the natural capacity of man for justice.[42]

Justice is not simply immanent in the nature of every man; it is manifested through social relationships. Hence it is reciprocal and mutual. Proudhon thinks that the natural impulse of every man demands that he be respected and that he respect others equally. Justice is therefore the law of human collectivity, and is the principle which underlies all human association. It is that which makes social life possible and desirable. What Proudhon has in mind is a society based upon mutual and reciprocal justice, which is the very society Rousseau has in mind when writing *The Social Contract.*

According to Proudhon, the principle of justice demands, in place of the historic state, a human existence on the basis of liberty and equality. Proudhon sings the hymn to liberty most beautifully. "O Liberty, charm of my existence! Without you work is torture and life a long death!" [43] Liberty has two aspects. Negatively, it knows no authority, no reason, and no principle other than itself. To laws of the world, and of thoughts which beset it, it says "no"; to love which seduces, "no"; to the order of the prince, the voice of the priest, the cry of the multitude, "no, no, no." It is the eternal contradictor in opposition to all thought and all force which tends to dominate it. It is the indomitable insurgent which has no faith in anything except itself.[44] Positively, liberty consists of a system of liberties, of speech, of conscience, of press, association, work, etc. In an address delivered to the electors of the department of the Seine in 1848, Proudhon remarks: "Liberty is the sum total of my system—liberty of conscience, freedom of press, freedom of labor, of commerce, and of trading, the free disposal of the products of labor and industry—liberty, infinite, absolute, everywhere and forever." [45] Both in its positive and in its negative aspect, liberty, according to Proudhon, does not mean license. Liberty does not permit one to abuse others, but is "the right of doing what does not injure others." [46] "The unlimited liberty of man has for its limitation respect for the liberty of others."

Proudhon is a passionate lover of equality no less than of liberty. He believes that men are born equal in essence, in quality, in type, in dignity, and in

[41] Proudhon, *Justice;* I, 224-25.

[42] Proudhon, P. J., *La guèrre et la paix. Oeuvres Complètes;* Vols. XIII and XIV, Bruxelles, 1868-76. I, 159; II, 305-07. *Justice,* I, 142; II, 97.

[43] Proudhon, *Système;* II, 287.

[44] Lu, S. Y., *The Political Theories of P. J. Proudhon;* New York, M. R. Gray, 1922 (viii and 153 pp.). Page 53.

[45] Proudhon, *Mélanges;* I, 46.

[46] Proudhon, *Mélanges;* I, 45.

right.[47] That they are found inequal everywhere is due to three chief causes, psychological, economic, and social. Psychological inequality is due to inequality in education and conditions. Proudhon believes that all men have the same capacities and that they should have equal opportunity for the development of their native intelligence.[48] The chief cause of inequality is economic. The difference between the rich and the poor should be entirely eliminated in order to have the positive anarchy. Social inequality, in rank or caste, should also be abolished. Proudhon firmly believes that through education and through economic and social reforms the original equality of men may be restored.

Whereas liberalism stands for private property, for liberty, and communism emphasizes the principle of equality, anarchism aims to solve the contradiction between property and communism, between liberty and equality. In his *Système des contradictions économique,* Proudhon gives us a general equation for the solution of the antimony. "It must be a law of exchange based upon a theory of mutual help. This theory of mutualism —that is, of natural exchange—is from the collective point of view a synthesis of two ideas—that of property and that of communism." [49] As property is theft, and as communism amounts to coercion, the ideal of mutualism combines the principles of liberty and equality without robbery or force.

Liberty and equality, antithetical as they appear, are then synthesized by Proudhon in mutualism as the true basis of a new society. One may ask next how is social life possible on such a basis. Proudhon's answer is direct and simple. Men are social beings, and are to be kept together, not by the supreme authority of the state, but by a series of contracts which are spontaneously, voluntarily, and reciprocally entered into by individuals severally and by federally constituted communes or societies. Every community should be organized on the basis of a series of contracts in which the free wills of the parties are embodied. Every contract must be free and by its nature cannot be perpetual. It is an economic rather than political contract; it is made for the purpose of guaranteeing the economic welfare of its members rather than for controlling them.[50] Proudhon does not favor the centralization of all activities in one organization which will tend to become dictatorial and oppressive. He wishes to have a series of economic contracts, constituting an economic regime, into which the political system may be submerged. By this new economic regime, "what today is government will no longer be anything but administration." [51] And in the regime, there will be no laws and courts, no police, no bureaucracy. "The regime of contracts, substituted for the regime of law, would constitute the true government of man and of the citizen, the true sovereignty of the people, the republic." [52] Only then will "every citizen be king; for he will have plenary power, he will reign and govern. The republic is a positive anarchy."

The anarchistic community must be a small one. Proudhon would divide France, for instance, into thirty-six small independent communities, each of which is to be a pure republic, or a positive anarchy, organized on the basis of a series of economic contracts. All these communities may be loosely confederated into a union. In fact, Proudhon thinks that the whole of Europe may form a confederation of confederations, in order to maintain an inter-communal and interconfederate equilibrium, peace and harmony. The anarchist ideal is then a universal humanity, loosely confederated by numerous self-governing, small communes, each organized on the basis of a series of economic contracts voluntarily entered into by its members. Such a world reminds us of the peace plan of Rousseau, according to which Europe would be a confederation of small pure republics, each an entirely voluntary contractual regime. Despite their differences,

[47] Lu, *op. cit.,* p. 55.
[48] Proudhon, *Justice;* I, 303.
[49] Proudhon, *Système;* II, 414.
[50] Proudhon, *Idée générale;* pp. 309-312.
[51] Proudhon, *Confessions.*
[52] Proudhon, *Idée générale;* pp. 253-304.

Rousseau and Proudhon are really of kindred spirit, both being prophets of liberty and equality.

At this juncture, it may be appropriate to compare the thoughts and feelings of Marx, Engels, and Proudhon with regard to the stateless society and the positive anarchy. It will be recalled that, concerning the stateless society, Engels says: "Then for the first time, man . . . . emerges from mere animal conditions of existence into really human ones . . . . only from that time will man himself, more and more consciously, make his own history . . . . it is the ascent of man from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom." [53] This statement Marx may be assumed to endorse. With similar enthusiasm, Proudhon looks into the future when he declares: "Anarchy is suitable for adult society just as hierarchy is for a primitive one. Human society has progressed gradually from hierarchy to anarchy." [54] Despite their differences, Marx, Engels, and Proudhon are all optimistic in believing that human society is progressing toward the stateless and anarchistic stage, and that man is becoming more and more conscious and more and more adult as time advances.

In conclusion, the political ideas of Proudhon, taken as a whole, aim not only at the negation of the historic state, the involuntary and hierarchical organization of society, but also at the affirmation of a free universal community, a spontaneous and equalitarian confederation of human beings. There are people who consider anarchism as the "acme of disorder and the expression of chaos." But it should be understood that Proudhonism does not culminate merely in the negation of the historic state and the negation of every social institution, but envisages an ideal human existence, an existence, which represents "freedom in order and independence in unity," and under which the state will gradually be absorbed in society.

We have seen from this brief account that there are three parts of the anarchistic theory of the state. The first shows that the historic state is an involuntary and hierarchical organization of society. The second deals with the methods, peaceful in nature, whereby the state may be dissolved. The third is concerned with the principles of the positive anarchy, a society of justice, of liberty and equality. The political program of Proudhon is primarily an economic one, an economic reorganization of society with a view to abolishing property which is theft, and to obliterating all class distinctions. The political development, according to Proudhon, is of dialectical nature, with a strong tendency toward synthesis and equilibrium. This in substance is the systematic structure of the Proudhonian theory of the state.

### 6. Bakunin's Contributions to the Anarchist Theory of the State

The great disciple of Proudhon, Bakunin, was a man of action rather than of ideas, was more influential as a propagandist and a revolutionist than as a thinker.[55] His writings lack orderliness and reflect a violently emotional and impulsive life. His style is vivid, eloquent, incisive, and forceful.

Bakunin accepted the fundamental principles of anarchism as formulated by Proudhon. He was not so well acquainted with political economy as Proudhon, but was more versed in Hegelian dialectics than the master.[56] He was a left Hegelian and a materialist.[57] Just as Marx used the Hegelian method to justify the communist policy, so Proudhon employed the same weapon to defend the anarchist program. In the polemics between Proudhon and Marx, between *Philosophie de la misère* and *Misère de la philosophie,* in 1847, the anarchist seemed to have suffered a mortal blow as a dialectician. It was Bakunin who reenforced anarchism with the weapon of dialectics, and who challenged time and

[53] Engels, *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific;* p. 135.
[54] Proudhon, *Mélanges;* III, 9.

[55] Merriam, C. E., and Barnes, H. E. (eds.), *Political Theories, Recent Times;* New York, Macmillan, 1924 (xii and 597 pp.). Page 201. Coker, *Recent Political Thought,* p. 203.
[56] Ruhle, *Karl Marx;* p. 283.
[57] Masaryk, T. G., *The Spirit of Russia,* Tr. by E. and C. Paul; London, G. Allen and Unwin, 1919 (2 vols.). I:447-48.

again in the International the master dialectician, Marx.

Defending the federalism of Proudhon and denouncing the centralism of Marx, Bakunin said at the Peace Congress at Berne in 1869:

> I am no communist, because communism concentrates all the forces of society in the state, and lets it be absorbed by it, because it necessarily results in the centralization of property in the hands of the state; whereas I wish to do away with the state, to root out utterly the principles of authority and guardianship of the state, which, under the pretence of improving and idealizing men, has hitherto enslaved, oppressed, exploited, and ruined them. I wish for the organization of society, and of collective and social property from below upwards, by means of free association, and not from above downwards by means of authority, be it what it may. In demanding the abolition of the state, I mean to abolish the inheritance of property by an individual, i.e., of property that is only a matter of the state's arrangement, and is only a consequence of the principle of the state itself. In this sense I am a collectivist, and by no means a communist.[58]

He sharpens the contradiction between property and communism, between liberty and authority, and thinks that federalism is the higher synthesis of the two antinomous terms. "Liberty without socialism (communism) means privilege, and socialism without liberty means slavery and brutality." [59] In a more formal way, Bakunin put the dialectical formula thus: "Statehood (centralization) is the thesis, anarchy or amorphism is the antithesis, and federation will be the synthesis."[60] He favors such communism or socialism as is organized, not centrally, but federally, not from above downwards, but from below upwards, and defends his position with the very same weapon which Marx uses. This is a distinctive contribution of Bakunin to the development of anarchism.

As to the nature of the historic state, Bakunin and Proudhon were in complete agreement. Both believed that private property is the ground of existence and the consequence of state, and that religion is an evil, because it sanctions the political order. Like Proudhon, Bakunin is *"anti-religeuse, anti-propriétaire, anti-monarchique."* [61] The entire social philosophy of Proudhon may be summarized in the following three slogans, which Bakunin accepts without reservation: "La propriété, c'est le vol. Dieu, c'est le mal. Le meilleur gourvernements, c'est l'anarchie." In these aspects, Bakunin did not make any new contributions, but he did express these ideas in a more appealing and fiery manner.[62]

A novel development of Bakuninism is the belief that the goal of anarchism is to be attained through both evolution and revolution. Whereas Proudhon denounces civil war and force, Bakunin thinks that the destruction of the public order requires some measure of violence. The state cannot be destroyed by peaceful and legal means only, as advocated by Proudhon. The annihilation of the state will involve "the forcible dissolution of churches, the army, courts, police, legislative assemblies, administrative offices, and the invalidation of all titles to property." [63] Bakunin argues that the social revolution will be organized from below upwards by voluntary associations of faithful anarchists, who will execute thoroughly the program of destruction, by violence whenever necessary.

In place of the state thus destroyed, there will be established a free society, in which all class distinctions will be abolished, and in which everybody will enjoy the fruit of his labor on equal terms. The basis of the free society will be contract and voluntary association, instead of law and compulsive allegiance. The abolition of the state will also destroy all political and national boundaries. "There will be a free union of individuals into communes, of communes into provinces, of provinces into nations, and finally of nations into the United States of Europe, and later of the whole world." [64]

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[58] Zenker, Ernst Victor, *Anarchism;* New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1897 (xiii and 323 pp.). Page 148.

[59] Bakunin, Michael A., *Fédéralisme, socialisme, antithéologisme. Oeuvres;* Vol. I, Paris, Stock, 1907-13. I, 59.

[60] Masaryk, *op. cit.,* I, 448.

[61] Desjardins, Arthur, *P. J. Proudhon, sa vie, ses oeuvres, sa doctrines;* Paris, Perrin, 1896 (2 vols.). I, 84.

[62] Bakunin, M. A., *Dieu et l'état. Oeuvres;* Paris, Stock, 1907-13. I:267-326.

[63] Coker, *op. cit.,* p. 205.

[64] Bakunin, *Fédéralisme, socialisme, antithéologisme;* I:16-17.

Finally, a word may be said about the principle of solidarity which is based upon liberty and equality. According to Bakunin, a man is truly free, not only when he is recognized as free by others, but also when he respects the equal freedom of others. "Liberty is not a matter of isolation, but of mutuality; not of separation, but of combination; for every man, it is only the mirroring of his humanity (that is, of his human rights) in the consciousness of his brothers." [65] This principle of solidarity is closely akin to the mutualism of Proudhon, and is more similar to the principle of the general will of Rousseau than is commonly understood. The general will is not an institutional sovereign, but the consequence of the fundamental bond of social union in which every man so wills that his freedom is consistent with the freedom of all. So is the principle of solidarity, which requires that every man respect the freedom of all others on equal terms. A society based upon this principle is a free society.

### 7. Kropotkin's Contributions to the Anarchist Theory of the State

Unlike the works of Bakunin, the writings of Kropotkin display a serene scientific temper and a broad humane spirit. Anarchism in Kropotkin reaches a higher stage of scientific development than ever before. By training, Kropotkin was a geographer and a biologist. He sought to apply the method of natural science in the study of society. He justified anarchism in terms of natural evolution rather than of dialectics, and carried the economic aspects of anarchism much farther than before.

According to Kropotkin, the law of organic evolution is primarily a law of mutual aid, not of conflict. Individuals and species that show greater competitive than cooperative qualities tend to die out, while those endowed with capacities for mutual aid tend to survive in the long run. The higher the species, the greater the capacities for effective cooperation.[66] This law of mutual aid, Kropotkin argues, manifests itself not only in natural evolution, but also in social evolution. The higher the stage of social evolution of any society, the greater the cooperative spirit among its members. The principle of mutual aid is similar to Proudhon's principle of mutualism and Bakunin's principle of solidarity; it is the principle of justice, the principles of liberty and equality; it is the golden rule. The evolution of society, Kropotkin maintains, consists in progressive realization of the principle of mutual aid. The anarchistic society is the next evolutionary stage in which the principle will be more fully realized. Anarchism is "no longer a matter of faith; it is a matter for scientific discussion." [67]

The historic state appears to be a hindrance to the evolution of humanity. For it is not based on cooperation, but on oppression and suppression. The state is particularly for the protection of the wealthy classes. "The mission of all governments, monarchical, constitutional, or republican, is to protect and maintain by force the privileges of the classes in possession, the aristocratic, the clergy, and the traders." [68] Religion, too, is an obstacle in human evolution, for it sanctifies political oppression and economic privileges. Like Proudhon and Bakunin, Kropotkin is anti-religion, anti-property, and anti-state. These three institutions are all blockages to the full realization of the principle of mutual aid in social evolution.

While believing that anarchism will inevitably become a reality, Kropotkin does not think that it will be brought about solely by a gradual and peaceful process. In the natural evolution of society, there is slow and steady development from a lower stage to a higher, but there are also quick and revolutionary movements forward. The evolution of the present society will culminate in a revolution from which the free society will

[65] Bakunin, *Dieu et l'état;* I, 278.

[66] Kropotkin, Peter A., *Mutual Aid;* London, W. Heineman, 1902 (xix and 348 pp.).

[67] Kropotkin, P. A., *Anarchist Communism;* London, Freedom, 1897 (35 pp.).

[68] Kropotkin, P. A., *Law and Authority;* London, International Publishing Company, 1886 (23 pp.). Page 20.

emerge. At the beginning, the revolution will necesarily be destructive and violent; it will overthrow the existing government, demolish prisons and forts, and destroy churches and courts. "A frightful storm is needed to sweep away all this rottenness, to vivify torpid souls with its breath, and to restore to humanity the devotion, self-denial, and heroism, without which a society becomes senile and decrepit, and crumbles away." [69] When the state is thus overthrown, a new free society will be established, not on the basis of force and compulsion, but on the basis of voluntary association and cooperation. "If the dissolution of the state is once started, if once the machinery of oppression begins to weaken, free associations will be formed automatically. When cooperation is not forced by government, natural wants will bring about a voluntary cooperation. Overthrow the state and a free society will rise at once on its ruins." [70]

Another distinctive feature of Kropotkinism is the economic organization of the free society. In the first place, the new order will be that of complete communism. Kropotkin does not think that the division between goods for production and goods for consumption is sound. It is fallacious to think that goods for production should be under the control of the whole community, while goods for consumption should be privately owned. He thinks that goods for consumption, such as houses, foods, clothes, are just as necessary and useful for productive purposes as machines, factories, and land. The free society should be completely communistic.[71]

In the second place, Kropotkin thinks that in the free society industry and agriculture should be combined. Industry will become more decentralized and "workshops, foundaries, and factories will develop within reach of the fields" to furnish agricultural machinery. Men will work partly in the factories and partly in the fields. Furthermore, not only will industry be combined with agriculture, but "brain work will be joined with manual work." Everybody will enjoy a certain amount of leisure and be free to cultivate himself. Kropotkin thinks that if production is organized in accordance with science, everybody will have all his needs satisfied and will be able to enjoy health and comfort.[72] Then the principle, "to every man according to his needs," will be realized.

## 8. Tolstoi's Contributions to the Anarchist Theory of the State

If Bakunin was a man of action and a forceful writer and if Kropotkin was a scientific thinker, Tolstoi was a great literary genius with vivid realism and with profound religiosity. All three were Russian anarchists. They were anti-state and anti-property. While Bakunin and Kropotkin were anti-religion, Tolstoi was anti-church, but not anti-religion. In fact, religion, or more exactly, primitive Christianity, was the main source of Tolstoi's anarchism. To him, the state, private property, as well as the church were incompatible with true Christianity.

According to Tolstoi, the state is an institution of violence or force and carries out its laws and mandates through armed men, the police and the militia, who are trained for the purpose of slaughtering the people. The state is a violation of the supreme law of Christianity, namely, not to resist evil by force.[73]

In the second place, while the state is based upon force, the mission of the state is to legalize the exploitation of the poor by the rich, is to protect private property. The state makes it possible for a few to enjoy superfluous comforts and luxuries while the many live in poverty and toil from morning until night. This again is

[69] Kropotkin, P. A., *Paroles d'un révolté;* Paris, Marpon et Flammarian, 1885 (x and 342 pp.). Page 90.

[70] Kropotkin, *Paroles d'un révolté;* pp. 116-17; 243-45. *The Conquest of Bread;* London, Chapman and Hall, 1906 (xvi and 299 pp.). Pages 75-95; 100-04; 110-13.

[71] Kropotkin, *Paroles d'un révolté;* p. 136.

[72] Kropotkin, P. A., *Fields, Factories, and Workshops;* London, T. A. Nelson and Sons, 1919 (xii and 477 pp.).

[73] Tolstoi, Leo, *The Kingdom of God Is Within You,* Tr. by A. Delano; London, Scott, 1894 (vii and 381 pp.).

contrary to the teachings of Jesus, to the true meaning of Christianity.[74]

Not only the state and private property are against true Christianity, but also the church itself is un-Christian. Tolstoi had in mind especially the Russian Church, that supported the tyranny of the Russian state, condoned the idle life of the nobility, and sanctioned private property. The Church was sharply opposed to the teachings of Jesus.

Tolstoi is therefore anti-state, anti-property, and anti-church. Does he offer any program of action in order to bring about a new society? Here Tolstoi differs widely from Bakunin and Kropotkin. While Bakunin at times glorifies the use of violence as a necessary instrument for destroying the state, and while Kropotkin thinks that the natural evolution of society will culminate in revolution, Tolstoi condemns the practice of violence in unsparing terms. The following observation is so keen and eloquent as to merit quoting in full:

> When a government is overthrown by violence and the authority passes into other hands, this new authority is by no means likely to be less oppressive than the former. On the contrary obliged to defend itself from its exasperated and overthrown enemies, it will be even more cruel and despotic than its predecessor, as has ever been the case in periods of revolution. If socialists and communists believe that the possession of individual capital is a pernicious influence in society, and anarchists regard government itself as an evil, there are, on the other hand, monarchists, conservatives, and capitalists who look upon the socialist and communist state as an evil order of society; and all these parties have nothing better to offer by way of reconciling mankind than violence. Thus whichever party gains the upper hand, it will be forced in order to introduce and maintain its own system not only to avail itself of all former methods of violence but to invent new ones as well. It simply means a change of slavery with new victims and a new organization, but the violence will remain, may increase, because human hatred, intensified by the struggle, will devise new means for reducing the conquered to subjection.[75]

Instead of violence, Tolstoi preaches the principle of love and the practice of non-resistance. He does not say anything about the organization of the future society, but simply teaches the regeneration of the conscience or the soul, the realization of the Kingdom of God within the individual. It is right to refuse to obey the command of the state, to refuse to pay taxes and to serve on juries; one is not to return evil with evil; one is to love his friends and foes alike; one is to live simply, to toil, and to share the fruits of his labor with others. When men live in this manner, the state will be superfluous and will melt away. In its place, "there will be nothing. Something that has long been useless and therefore superfluous and bad will be abolished." [76] In this way, the state will come to an end, and the Kingdom of God will come.

### 9. Summary

We may summarize the main points of this chapter as follows:

1. Anarchism is a political program which aims at the destruction of the historic state and the establishment of the anarchist utopia.

2. Proudhon, the father of modern anarchism, owes his inspiration to three sources, the Bible, Hegel, and Adam Smith.

3. In accordance with dialectics, Proudhon seeks to discover the highest synthesis of social and economic contradictions, and this he finds in the principle of federation.

4. From classical economics, Proudhon deduces the theory that property is theft.

5. The historic state is an involuntary and hierarchical organization of society.

[74] Tolstoi gives most vivid descriptions of the life of the poor people and how they are exploited by the rich and powerful. For instance, he says: "We cannot shut our eyes and pretend that we do not see the policeman, who armed with a revolver, paces before our window, protecting us while we are eating our excellent dinner, nor do not know of the existence of soldiers who will appear armed with guns and cartridges whenever our property is menaced. We know perfectly well that if we finish our dinner, see the new play to its end, enjoy a merry-making at Christmas, take a walk, go to a ball, a race, or a hunt, we owe it to the policeman's revolver or the ball in the soldier's musket, which will pierce the hungry belly of the disinherited men who, with watering mouth, peep round the corner at our pleasures and who might interrupt them if the policeman or the soldiers in the barracks were not ready to appear at our first call." *The Kingdom of God Is Within You;* p. 354.

[75] Quoted in Merriam and Barnes, *op. cit.;* p. 243.

[76] Tolstoi, L., *Essays and Letters;* London, H. Frowde, 1925 (vii and 372 pp.). Page 257.

6. The dissolution of the historic state, according to Proudhon, may be brought about by peaceful and legal means, such as the Bank of People, education and propaganda, decentralization and reduction of state functions.

7. The positive anarchy or pure republic is a spontaneous and voluntary federation of human beings, is a regime of contracts, and is based upon the principles of justice, liberty and equality, and mutualism.

8. Bakunin reenforces the federative principle with the theory of dialectics. He believes in using force to overthrow the historic state. He bases his ideal of the free society on the principle of solidarity.

9. Kropotkin defends the anarchist system with the theory of natural evolution. He thinks that the evolution of society will culminate in a revolution from which will emerge a new society organized in accordance with the principle of mutual aid and with certain economic principles.

10. Tolstoi attacks the state, private property, and the church as being contrary to true Christianity. He preaches the doctrine of non-resistance, and his anarchistic ideal is the Kingdom of God.

# Chapter VII
# Patterns of Antistatism

## 1. Introduction

There are, as we have earlier observed, at least two ways of studying antistatism. We have called them the "philosophic" and the "scientific." The first is concerned with what ought to be, with the reasons why the historic state ought to be abolished and why the stateless or anarchistic utopia ought to be realized. It deals with the ideational structure of the antistate theory, its systematic or logical nature, and its paradoxes and contradictions, if any. The procedure is both analytical and synthetic, dividing the theory into its component parts and putting them together in an integrated whole. In other words, antistatism is treated as a moral system, a system of what ought to be, which consists of a number of rationally-formulated and logically-related principles. In the first part of the essay, we have tried to follow this method, making a philosophical study of five antistate systems.

In the following chapters, we shall follow a scientific procedure, the aim of which is to describe what is, not what ought to be. We shall be concerned with the classification of antistatism and with the analysis of the social and psychological conditions of antistatism. The procedure is at once comparative and comprehensive. By a comparative study, we may be able to discover certain fundamental patterns into which the several antistate systems may be classified, and certain underlying uniformities in the conditions under which antistatism emerges and spreads. We shall note the differences among the several antistate systems no less than the similarities, for what differentiates one antistate system from another is no less important than what constitutes the essence of antistatism as a whole.

The general observations to be made in the following chapters are only suggestions or at best working hypotheses, which may be useful in understanding the phenomenon of antistatism. Every scientist at some stage of his investigation will be driven to formulating or unconsciously assuming certain working hypotheses, which will help in relating men, ideas, or things to one another and without which no systematic thought will ever be reached. It is profitable, and perhaps necessary, to develop some such hypotheses in detail, with a view to arriving eventually at higher and more reliable principles.

In a comparative study, scientific procedure must be based on a systematic classification of the patterns or types of antistatism. Our first step therefore is to define as well as we can certain patterns of antistatism with reference to certain

points of view. It is obvious that without assuming certain points of view, we shall not be able to define the patterns of antistatism, and that without a systematic classification we shall fail to relate different patterns to their respective social conditions and personal traits and to their different theoretical bases. Our initial task is therefore to define the patterns of antistatism and to describe the variations within the respective patterns.

It may be noted that antistatism itself is one part or category of political thought, that part which rejects the historic state and offers a stateless or anarchistic utopia as an alternative of the state. Within the category itself, antistatism may be divided into several patterns. Plainly, there are many ways in which antistatism may be classified; many points of view from which antistatism may be seen. For instance, antistatism may be divided chronologically, by country, or according to certain logical concepts or moral values. With none of these, however, shall we be concerned.

In rejecting the historic state, the antistatist looks either backward to a paradise lost or forward to a paradise to be gained. The gaze of the antistatist is therefore directed into some idealized era of the remotest antiquity or far into the most distant future. From the point of view of goal, antistatism is either retrospective or prospective.[1] Both are protests against the present: one is characterized by longings for the past and the other by hopes for the future. While the general directional orientations of antistatism are quite clear, it is well to remember that the antistatist does not usually have a fixation of the gaze. By a curious mental mechanism, he often finds that the remotest past and the most distant future have more things in common than either of the two has with the immediate present. The idealization of the past often brightens the prospects of the future just as the possibility of the coming kingdom not infrequently increases the imaginary reality of the paradise lost.

When the goal is defined, the road to it naturally engages our attention. In order to abolish the historic state and to realize the stateless and anarchistic utopia, antistatism advises or implies that certain actions be taken. One guiding principle of classifying the ways and means of antistatism is to determine whether they are externalized or internalized activities. The internalistic antistatism is primarily concerned with the inward activity of the ego, whereas the externalistic is characterized by outward activities of the group. Needless to say, this division should not be too rigid and sharp. There are two extremes, one of isolated and introverted individuals and the other embracing the entire humanity, between which there is a whole range of more or less internalistic or externalistic activities. Furthermore, it is to be observed that almost every private action has its social repercussion, however slight, and every public deed tends to produce some effect upon the inner life of the individual. The main point to be considered is whether the antistate utopia is to be realized by internalized activities of the individual or by externalized activities of the group.

We propose, therefore, to classify antistatism from the points of view of goal and method, of whither and how. The first classification differentiates the antistate termini, the second delineates the roads whereby the termini may be reached. A pattern of antistatism consists of a goal and a method. The goal may be either retrospective or prospective; and the method may be either internalistic or externalistic.

It cannot be too much emphasized that in this essay the word "state" means the historic state, the involuntary and hierarchical organization of society; and the word "utopia" means the anarchistic or stateless society including both the idealized natural society of the past and the wished-for rational society of the future. In order to avoid any confusion of terms, note the following illustrations. The Re-

[1] Mumford, Lewis, *The Story of Utopias;* New York, Boni and Liveright, 1922 (xii and 315 pp.). The author divides utopias into two groups, those of escape and those of reconstruction. Hertzler, Joyce O., *The History of Utopian Thought;* New York, Macmillan, 1926 (321 pp.). Pages 257-67. The author classifies men into three groups, those who look backward, those who look ahead, and the army of world-as-it-is worshippers.

public of Plato has often been considered a utopia. A utopia unquestionably it is; but it is not a stateless or anarchistic utopia but an idealized form of the class state, and hence does not come within the scope of our discussion. There are many other utopias, which are similarly pictures of the ideal political state and which are for that reason not included in this essay. On the other hand, neither the communist nor the anarchist will consent to the use of the word "utopia" to describe his final goal. To him, the utopian being the unscientific, the utopia is something which can never be realized. The communist calls the anarchist utopian and *vice versa;* each reserves for himself the name scientist. In this essay, the utopian does not connote the unscientific. Our intent is not invidious. The word "utopia" (no-place) simply means the stateless and anarchistic society, which is non-existent.

### 2. The Retrospective Goal

The leitmotif, if one may say so, of the retrospective pattern is "going home." There is something charming and attractive about "home" which stands in sharp contrast with the strange land. In the former there is peace and security; in the latter there is war and struggle. In the former there is love and faith, both simple and spontaneous; in the latter there is fear, suspicion, hatred, there is inequality, slavery, oppression. In the consciousness of almost every individual, there is this contrast. In many people the contrast gradually fades away. Then the strange land gradually becomes the home itself. Such people are said to be at home in the world. But there remain others who are never at home anywhere save in their intimate circles. They are delicate persons who, like children, are eternally seeking for the protecting mother to enfold them from the snares of the world. It is this desire to go home that characterizes the retrospective pattern of antistatism.

Of the antistate systems, Laotzuism, Zenoism, and Rousseauism (as a doctrine of the state of nature) may be said to be of the retrospective pattern. They all find the historic state an intolerable form of human society, and idealize the original state of nature as the happiest condition of existence. They want to return to nature, to go home, as it were.

In the history of political thought, there are few phenomena that are more interesting and instructive than the similarity of ideas of these three thinkers. There were some twenty centuries separating Laotzu and Zeno from Rousseau. And there was no less than a whole continent between the Taoist and the Cynic-Stoic. Yet, generally speaking, the three men condemn the historic state and wish to return to the state of nature for practically the same reasons. This phenomenon is no mere accident; it is governed by certain psychological and sociological principles which are discussed in later chapters.

There are two symbols, "nature" and "culture," which recur time and again in the retrospective pattern and which stand diametrically opposite to each other. To Laotzu, Zeno, and Rousseau alike, nature represents all that is good and true, while culture means everything that is artificial, conventional, corrupt, false. The historic state is a product of culture, and hence is against nature.

From these two antithetical symbols are derived the contrasting ideas of the law of nature and the law of man; the one is universal and eternal, and is good, the other is particular and conventional, is made to maintain the hierarchical organization of society, and is bad. All three thinkers believe that society should be governed by the law of nature and that the historic state, which is sanctioned by the law of man, should be abolished.

Laotzu and his disciple Chuangtzu, Zeno and his forerunner Diogenes, and Rousseau, all wanted to return to the state of nature, to live in accordance with the law of nature, that is, to live simply and spontaneously. Laotzu himself retired to the state of nature, and nobody knows where he ended. Chuangtzu was a hermit. Diogenes and Zeno lived a simple life, that of the dog. They tried to return to nature in the midst of the most civilized city of the ancient world. Rousseau liked to consider himself a noble savage. He prefaced *The Discourse on the*

*Arts and Sciences* with the following line from Ovid: "Here I am, a barbarian, because men understand me not." All these men felt ill at ease in society and condemned not only the political organization, but the whole of human culture.

Rousseau went so far as to declare that a thinking man is a depraved animal,[2] which statement might very well have been said by Laotzu or Zeno. Certainly, the proud dogs, Diogenes and Zeno, did not want to be depraved animals; they wanted to be sound and robust beasts. Certainly, Laotzu and Chuangtzu who taught that all evils come from the sages and saints did not wish to be thinking men in the Rousseauan sense. Furthermore, when one reads Rousseau's ideas of China as a vast empire putrefied and polluted by men of science and literature and of Athens as the model of every corrupt age,[3] one feels as though the Taoist and the Cynic were speaking through the pen of the Genevan. From this point of view, Laotzu, Chuangtzu, Diogenes, and Zeno may be called "the Rousseaus of antiquity." [4] Despite their differences, they all scorned culture, arts, sciences, and philosophies, which in their opinion had corrupted mankind, and they all wished to return to mother nature, to go home.

### 3. The Prospective Goal

The leitmotif of the prospective pattern is "marching forward." There seems to be the go-ahead urge permeating the whole pattern. There is motion, progress, evolution, revolution; there is movement, perhaps at times moving for its own sake, but generally moving toward a definite-seeming goal in the distant future. There is tension between the ideal and the actual, between the utopia of the future and the existing reign. There seems to be a faith that the ideal will be the actual, the utopia will become a social fact. This is the fundamental characteristic of the prospective pattern.

Of the antistate systems we are concerned with, communism and anarchism are decidedly of the prospective pattern. The social contract, in so far as it is a doctrine of what rational society ought to be, may be considered of the same pattern. Rousseau was the prophet of the free community; Marx and Proudhon were the heralds of the stateless and anarchistic society. The social contract set the France of the eighteenth century afire with revolutionary ideas and plunged it into violent activities; the communist and anarchist manifestoes fired the imagination of the world proletariat, and intensified the class struggle of recent times. Rousseauism, Marxism, and Proudhonism, in short, are dynamic and explosive doctrines, calculated to destroy radically the foundation of the social pyramid, and to abolish the historic state.

When one is not satisfied with the realities of the present, he often lives in the memories of the past or in the hopes for the future, or both. In the *Discourses,* Rousseau longed to return to the state of nature, but in *The Social Contract* he looked rather to the future society. The *Discourses* were composed to demonstrate what the law of nature was, but *The Social Contract* was written with a view to showing what the "laws might be" in human society. The antistatists in general look both backward to the past and forward to the future. Marx and Proudhon, for instance, assumed the primitive condition of existence to be equalitarian and free, even though their emphasis was upon the coming society. Therefore, there should not be a rigid division between the retrospective and the prophetic orientation.

There are two symbols that recur time and again in the prospective pattern of antistatism, and constitute the positive principles of the utopia. They are "liberty" and "equality." In a certain sense, liberty and equality are contradictory, the former being the principle of individuality, and the latter the principle of community. Oftentimes, the realization of individual freedom lessens the possibility of

[2] Rousseau, *The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality;* p. 181.
[3] Rousseau, *The Discourse on the Arts and Sciences;* pp. 135-36.
[4] In fact, Rousseau was known as "the dog of Diogenes gone mad." Voltaire said of him: "a mad dog, who bites everybody, a bastard of Diogenes, although at times he writes like Plato."

communal impartiality, and the leveling of social hierarchy limits the development of the individual ego. It is the contention of the modern antistatist, however, that there is no liberty unless there is equality, and *vice versa.* To Rousseau, Marx, and Proudhon, liberty and equality seem not only compatible but also mutually complementary. The greatest liberty of the individual is realized when there is complete equality in rank and fortune; and the greater the social and economic equality, the greater the free development of individuality. The goal of the modern antistatist is not only the negation of the involuntary and hierarchical organization of men, but also the bringing about of a condition of existence in which there is equal distribution of social values and free development of individual talents and gifts.

Just as Laotzu and Zeno were "the Rousseaus of antiquity," Marx and Proudhon may be properly called the Rousseaus of the nineteenth century. In a real sense, Marxian and Proudhonian antistatism is a further development of the political thought of Rousseau. It was Rousseau, who declared that without equality—of rank and of fortune—there will be no liberty. This idea of the complementary nature of liberty and equality is a common assumption of all three antistate systems. When Rousseau declares: "Man is born free, but everywhere he is found in chains!" he is distantly echoed by Marx, who announces that "the workers have nothing to lose but their chains," and urges all the workers of the world to unite in the struggle for liberty and equality. When Rousseau regrets that man has lost natural liberty, he is confidently reassured by Proudhon, who believes that man is progressing toward a positive anarchy in which the real condition of liberty will obtain. While Rousseau longs for the organization of pure democracy on the basis of a voluntary contract, he is supported by Marx and Proudhon who conclude, through their dialectical and economic laws, that the stateless and anarchistic society will inevitably come in the future. The differences in the methods and contents of their thought should not blind us to the similarity of their final aims.[5]

The followers of Marx and Proudhon in general do not create any new utopias. Men like Lenin or Trotsky developed the idea of the stateless society to further detail. Bakunin and Kropotkin elaborated the organizational and administrative aspects of the positive anarchy. Like their masters, they all believed that the state will inevitably evolute into the stateless and anarchistic society of the future. Their antistate doctrines may also be considered as falling within the prospective pattern.

The free state of contract, the stateless society, and the positive anarchy are different names for the coming kingdom of liberty and equality. All the three great modern antistatists use the symbols of liberty and equality. Marx and Proudhon do not employ the contradictory symbols of nature and culture, nor does Rousseau set nature and culture in sharp contrast in *The Social Contract.* The prospective pattern is characterized, not by looking backward to the state of nature, but by marching forward to the distant future. It is the work of the Promethean ego that refuses to be permanently chained in the rock of the historic state and wishes to flee from the realm of necessity to the kingdom of freedom. It is progressive, evolutionary, dialectically moving forward to a definite goal.

### 4. The Internalistic Method

From the point of view of goal, antistatism has been classified into the retrospective and prospective patterns; from the point of view of method, it may be divided into the internalistic and externalistic patterns, which we shall discuss in the following pages. The goal classification defines the final termini of antistatism; the method classification delineates the roads whereby the goals may be reached. The guiding thought of the second classification is whether antistate actions are carried out inwardly or outwardly.

[5] Smith, T. V., *The Promise of American Politics;* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1936 (xxix and 307 pp.). Pages 122-31.

The internalistic pattern of antistatism is characterized by personal effort to seek the realization of the utopia. It is concerned with the security and peace of the individual ego rather than with society as a whole. The internalistic antistatist wishes to obtain an ego utopia consistent with the principles of liberty and equality for all members of the society. This important point is to be emphasized. The internalistic antistatist is one who attempts to realize such an ego utopia as is not in contradiction with the ideals of liberty and equality for all. He seeks in his own way to live in a free realm, where there is absence of coercion and in which the condition of inequality does not obtain.

Laotzuism, Zenoism, and Rousseauism (in so far as the doctrine of the state of nature goes) may be considered of the internalistic pattern. These theories do not suggest any collective programs of action in order to bring about the original state of nature. They do not recommend any social or external organization. In Laotzuism, we find the counsel of non-assertion and non-action, by which all existing evils are to disappear. Laotzuism, from this point of view, is an attempt to obtain internal peace and security, rather than to reform the external world. It is concerned with the utopia in which the individual ego will be perfectly free and happy, rather than with collective reconstruction of society. Laotzuism envisages a community of introverted egos that do not interfere with one another, much less oppress or coerce one another. The technique of the ego utopia consists in non-assertion and non-action. The poetical mystic, Chuangtzu, is also concerned with the realization of an ego utopia. His utopia is of the transcendental and spiritual nature, and his technique is that of the identification of the soul of man with that of the universe. The most extreme form of internalistic pattern is perhaps the antistatism of Yangtzu who would refuse to benefit, or to be benefited by, the world in any manner. His ideal is that every man is sufficient unto himself.

Strikingly similar to Laotzuism is Zenoism. The ultimate aim of Zenoism is the mental state of apathia, a condition of internal rationality over which the external world has no power or control, a condition of supreme happiness and freedom. Zenoism shows a new way "to the highest heaven," a life that is indifferent to "riches, glory, health and strength," a life that is in accordance with nature. The utopia of Zeno is a republic of independent and rational egos, of wise men, each of whom is a master unto himself and a king, unfettered by conventions, statutes, and laws, uncorrupted by culture. The road to this utopia is not via social reorganization, but through personal cultivation, through inward activity that will unfold the nature of man in such a way as will make him peaceful and free. The pattern of Diogenes is similar to that of Zeno, and needs no further comment here.

In so far as it is a doctrine of the return to nature, Rousseauism is characterized by an attempt to seek for "serenity, security, and peace of the heart." It is, like Laotzuism and Zenoism, a personal or internal effort to obtain a condition of freedom. It is a retreat from social life, requiring an appreciation of the beauty of nature and of the harmony of pastoral strains, an enjoyment of solitude and quiet contemplation, and finally a mystic union with "the incomprehensible being who embraces all." The utopia of Rousseau is a natural society of isolated individuals, who have no intercourse with one another, and each of whom finds his own peace of heart in his own path of life. It is not to be brought about by a collective movement. It is a utopia of peace and security, which the individual can obtain through his own self-cultivation.

From the point of view of method, we have seen that Laotzu, Chuangtzu, Diogenes, Zeno, and Rousseau are of the internalistic pattern. They commonly emphasize personal and internal cultivation as the road to the ego utopia of freedom and peace. To these, we may add the Christian anarchist Tolstoi. The Russian count was less interested either in the liberal-democratic movements or in the revolutionary plots of the communists, anarchists, and nihilists, than in the regeneration of the individual conscience.

He regarded most institutional schemes for reforming society as futile. He taught the Christian principles of love and equality, and the practice of passive resistance and civil disobedience. His is the kingdom of God, which is within the ego, and is an internal condition of independence and freedom.[6]

### 5. The Externalistic Method

The externalistic pattern of antistatism is characterized by social action for the realization of the utopia. It is concerned less with the attainment of the inner condition of peace and security of the individual ego than with the realization of the liberty and equality for all. It is distinguished from the internalistic pattern by its programs of group or class action, programs that cannot be executed by persons in isolation from one another and that require concerted and coordinated effort, the common rational will of the community, or the united spirit of a class.

Communism and anarchism are of the externalistic pattern. They stand in sharp contrast with Laotzuism and Zenoism which teach the cultivation of the individual ego as the road to freedom. As a doctrine of the return to nature, Rousseauism is internalistic; but as a doctrine of the social contract, Rousseauism is externalistic. The quest for the ego utopia marks the former, just as the search for the formula of the free community distinguishes the latter.

Rousseauism denounces the historic state, which is based upon the right of the strongest and is to maintain the condition in which "the privileged few should gorge themselves with superfluities, while the starving multitudes are in want of the bare necessities of life."[7] In order to transform the historic state into a free community, Rousseau argues, a social contract ought to be voluntarily concluded among its members with a view to guaranteeing the greatest good of all, which is liberty and equality. It is obvious that the social contract is an external act, a collective act of each and every member of the community. None may be excluded from the contract, equality in status and unanimity of consent being required, and yet none may be included against his will, freedom of choosing residence being a condition of the free state.

That the social contract is a collective program we have seen. But how is the contract to be a possibility? What shall be done to make those on the pinnacle of fortune and grandeur come to an agreement with the common people on the basis of equality? Is the social hierarchy to be destroyed by force before the social contract may be concluded? Or is the contract to be an ideal form of social structure toward which society may gradually advance? Rousseau does not give us any definite answers. He tells us what ought to be done in the final stage, but leaves us to speculate as to how to reach that stage when the contract may be voluntarily entered into by all members of society.

If Rousseauism is more concerned with the final conditions of the free utopia than with the transitional stages from the historic state to the ultimate goal, Marxism and Proudhonism are more interested in contriving strategies and tactics of antistatism than in describing in a definite manner the organization and administration of the stateless and anarchistic society. While from the point of view of method, all three are of the externalistic pattern, they differ in that Marxism and Proudhonism emphasize what is to be done now while Rousseauism stresses what ought to be done in the final stage.

As to what is to be done now, Marxism and Proudhonism differ widely. Marxism advocates violent revolution, Proudhonism peaceful evolution. Marxism favors centralism, Proudhonism federalism. Marxism stands for the dictatorship of the proletariat as the transitional stage, Proudhonism wants to do away with authority of the state immediately. In Marxism, there is first a crescendo of state power and then a gradual diminuendo; the state is first raised to its Nth power, and then slowly withers away. In Proudhonism, the movement of the state is to be from pianissimo to silence; from mini-

[6] Tolstoi, *The Kingdom of God Is Within You.* Coker, *Recent Political Thought,* p. 224.
[7] Rousseau, *The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality;* p. 238.

mization and decentralization of authority to its final disappearance. Both programs, however, require collective actions, organized and directed to definite goals.

The disciples of Marx and Proudhon do not always follow orthodox strategies and tactics. The Second International in general believes that the stateless and classless society can be reached by peaceful and evolutionary means, whereas the Third International maintains that the forcible seizure of political power is the correct practice of the Marxist. The Stalinists believe in the principle of socialism in one country, while the Trotskyists demand the staging of the world revolution. The strategies and tactics of anarchism vary with different situations and persons too. While Proudhon advocates methods of peaceful evolution, Bakunin and Kropotkin, the two most outstanding disciples of the former, believe that evolution must culminate in a violent and destructive revolution. We see therefore, that there are Marxists who believe in evolutionary means and Proudhonists who maintain the necessity of a violent revolution. Their final aim being the same, strategies and tactics vary.

The above paragraphs indicate briefly some of the strategic and tactical differentiations within the externalistic pattern. It is as important to note the variations within a pattern as to observe its fundamental characteristic. The externalistic pattern, of which there are the communist, the anarchist, and the social-contractist variations, is marked by the collective and concerted effort of a class or a whole community to bring about the coming kingdom of freedom. It is quite clearly distinguished from the internalistic pattern, which is characterized by personal and inward activity to realize the ego utopia.

Before closing, it is well to emphasize that neither the goal nor the method classification is to be taken as categoric or inflexible. Classification defeats itself, if it is not elastic and allows no exceptions. Neither point of view, whither or how, is fixated. And each pattern is plastic.

Systematization of antistate theories is for the sake of revealing their relationships rather than emphasizing their discrepancies. There seems to be a correspondence between the retrospective orientation and the internalistic action, and between the prospective orientation and the externalistic action. Those who look backward to the original state of nature are in general inclined toward personal and inward exercises. Those who look forward to the coming kingdom of freedom generally recommend collective programs.

There are antistate theories that cannot be strictly classified under any pattern. They may seem equally retrospective and prospective, equally internalistic and externalistic. In general, however, they can be said to be more or less retrospective or prospective, more or less internalistic or externalistic, at any particular time-space. No pattern is pure; each is a constellation of varied elements and in one way or another overlaps the other.

## 6. Summary

1. Antistatism may be classified from the points of view of goal and method, of whither and how. The goal classification defines the antistate termini; the method classification delineates the roads whereby the termini may be reached.

2. A pattern of antistatism consists of a goal and a method. The goal may be either retrospective or prospective; the method may be either internalistic or externalistic.

3. Laotzuism, Zenoism, and Rousseauism (as a doctrine of the state of nature) are of the retrospective pattern, which is characterized by the wish to return to some original state of nature.

4. Rousseauism (as a doctrine of the social contract), communism, and anarchism are of the prospective pattern, which is characterized by the attempt to construct some future society.

5. Laotzuism, Zenoism, and Rousseauism (as a doctrine of the state of nature) are of the internalistic pattern, which is characterized by personal effort to realize the ego utopia of freedom and peace.

6. Rousseauism (as a doctrine of the social contract), communism, and anarch-

ism are of the externalistic pattern, which is characterized by collective effort to bring about the free community or the stateless and anarchistic society.

7. There is a general correspondence between the retrospective goal and the internalistic method, and between the prospective goal and the externalistic method. Those who look backward to some idealized era of the past generally recommend some inward activity; those who look forward to some future society generally propose some collective program.

# Chapter VIII

# Social Conditions of Antistatism

## 1. General Observations

Proper classification is the first important task in scientific procedure. In the preceding chapter, we have classified antistatism from the point of view of goal into the retrospective and prospective patterns and from the point of view of method into the internalistic and externalistic patterns. Our work does not stop there. The next step is to state the conditions under which antistatism appears and spreads. It is assumed that the emergence and dissemination of antistatism follows a series of laws or principles of which we are not fully aware. No political theory arises out of the clear blue, and then diffuses through time and space in a zigzag fashion by accidents or incidents. Antistatism, as a category of political thought, is not an atomistic conglomerate of chances. It rises or falls in accordance with certain laws which run through the depths of human psychology and through the length and breadth of human history, and which are not entirely known in the present stage of our knowledge.

In the following pages, an attempt will be made to state some of the common conditions of antistatism and some of the particular or special circumstances in which the several antistate patterns take shape. The observations of the general conditions may serve as provisional and partial interpretations of antistatism; in no event do they pretend to be universal laws.

In order to analyze the social conditions of antistatism, it may be well to start with the concept of the state as defined in the beginning of the essay. The state, it will be recalled, has been treated as the coercive power that maintains a hierarchy of social values in accordance with which social life is organized. The purpose of the state, from this point of view, is to insure the continuation and permanency of the social pyramid, the hierarchical arrangement of men and things, to secure a stable equilibrium between various human and material forces.

Political society is thus pyramidal in structure. There is, however, no definite form or norm of the pyramid. Sometimes it is short and broad. Sometimes it is high and narrow. Sometimes the apex is very high and narrow while the basis is very low and wide. There are many shapes of the pyramid. There are many ways in which social values are apportioned.

For political analysis, one has to study not only the structural form, but also the functional relationships between the higher, middle, and lower classes. At certain times the structural aspect is less important than the functional. During critical periods of history, when the structure may remain rigid, the interaction between certain classes may become so strained as to threaten the foundation of the social pyramid. In such periods there are generally high tensions in class relations.

It is to be contended in this chapter that antistatism generally emanates from areas of high tension in society. We shall attempt to locate as exactly as we can the tensional zone in the functional relationships between various classes in the social hierarchy, the sore spot, as it were, where antistatism originates and from where it diffuses through certain sections of society. From a study of the social millieu of antistatism, we are able to locate the sore spot where the birth of antistatism takes place. This we shall do first in a formal manner. Two observations may be

stated at the beginning. The first is chiefly concerned with the ancient antistate systems; the second with the modern. They are:

1. Other conditions remaining as they are, when an exogenous group is blocked in its attempt to climb the social ladder by the indigenous population, it tends to reject the native state.
2. Other conditions remaining as they are, when a rising class is blocked in its attempt to climb the social ladder by the higher classes, it tends to reject the existing state.

These two observations, it is to be noted, are concerned with the particular points of strain in the functional relationships between the various groups or classes in the social pyramid. It is at these points, where tension is severe and the level of insecurity is high, that the feelings of discontent and resentment are more likely to be verbalized or articulated. In the social hierarchy there may be other spots of strain and tension which heighten the general level of social insecurity and hence help the spread of antistatism. These will be noted in the analyses of particular situations.[1]

When either of these two conditions obtains there is no free circulation or locomotion of classes. There is blockage to the rising class or estoppage to the exogenous group. The point of strain is where the blockage or estoppage occurs, and this is the spot at which antistatism has its origin. The more complete the blockage or estoppage, the more strained the relation between the classes or groups concerned, the higher their insecurity level, the more radical the antistate outburst.

### 2. Exogenous Groups Versus Indigenous States

The backgrounds of the antistate teachings of the Taoists and the Cynics and Stoics, however different they appeared, had some aspects that were strikingly similar. The first significant fact to be noted is that the leading Taoists were "southerners" and the prominent members of the Cynic-Stoic school were all non-Athenians. In fact, they were considered by the indigenous populations as "barbarians." They were, in the eyes of the proud Chinese and Athenians, uneducatable beasts, for they refused to be "civilized" and they condemned not only the native political institutions, but also the culture, arts, and sciences of which China and Athens were so proud.

During the feudal period of China, the central government exercised a "civilizing" influence upon the southern "barbarians," who were being assimilated.[2] Chinese civilization made its headway from the north to the south, from the Yellow River to the Yangtze. The rulers of the feudal régime undertook the tremendous task of colonization by dispersing civilized groups among the "barbarous" tribes. This movement naturally produced the following effects. Some "barbarians" were completely assimilated; these did not protest against China. Some were unable to learn new things and ideas from the northerners. Others, more intelligent, became great masters of the Chinese language and developed a keen understanding of Chinese culture, but nevertheless preferred the primitive state of existence to a highly refined form of life. It is among this group that we find the first anarchists in China.

In the history of Chinese thought, the Taoist is generally considered as the southern school in opposition to the Confucian and the Mocian, which are the northern schools. Laotzu, the founder of the southern school, came from Chu, the "barbarian" state of the south, to the capital of Chou, the center of Chinese culture. He felt that he was "rustic," "ignorant," "awkward," and "confused";[3] that he was humbled and humiliated in most social situations. Chuangtzu, one of the greatest masters of the Chinese lan-

[1] Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity;* McGraw-Hill, New York, 1935 (vii and 307 pp.). Pages 8, 46, 113-14. Speier, Hans, Social Stratification. *Political and Economic Democracy* (ed. by Max Ascoli and Fritze Lehman); New York, W. W. Norton, 1937 (336 pp.). Pages 255-70. Brown, Junius Flagg, *Psychology and the Social Order;* New York, McGraw-Hill, 1936 (xiv and 529 pp.). Pages 138 and 178. Sumner, William Graham, *Folkways;* Boston, Ginn and Company, 1906 (vii and 692 pp.). Pages 12-15.

[2] Liang, *History of Chinese Political Thought;* pp. 156-57.

[3] Laotzu, *The Tao Teh Ching;* ch. xx.

guage and one of the greatest deniers of the Chinese state and culture, and Yangtzu, the extreme individualistic anarchist, were of unknown origin. They are said to have been greatly influenced by the free spirit of Chu.[4] The king of Chu asked Chuangtzu to be his prime minister, but the latter declined, saying that he would rather enjoy playing alone in the foul waters than be bound by the powers that be. Yangtzu was a bitter enemy of Mencius, who used to call him a "beast." There were many other anarchistic thinkers of the south, who were generally hermits and recluses desiring to be let free and unknown. The following are outstanding examples.

> The madman of Chu, Chieh-yu, passed by Confucius, singing and saying: "O Phoenix! O Phoenix! How is your virtue degenerated! As to the past, reproof is useless; but the future may still be provided against. Give up your vain pursuit. Give up your vain pursuit. Peril awaits those who now engage in affairs of government." [5]

On another occasion, Confucius met Chang-tsu and Chieh-ni when they were at work in the fields together. He sent his disciple Tse-lu to inquire for the ford. Whereupon, Chieh-ni said:

> Disorder, like a swelling flood, spreads over the whole empire, and who is he that will change its state for you? Than follow one who merely withdraws from this one and that one, had you not better follow those who have withdrawn from the world altogether? [6]

These men were lonely, sensitive souls of antiquity, their lives unknown but their principles unmistakably recorded. As a whole, they were an unusually gifted group of men who feared the tyranny of powers and were baffled and disillusioned in sundry ways and humbled or humiliated by the feudal hierarchy. They were driven to voicing their discontent and resentment against the "civilized" order and to formulating anarchistic doctrines.

The influence of this school spread not only among the southerners, but also throughout the lower classes of the entire empire,[7] those people who were oppressed and heavily taxed by the feudal lords, princes, and dukes. In the time of Laotzu, Chuangtzu, and Yangtzu, the feudal empire was disintegrating, and the princedoms and dukedoms became more or less independent and were contending and warring with one another incessantly. The life of the people was very insecure. There was high tension between the masses of the people and the repressive governments. It was then that the radical gospel of the Taoists found a ready acceptance on the part of the people.

Antistate theories in Athens came, not from the Athenians, but from those aliens who were well versed in Greek literature and philosophy, the Cynics and Stoics, who were "civilized" in Athens but who preferred the primordial existence of nature to the elegant style of life in the ancient seat of culture. The most influential of this exogenous group were Diogenes and Zeno, the proud dogs of antiquity, the kindred spirits of Laotzu, Chuangtzu, and Yangtzu, the forerunners of Rousseau. Diogenes was a native of Sinope, Zeno of Cittium, and practically all the other important members of the "canine" family were from lands other than Greece. They were a group of enterprising individuals. Diogenes was said to be a money-changer, Zeno a merchant of purple, some of the others were unsuccessful business men, and a few were of low birth. At any rate, they were a group of "barbarians," who happened to come to Athens. They gave up all their worldly or pecuniary pursuits, and devoted themselves to philosophy and literature. They became extremely poor, but thought they could get happiness without wealth and power. Diogenes was said to be:

> Houseless and citiless, a piteous exile
> From his dear native land; a wandering beggar
> Scraping pittance poor from day to day.[8]

[4] Fung, *A History of Chinese Philosophy;* I, 162-66 and 259-60.

[5] Confucius, *Confucian Analects. The Four Books;* Shanghai, The China Book Co., 1914 (4 vols. in one). Pages 196-97.

[6] *Ibid.;* pp. 197-98.

[7] Mencius, *The Works of Mencius. The Four Books;* Page 158: "The words of Yangtzu and Mocius fill the empire. If you listen to people's discourses throughout it, you will find that they have adopted the views either of Yangtzu and of Mocius."

[8] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers;* Bk. VI, ch. vi.

Of Zeno it is said:

This man adopts a new philosophy,
He teaches to be hungry; nevertheless,
He gets disciples. Bread his only food;
His best dessert dried figs; water his drink.[9]

The exogenous canine family, as a whole, was ridiculed by philosophers and fools alike, but it was proud and arrogant; it defied the whole of Athens, returning scorn with scorn and ridicule with ridicule. It was a family of dirty beggars, haughty and ambitious, but thwarted and humiliated. They were not welcome in Athens; they could not enter into the political life there; they had no ladders by which they might ascend the social pyramid. They were barred altogether from getting greater shares of social values, and were driven to seeking new values in life. Diogenes declared that he coined new values; Zeno announced that riches, glory, strength, and health were indifferent objects.

The followers of Diogenes and Zeno, of course, were not all aliens. In the Hellenistic age, the city state began to decline, the old political ideologies and institutions to lose their forces. The glory of the past was gone. With invasions from without, and with foreign domination and control, there were many Athenians who were impoverished and baffled and who became very pessimistic of life. It was probably among those people that the Stoic school recruited its native members. The best description of the disciples of Zeno is perhaps the following verse:

Till he collected a vast cloud of beggars,
Who were of all men in the world the poorest,
And the most worthless citizens of Athens.[10]

Indeed, the inhabitants of the porch, including aliens, sailors, artisans, beggars, and slaves, were typical representatives of the plebeian classes. But they were a group of proud people, each of whom called himself a king.

In a comparative study of the backgrounds of the Taoistic and the Cynic-Stoic antistate doctrines, we find that the most important common phenomenon was that the prominent members of these schools were all aliens or strangers, gifted and ambitious men, who were either barred altogether from entering into political life, or obstructed in their attempts to gain wealth and prestige, or ridiculed and scorned contemptuously by the indigenous populations, including philosophers[11] no less than imbeciles. They were forced by circumstances to opposing the Chinese and Greek states and societies respectively. From this comparison, we may make a general observation to the effect that, when an exogenous group is estopped in climbing the social ladder, it tends to reject the native state. This principle locates the particular point of tension, at which antistatism may originate. If a society has only this single spot of strain, antistatism will be confined to the exogenous group concerned. But if a society has other tensional areas, as the China of the Contending States or the Hellenistic Athens, antistatism will spread to those where there is a high level of social insecurity.

### 3. Ascending Classes Versus Existing States

The rise and spread of the modern antistate doctrines, the liberal, the communist, and the anarchist, will be the subject of our analysis in this section. There were particular situations and sources from which these antistate systems originated and special circumstances in which they were disseminated through certain sections of society. A comparative study may lead us to seeing some of the common characteristics in the emergence and diffusion of these systems. We are first to locate, as precisely as possible, the zones of tension from which antistatism emerged, and next to observe other tensional areas through which the ideas of antistatism were diffused.

Rousseau is generally considered, from the ideological point of view, the father of the French revolution. In the eighteenth century, however, Rousseau was not the only man who was opposed to the ancient régime, to the aristocratic and ecclesiastic

[9] *Ibid.;* Bk. VII, ch. xxiv.
[10] *Ibid.;* Bk. VII, ch. xviii.

[11] A classic parallelism may be pointed out here. Just as Plato called Diogenes a dog, so Mencius called Yangtzu a beast.

parties. There were other prominent thinkers of the age of enlightenment, who were also bitter against the estates. Rousseau was possibly the most radical among them and certainly the most influential in arousing the discontent of the third estate. In the general social pyramid of the France of the eighteenth century, Rousseau may be placed in the company of a rising group of intellectuals, the *philosophes,* the encyclopedists and physiocrats, of whom we may mention Voltaire, Montesquieu, Diderot, Mably, Morelly, d'Holbach, Raynal, Quesnay, and Gournay. While there were personal and theoretical differences among them, they were in general a group of radical thinkers, who were mainly responsible for the creation and diffusion of the ideology of the French revolution. In criticizing the ancient régime, Montesquieu was almost as effective as Rousseau; in attacking the corruption and oppression of the ecclesiastic and aristocratic parties, Voltaire and Diderot were as vehement as Rousseau. Mably and Morelly were as much the prophets of equality and the physiocrats were as much the champions of liberty as was Rousseau. But from the point of view of political thought, Rousseau was the most comprehensive and the most imaginative of them all. He was the incarnation of the revolutionary spirit of the age. He was the best representative of the age. He could not have produced *The Social Contract* had he not been in the France of the eighteenth century and had he not associated himself with the philosophical circle. From the sociological standpoint, Rousseau was a child of the age of reason.

The philosophical circle was composed of men who were neither of the lowest stratum of society nor of the highest. They were of the middle class. Rousseau was the son of a watchmaker and of the daughter of a minister. He was apprenticed to a notary, sent to the seminarists of St. Lazare and to a music master. He became a tutor, a music copier, and later a writer par excellence. Voltaire was the son of a notary, a grandson of a prosperous merchant, and he was educated in College Louis-le-Grand. Montesquieu was born of a good family and inherited the Barony of Montesquieu from his uncle. Diderot was educated by the Jesuits, and was a translator. Mably was brought up by the Jesuits of Lyon and sent to the seminary of Saint-Sulpice. Morelly was an obscure person and was known to have given lessons at Vitry-le-Francois. Baron d'Holbach was a generous and wealthy man. Raynal was educated at a Jesuit college in Pezenas. Quesnay was the son of an advocate and small landowner. Gournay was the son of a wholesale merchant. These people were members of the middle class, that wished to rise in the social pyramid but was blocked by the clergy and nobility. It was at this tensional zone between the ascending middle class and the two estates that the radicalism of Rousseau and of his contemporaries found its origin.[12]

The radical ideas of Rousseau and of the other philosophers gradually spread through different classes. At first, it was the educated merchants, bankers, lawyers, and professors who read the philosophers and agreed with them. Then the more liberal among the nobles and clergymen became interested in the radical philosophy and were greatly impressed. The intellectuals and dilettantes formed circles and clubs and spent their evenings discussing *The Social Contract* of Rousseau and the philosophies of Voltaire, Montesquieu, and others. There were the Tuesdays at Madame de Helvetius; the Thursdays and Sundays at Madame d'Holbach. There were many salons, cafes, and theaters in which members of the middle class passed their leisure hours arguing about the new political philosophy. The lower middle class people joined the Masonic lodges and the Illuminati lodges, in which men like Robespierre, Brissot, and Marat had their oratorical training. In fact, in the latter part of the eighteenth century, the whole of France became a debating club; Paris was the cafe of Europe.[13] The intellectual atmosphere of

[12] Gottschalk, Louis Reichenthal, *The Era of the French Revolution;* New York, Houghton Mifflin, 1929 (x and 509 pp.). Especially ch. iii. Roustan, M., *The Pioneers of the French Revolution;* London, E. Benn, 1926 (302 pp.).

[13] Gottschalk, *op. cit.;* pp. 80-87.

the time was tense, reflecting a high level of social insecurity. The Goddess of Reason was winning many converts; the state of nature kindling the imagination of almost the entire third estate. In short, the time was ripe for a violent explosion, for a radical revolution, which would put the Rousseauan ideas of liberty and equality into practice.

It may be stated here that in general revolution bursts out neither at the zenith nor at the nadir of society. In times of social crises, those on high are insecure, but they are in general determined to stabilize the social structure as well as they can. Those at the nadir also are insecure, but their fears in most cases outweigh their resentments and hostilities. Consequently, they are prevented from plunging into revolutionary deeds, and prefer passive acquiescence to active antagonism. The "danger zone" lies in the class somewhere between the zenith and the nadir that has acquired the capacity to rise but is blocked from ascending to the higher strata of the social pyramid. There lies the dynamite that is likely to explode the rigid social structure.[14]

While the causes of the French Revolution were many, historians have in general thought that the most important factor was the middle class, the class that had the determination and ability to cross the rigid barriers separating it from the higher classes, nobility and clergy.[15] With the enlightenment and with the rise of modern industry, the middle class considered itself more learned and more capable than the nobles and clergymen who were thought to have outlived their historical usefulness but who still enjoyed special privileges, great wealth and prestige. The rising class was deeply wounded by the inequality of status and resentful against the estates. It was this hostility of the middle class against the estates maintained above it by tradition that was mainly responsible for the French Revolution.[16]

We now locate the point of severest tension in the social structure of the France of the eighteenth century. It was the tension between the rising middle class and the two estates. It was at this point that the social structure began to break. It was precisely in this tensional zone that the Rousseauan demands for liberty and equality became most urgent and imperative. The insurgent gospel of Rousseau met exactly the needs of the ascending class and became at once embodied in the political program of the revolution.

It would be far from the truth to say that the tension between the middle class and the estates was the only dangerous spot. There were in the ancient régime other areas of conflict, which were of explosive character and which heightened greatly the general level of social insecurity. While the middle class clamored for a greater share of social prestige and political power, the lower classes were crying for an improvement of their lot. There were riots in the provinces, attacks upon the wealthy, mob revolts against heavy taxation. "Despair, fell disease, and ghastly poverty" reigned throughout the kingdom. On the eve of the revolution the rural crisis was seriously aggravated by the bad harvest of 1788 and the hard winter of 1789. The populace was not alone in manifesting restlessness and discontent. There were conflicts throughout all the grades of the social pyramid. While the upper clergy and the nobility of the court were well satisfied with the ancient régime, the

[14] Lecky, William Edward, *A History of England in the 18th Century;* New York, D. Appleton, 1882-90 (8 vols.). VI, 183-365. Lowell, Edward Jackson, *The Eve of the French Revolution;* Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1934 (viii and 408 pp.). Chs. i, iii, and vi.

[15] Taine, Hippolyte Adolphe, *The Ancient Régime,* Tr. by J. Durand; New York, Henry Holt, 1896 (xvi and 421 pp.). Levasseur, E., *Histoire des ouvières et de l'industrie en France avant 1789;* Paris, A. Rousseau, 1900-01 (2 vols.). See, Henri, *Economic and Social Conditions in France during the Eighteenth Century;* New York, A. A. Knopf, 1927 (xix and 245 pp.).

[16] Taine said: "Since the nobility, having lost its special capacity, and the third estate, having acquired general capacity, were now on a level in respect of education and aptitudes, the inequality which divided them had become hurtful and useless. Instituted by the custom, it was no longer ratified by the consciousness, and the third estate was with reason angered by privileges which nothing justified, neither the capacity of the nobles nor the incapacity of the bourgeoisie." Quoted in Le Bon, Gustave, *Psychology of French Revolution,* Tr. by Bernard Miall; New York, G. P. Putman's Sons, 1913 (337 pp.). Page 140.

lower clergy and the nobility of the country were not so complacent.[17] "The lesser clergy are hostile to the prelates; the provincial gentry to the nobility of the court; the vassals to the seigneurs; the peasants to the townsmen."[18] In fact, the whole of France was in a state of disequilibrium and disturbance. When the middle class started the revolution, the pent-up emotions and insecurity feelings of almost every class, save the highest, were released in shouting the slogans of liberty, equality, and fraternity as well as in violence and in the guillotine. Such were the social conditions in which the Rousseauan doctrine was made the bible of the "common people."

The "common people" having triumphed, the free state of contract was presumably established. The rigid social hierarchy was supposed to be abolished. There would be no more inequality, no more slavery, no more poverty. A new era of human history was to begin. And Rousseau was made the high pontiff, according to whose mandates the régime of liberty, equality, and fraternity was to be organized and administered.

Having placed itself on the upper strata of the social pyramid, the bourgeoisie tended to stabilize the "free" régime it had created in the name of the "common people." The free state soon became the bourgeois or plutocratic state. The condition of equality remained a dream; and without equality the ideal of liberty, in the Rousseauan sense, was never a reality. With liberty and equality unrealized, the free state of Rousseau did not come into existence. It remained for the radical thinkers of the nineteenth century, the leaders of the anarcho-communist movement, further to develop the ideas of Rousseau and to attempt to carry them out in practice.

Communism and anarchism, different as they were in many respects, were the products of the same social conditions, and consequently may be treated together. The anarcho-communist movement emerged from the Europe of the nineteenth century and spread through certain sections of society. We shall attempt to locate, as precisely as possible, the tensional zone in society from which communism and anarchism emanated and those other areas of strain through which the ideas of communism and anarchism were diffused.

We shall first study the social status of the great leaders of communism and anarchism. The fathers of communism were Marx and Engels. Among their followers were such prominent personalities as Plehanov, Bebel, Liebknecht, Kautsky, Lenin, Trotsky, to mention but the most outstanding. The father of anarchism was Proudhon, and the other leading anarchists were Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tolstoi, Reclus, Malatesta. We shall inquire for a moment into the social status to which these prominent communists and anarchists belonged. Marx was from a Jewish professional family and was himself a doctor of philosophy. Engels was a successful business man. Plehanov, the father of Russian Marxism, was a student at the mining academy in St. Petersburg and an eminent writer. Bebel, Liebknecht, and Kautsky were members of the *Reichstag*. Lenin was the son of an inspector of schools and of the daughter of a landlord. Trotsky was the son of a Jewish landlord. Among the anarchists, Proudhon was from a poor family, being the son of a journeyman brewer. Owing to his literary genius, he was awarded the Suard pension by the Academy of Besancon. The three great Russian anarchists, Bakunin, Kropotkin, and Tolstoi, were high-born and cultured. Bakunin was doctor of philosophy from the University of Turin. Kropotkin was a well-known natural scientist. Tolstoi was a great novelist. Reclus was a distinguished geographer. Malatesta was from an old, famous family and was a medical student at the University of Naples. These were only a few outstanding personalities in the anarcho-communist movement. It is safe to say that most of the leaders of anarchism and communism were drawn neither from the lowest classes nor from the highest, but from the middle classes. Like the *philosophes*, the encyclopaedists and physiocrats of the eighteenth century,

[17] Gottschalk, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-54.
[18] Le Bon, *op. cit.*; p. 152.

the communist and anarchist leaders were a powerful group of malcontented intellectuals, who were in one way or another dissatisfied with and hostile against the plutocratic state of the West or the autocratic state of Russia.

It seems clear from the brief account given above that the leaders of the anarcho-communist movement were scarcely members of the proletariat. They were malcontented intellectuals, who as a group were rather *declassé,* or at least not too firmly situated in the social hierarchy.[19] They formed an indefinite social stratum, moving and restive, and might have landed themselves anywhere in the social pyramid. As a group, they might be said to constitute the malcontented intelligentsia class. It was this intelligentsia class that gave birth to the ideas of communism and anarchism. This class aspired to the apex of the social pyramid but was blocked by the rigidity and tenacity of the established order. It was from this class that the communist and anarchist antistatism emerged.[20] Antistatism did not come from the nadir of society, nor from the zenith thereof; it came from the intellectual members of society, who were somewhere below the apex but far above the bottom, and who were attempting to climb the social ladder but were blocked from reaching the highest.

The leaders of the anarcho-communist movement were men who were skillful in manipulating symbols and watchwords, in influencing human emotions and inspiring collective actions. They were great engineers of human consent. Some were masters of revolutionary words, others of revolutionary deeds. They were a professional or expert class that struggled for social supremacy. They were immediately below the ruling classes and came into most direct contact and hence conflict with the latter. In education and in capacity, they were not inferior to the members of the ruling élite. But in the social hierarchy of values they stood in envy and resentment below the top. They got medium incomes, enjoyed not too much prestige, and exercised little political authority. Had they been far down in the social hierarchy, they would not have come into direct relations with the ruling élite. Immediate contact facilitated comparison of relative status, of relative superiority and inferiority, and tended to create tensions between the adjacent classes. It was in the tensional zone between the rising intelligentsia and the ruling élite that communism and anarchism had their origin.[21]

In the liberal state of the West, wherever there was a sufficient degree of free circulation and locomotion of social classes, there was relatively a small amount of social tension and a low level of social insecurity, and there communism and anarchism were not likely to spread widely. The more rigid the social hierarchy became, the more severe was the tension between the plutocratic class and the classes not far below that were aspiring to the apex of the pyramid, between the bigger bourgeoisie and the lesser bourgeoisie, and the more likely were communism and anarchism to disseminate and propagate. The brilliant intellectuals, such as Marx, Engels, Proudhon, and a few others, formulated the radical ideology; semi-intellectuals, brain workers, and self-taught or class-conscious laborers, unemployed college students or graduates, and some professors, doctors, lawyers, literateurs, and business employees, organized clubs, unions, and parties in order to diffuse radicalism or to carry out certain political programs. The anarcho-communist movement in some situations did reach the bottom of the social hierarchy, but by and large it was a movement staged and manned by the lower middle class, the malcontented intellectuals, a class of experts in human engineering and in propaganda and organization.[22]

[19] Mannheim, Karl, *Ideology and Utopia,* Tr. by L. Wirth and E. Shils; London, K. Paul, Trench, Trubner and Company, 1936 (xxxi and 318 pp.). Pages 136-38.

[20] Masaryk, T. G., *The Spirit of Russia,* Tr. by E. and C. Paul; London, G. Allen and Unwin, 1919 (2 vols.). II, 328-31. Nomad, *Rebels and Renegades;* pp. vi-vii.

[21] Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity;* pp. 264-68. Speier, *op. cit.;* pp. 265-66.

[22] Man, Hendrik de, *Die Intellectuel und der Sozialismus;* Jena, E. Diederichs, 1926 (37 pp.). *The Psychology of Socialism,* Tr. by Eden and Cedar Paul; New York, Henry Holt, 1927 (509 pp.). Nomad, *op. cit.*

In the autocratic state of Russia, the anarcho-communist movement was strongest. There one finds several extreme forms of anarchism and communism. The leaders of these movements, as has been indicated, were all malcontented intellectuals. Machajski, who spent ten years in Siberia for his activities as a revolutionary Marxist, declared that the socialist theories of the nineteenth century expressed the class interest of the intellectual workers and not of the manual workers.[23] If, as Masaryk pointed out, the forerunner of the Social Democratic Party, the Group for the Liberation of Labor, "was a literary association to popularize and diffuse the ideas of Marx," [24] the theorists and organizers of the anarchist movement in Russia may be called "a colony of intellectuals." The anarchists and the communists were a powerful group of intellectuals, who were against the absolutism of the Czar, against the stupidity and corruption of the church and the nobility. Owing to its despotism, at once unbenevolent and unenlightened, the Russia of the nineteenth century was the most fertile land for radicalism as well as for pessimism and terrorism. There were most violent explosions of human emotions in literature and in action; there were most despairing metaphysical and religious writings; there were most rational formulas for the creation of a new world. The general level of social insecurity was unusually high; the tensions between the ruling and ruled classes were very severe. The conflicts between the royalty, clergy, and nobility on the one hand, and the common people on the other, and the struggles between landlords and peasants were acute and sharp. This state of affairs, which reminds one of the France of the eighteenth century, led to countless isolated struggles of the terror, peasant risings and assassinations, which finally culminated in the revolutions of 1905 and 1917. The Russian revolution, like the French revolution, was staged and manned and philosophized by the rising classes, with the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia playing the leading role, in the name of the proletariat.[25]

We have seen that just as the middle class staged the French revolution in the name of the "common people," a group of professionally trained theoreticians, agitators, and strategists engineered the Russian revolution in the name of the "proletariat." As yet, there has been no successful anarchistic revolution. One often forgets that the ultimate objectives of these three antistate systems are similar. They aim at the establishment of a realm of liberty and equality, known variously as the free state, the stateless society, or the positive anarchy. In either the French or the Russian revolution, the distance between the final goal and the actual achievement is very great. It seems that the free state of Rousseau is as remote from the French Republic as the stateless society of Marx is from the Soviet Régime. The "general will" is as much a myth in France as the "dictatorship of the proletariat" is a dream in Russia.[26] Much as the rising bourgeoisie succeeded in putting itself upon the apex of the social pyramid, the Russian revolutionary strategists and social engineers built up a strong military and bureaucratic machinery with which to entrench themselves in the upper strata of the social hierarchy.[27]

So far, we have not considered interstate relations as they influence the dissemination and modification of antistate doctrines. The recent phenomenon of fascism or national socialism is a case in point. Fascism, as an ideology, is a mixture of proletarianism and nationalism. But the radical aspect, which tends to reject the capitalistic order and to further class struggle, is overshadowed by the national aspect, which tends to strengthen the cohesion of the social and economic

[23] Lasswell, *op. cit.;* p. 112.
[24] Masaryk, *op. cit.;* II, 328.

[25] Pokrovsky, M. N., *Brief History of Russia,* Tr. by D. S. Mirsky; New York, International Publishers, 1933 (2 vols.). II, 70, 148, 156. Lasswell, *op. cit.;* pp. 266-67.
[26] Stolberg, October in Thermidor, *The Nation.* "This essential weakness of Marxism lies in its purely metaphysical conception of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, based upon the revolutionary instincts of labor, which is quite as much a fiction as Rousseau's General Will based upon the Social Contract."
[27] Trotsky, *The Revolution Betrayed.*

classes and to lessen the inner tension of the social structure as a unit. Pressure upon a state as a unit usually increases the internal unity and discourages radical movements. In this essay, we have eliminated the consideration of inter-state relations, not because they are unimportant, but because the nature of this essay requires the treatment of the state in more or less abstraction. Therefore, the general observations we have made so far are all modified by the phrase, "other conditions remaining as they are."

We may restate the general observation concerning the propagation of modern antistatism. The liberal movement was that of the rising bourgeoisie, which came into conflict with the estates. The anarcho-communist movement was that of the professional or expert classes that were under strained relations with the plutocracy (West) or with the autocracy (Russia). The radical class is generally an ascendant class; it is situated neither at the zenith nor at the nadir of society, but somewhere in the middle. Radicalism issues from a tensional zone between a rising class and its superior classes that are not permeable and that bar aspirants.

When an ascendant class is blocked in its attempt to climb the social ladder by higher classes, it tends to reject the existing state. The contact and conflict between the rising class and its superior classes seems to be the "danger zone" from which radical ideology emerges and spreads to other areas of discontent and resentment throughout society.

### 4. Summary

1. The state is the power that maintains a hierarchy of social values in accordance with which social life is organized.

2. Antistatism generally originates in the zone of the severest tension, from which it spreads to other tensional areas throughout the social structure.

3. The backgrounds of ancient antistatism show that the points of tension lay in the relations between the exogenous groups and the indigenous populations. This phenomenon may be stated formally as follows: Other conditions remaining as they are, when an exogenous group is blocked in its attempt to climb the social ladder by the indigenous population, it tends to reject the native state.

4. The backgrounds of modern antistatism show that the points of the severest tension lay in the relations between a rising class and its superior classes that are not permeable. This phenomenon may also be stated formally as follows: Other conditions remaining as they are, when a rising class is blocked in its attempt to climb the social ladder by the higher classes, it tends to reject the existing state.

# Chapter IX

# Psychological Conditions of Antistatism

## 1. General Observations

We have seen that antistatism may be classified from the points of view of whither and how, of goal and method. Antistatism is oriented either retrospectively to a primordial state of existence or prospectively to a coming kingdom of freedom. It adopts either an internalistic mode of behavior to realize the ego utopia or an externalistic program of action to bring about a stateless or anarchistic society.

It is further shown that antistatism generally emerges from a tensional zone in society, the zone at which an exogenous group comes into conflict with the indigenous group, or an ascendant class encounters the opposition of the higher classes. When the exogenous group or ascendant class is blocked in its attempt to climb the social ladder, it tends to reject the existing state. Antistatism generally emanates from the area where the blockage occurs. From there, it spreads to other areas of strain in society.

We have thus explained, though partially, the general social backgrounds of antistatism. In this chapter, we propose to investigate the psychological conditions of antistatism, that is to say, we shall study personal reactions toward blockages which arise out of the rigidity of the social hierarchy. Antistatism generally emanates from a group of intellectuals, whether of exogenous or indigenous origin, that is blocked in its attempt to climb the social ladder. The antistatist as an individual must have a high level of aspiration, a high standard of achievement which he sets for himself, a high sense of self-esteem or self-pride. Prevented from realizing his ego ideal, he tends to denounce the existing order of men and things, the existing social structure under which his self-esteem is lowered and his self-pride wounded.

From the social point of view, antistatism emerges from a rising class that is blocked; from the personal point of view, antistatism emanates from an individual who is prevented from achieving a high level of aspiration which he sets for himself. Such an individual is generally very ambitious and possesses a delicate sense of self-esteem or self-regard. When he is blocked, he feels wounded personally. The more self-important he is, the more easily is he humiliated; and the more is he hurt, the higher he regards himself. There is then created a tension between the feeling of self-importance and the consciousness of self-disparagement, between ego-maximization and ego-minimization, between pride and inferiority, which tension keeps the personality high-strung and which is in fact the main spring of novel arrangements of ideas and intellectual vitality.[1]

When one is blocked from reaching his level of aspiration, from realizing his ego ideal, from fulfilling his desires and ambitions, he tends to react in a way in which he will find some satisfaction. The way in which one reacts toward blockages is perhaps the most important characteristic of one's personality.[2] In studying the personality of the antistatist, we may therefore observe particularly the way in which he meets social blockages, discriminations, and deprivations.

It seems that there are four main forms of antistate reaction toward social block-

[1] Adler, Alfred, *The Neurotic Constitution*, Tr. by Bernard Glueck and John Lind; New York, Moffat, 1930 (xxiii and 456 pp.). Page 20. Kretschmer, Ernst, *The Psychology of Men of Genius*, Tr. by R. B. Cattell; London, K. Paul, Trench, Trubner and Company, 1931 (xx and 256 pp.). Pages 176-77.

[2] Brown, *Psychology and the Social Order;* p. 240. "Personality change is primarily determined by the way in which the individual meets blockages in the psychological field."

ages. We may call these reactions regressive, progressive, introversive, and extraversive. The aim of these reactions, from the psychological point of view, is to redeem the self-pride or self-regard which is wounded by social blockages; or to put it differently, to bring about a condition of existence in which the ego would be supreme.

We shall define the four forms of reaction briefly as follows:

A regressive reaction is a returning to an earlier stage of existence. A regressive antistatist is one who, when thwarted by a social blockage, tends to retrogress to an early condition of indulgence. The development of his personality is somehow arrested. He becomes "a child" once more, a child of mother-nature, par excellence.

A progressive reaction is an advancing to a future stage of existence. A progressive antistatist is one who, when thwarted by a social blockage, tends to dream and scheme a new society in which the blockage will be removed. His personality continues to grow or develop.

An introversive reaction is an inward-turning of attention and interest. An introverted antistatist is one who, when confronted by a social blockage, withdraws into himself to find peace and security. He tends to hide himself and to avoid social contacts.

An extraversive reaction is an outward-turning of attention and interest. An extraverted antistatist is one who, when confronted by a social blockage, strives to break it. He tends to exhibit himself and to enter into political struggles. He feels and thinks himself into the external world.[3]

An introverted antistatist may be either regressive or progressive, that is to say, he may be oriented either retrospectively or prospectively. So may an extraverted antistatist. He may attempt to transform society according to the ideal of his childhood or according to some novel plan. Therefore the reaction of the antistatist to a social blockage may be introversive and regressive, introversive and progressive, extraversive and regressive, or extraversive and progressive. It seems, however, that regression and introversion are closely related, so are progression and extraversion. This will be shown more clearly later.

Needless to say, regression and progression are relative terms, for a regressive personality may sometimes progress, and a progressive regress. Nor are introversion and extraversion to be taken as absolute terms; the external world is relatively of less interest to the introverted personality, just as the internal world receives relatively less attention from the extraverted.

These forms of reaction to social blockages correspond closely to the patterns of antistatism. In the study of the patterns of antistatism, we analyze the theoretical structures of antistatism; in this chapter we enter into an investigation of the psychological responses to social blockages.

Finally, it may be added that personality types are primarily the resultant of social forces, that is, they are conditioned by education, group or class character, and social background. Personalities are formed gradually through living in society, through inter-personal relationships and experiences. An individual is born with certain physical characteristics and certain instinctual and intellectual qualities, but he is molded and remolded by society. It is generally agreed among recent psychologists that the development of personality, the formation of attitudes and ambitions, the habituation of certain forms of reaction toward external situations, are primarily socially determined.[4]

## 2. Regressive and Introversive Reactions to Blockages

The ancient antistatists, Laotzu and Zeno, and the modern antistatist, Rousseau, were all inclined to regressive and introversive reactions toward social block-

[3] Jung, Carl G., *Psychological Types*, Tr. by H. G. Baynes; New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1926 (xxii and 654 pp.). Pages 542-43.

[4] Dewey, John, *Human Nature and Conduct;* New York, Henry Holt, 1922 (vii and 336 pp.). Watson, John Broadus, *Behaviorism;* New York, The People's Institute Publishing Company, 1924-25 (251 pp.). Adler, *op. cit.* Lewin, K., *A Dynamic Theory of Personality*, Tr. by D. A. Adams and K. E. Zener; New York, McGraw-Hill, 1935 (ix and 286 pp.). Koehler, Wolfgang, *Gestalt Psychology;* New York, H. Liveright, 1929 (x and 403 pp.).

ages. They differed in degrees of regression and in intensity of introversive preoccupation. Generally, when confronted with obstacles, they almost automatically returned to earlier stages of existence and withdrew into themselves and avoided social contacts. By regression, they found security in the environment of indulgence and in nature, the symbol of mother. By introversion, they escaped social conflicts and contradictions and obtained peace of mind. Regression and introversion appear as two mechanisms whereby the ego that is blocked may find a condition of existence in which it will be able to maintain its pride and importance. We shall now briefly indicate some regressive and introversive characteristics of Laotzu, Zeno, and Rousseau.

Laotzu, a southerner, came to north China, where he was a stranger and constantly lonely. Of himself he said:

> The multitudes of men are happy, so happy, as though celebrating a great feast. They are as though in spring time ascending a tower. I alone remain quiet, alas! like one that has not yet received an omen. I am like unto a babe that does not yet smile.
>
> Forlorn am I, O, so forlorn! It appears that I have no place whither I may return home.
>
> The multitudes of men all have plenty and I alone appear empty. Alas! I am a man whose heart is foolish.
>
> Ignorant am I, O, so ignorant! Common people are bright, so bright, I alone am dull. Common people are so smart, so smart, I alone am confused, so confused.
>
> Desolate am I, alas! like the sea. Adrift, alas! like one who has no place to stay.
>
> The multitudes of men all possess usefulness. I alone am awkward and a rustic too.
>
> I alone differ from others, but I prize seeking sustenance from our mother.[5]

This passage shows unmistakably how Laotzu, when blocked or wounded, regressed to the state of a babe and longed for his mother. He was incapable of adapting himself to the new environment and felt uncomfortable in the happy multitudes of men; he wished to return to the primitive community in the south.

This tendency to regress from humiliating situations, from the psychological point of view, seems to be the main spring of the philosophy of Taoism. For Tao, to Laotzu, is the primordial force or energy of nature. To return to Tao is to restore the original nature of man and to become a child once more. Being one with Tao resembles the spiritual condition of a child.[6] Laotzu seems unable to grow up and too weak to face the life of competition and strife.

The retrospective orientation of Laotzu was coupled with an intense introversion. He withdrew almost entirely from society. To him, "to withdraw is the celestial way" of living. He said of his solitary life in the following famous verse:

> Without passing out of the gate
> The world's course I prognosticate,
> Without peeping through the window
> The heavenly reason I contemplate.
> The further one goes,
> The less one knows.[7]

This verse shows clearly how contemplative a life Laotzu lived by himself. He was a thinker, conscious of what was going on in the political and social world, but uninterested in participating therein, much less in reformation thereof.

The introversion of Laotzu was almost complete. He did not allow the external world to enter into his inner life. "Therefore is he inaccessible to intimacy, inaccessible to estrangement, inaccessible to profit, inaccessible to injury, inaccessible to honor, inaccessible to disgrace."[8] Between the subjective and the objective world, he built such a strong and insurmountable wall that nothing could invade or disturb him. Within that wall, in splendid and sublime isolation, he found his ego, not only unimpaired, but also supreme.

Other outstanding members of the Taoist school, such as Chuangtzu and Yangtzu, were also inclined toward regression and introversion. Their interest and attention were centered in the inner life. Yangtzu, the individualistic anarchist, was particularly intense in subjective cultivation as a means of defense against

[5] Laotzu, *The Tao Teh Ching;* ch. xx.

[6] *Ibid.;* chs. x, xxviii, and lv.
[7] *Ibid.;* ch. xlvii.
[8] *Ibid.;* ch. lvi.

the external forces. Chuangtzu, the mystic anarchist, devoted himself most completely to contemplation and to affective identification with nature. The Taoists as a group were hermits or recluses, solitary and lonely figures of ancient China.

Much as the Taoist, Zeno tended toward flight into the original state of nature, a state of childhood, a state of early indulgence and security. He is said to have been shipwrecked and to have lost a large quantity of purple, and consequently was unable to continue his business enterprise. And being an alien in Athens, he could not enter into the political life there. Unable to adjust himself to the conditions of Athens, he longed for the original state of nature. He preferred being an itinerant mendicant and remaining hungry and poor, to becoming successful in business or politics. This same may be said of Diogenes, and of most other Cynics and Stoics.

In social life, Zeno felt very uncomfortable. He is said to have avoided crowds with great care and refused many invitations to supper on account of his fat, flabby, weak legs.[9] He would rather remain "in proud obscurity" than expose himself to society and thereby get hurt. King Antigonous said of him: "Though I gave him a great many presents, he was never elated and never humbled."[10] These incidents show that Zeno was a delicate and sensitive person, who avoided all social relations if possible and did not let himself become involved in and thus disturbed by the business of other people.

Not interested in the objective world, Zeno bent his energy inward and engaged wholeheartedly in mental activity. It is said of him:

> The cold of winter, and the ceaseless rain,
> Come powerless against him; weak is the dart
> Of the fierce summer sun, or fell disease,
> To bend that iron frame. He stands apart,
> In nought resembling the vast common crowd;
> But, patient and unwearied, night and day,
> Clings to his studies and philosophy.[11]

By intense introversion, Zeno freed himself from the possibility of being wounded in social contacts and created a self-sufficient world, independent of other people and indifferent to life and death.

In meeting social obstacles and hindrances, Zeno tended to regress and to internalize his activity. These two tendencies are also noticeable in other Cynics and Stoics, and are the main psychological characteristics of the Cynic-Stoic pattern of life.

Like Laotzu and Zeno, Rousseau was a shy and retiring man. He was as much a stranger in Paris, as Laotzu was in Chou and Zeno in Athens. He was as sensitive and delicate as the Taoist and the Cynic-Stoic, if not more so. He cried, Back to Nature! much as the other two did some twenty centuries before him.

At the age of sixteen, the youthful Rousseau turned adrift upon the world, becoming nature's free son, the first of Bohemians. He was happy and gay, with a heart full of bold plans and beautiful simple theories. He was drawn to Paris, but that enlightened city made him old and unhappy. He came to "hate the state, the great, the oppressor." Looking back upon his youthful days, Rousseau wished to return home, to return to nature, to return to his childhood. Out of this wish sprang Rousseau's political and philosophical system, which was to lead men back again, out of the glaring evils and vices of civilization, to the simple paradise of the childhood of the race, where there were only innocent shepherds and tillers of the soil, and no law other than that of benevolent mother-nature. Leaving Paris, Rousseau retired to the country, where as he told us he enjoyed his solitary walks, those swiftly passed, delicious days that he spent all alone with himself, with his simple house-keeper, with his beloved dog, his old cat, with the birds of the fields and the hinds of the forest, with all of nature and its inconceivable author.[12] There in isolation, was he able to be "wholly himself," "an integral unity, an absolute whole," "a natural man," who was free from the damages and hurts which society might inflict upon him.

[9] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers;* Bk. VII, chs. ii and xv.
[10] *Ibid.;* Bk. VII.
[11] *Ibid.*
[12] Josephson, Matthews, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau;* New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1931 (xii and 546 pp.). Page 198.

Speaking of the young Holderin, Schiller once remarked: "What an intense subjectivity he has." The same intense subjectivity reveals itself in every book Rousseau ever wrote.[13] His subjectivity is oriented retrospectively and is inextricably bound up with the idealization of the past.[14] In other words, Rousseau turned his energy inward to himself and backward to some past stage of existence.[15] These two traits of his personality stand out in his entire political philosophy.

Thus it seems clear that Laotzu, Zeno, and Rousseau were inclined to regressive and introversive reactions to humiliating and baffling situations. They felt they were childish in the highly civilized cities. They were unable to readjust themselves to the novel circumstances and to demand their proper places in the social hierarchy. They longed for the lost days of youth. Laotzu might have wished to return to the rural village in southern China, Zeno to the happy isle of his childhood, Rousseau to the blue mountains of Savoy and the garden of Les Charmettes. Not only did they tend thus to regress, but they also were inclined toward introspectionism, toward solitary contemplation about the universe and man, toward self-pity and self-reproach as well as self-aggrandizement, in short, toward autistic fantasies and imaginings of all sorts as means of relieving the tensions created by unpleasant and deprivative circumstances.

### 3. Progressive and Extraversive Reactions to Blockages

If Laotzu, Zeno, and Rousseau were regressive and introversive in their reactions to difficult situations, Marx, Proudhon, and their followers were progressive and extraversive in the ways they met blockages which were imposed upon them by the higher classes in society. We shall briefly indicate some typical traits of Marx and Proudhon as they encountered such circumstances as seemed oppressive and offensive to them.

In the face of any obstacle, Marx was a good fighter. He never gave up anything because it was difficult. This was disclosed early in his life. In his letter to Ruge, regarding his engagement to Jenny von Westphalen, who was a gentile, Marx said:

> We have been engaged now for seven years and my future wife has had to fight hard struggles on my behalf partly against the pious aristocratic relatives who regard their "Father in Heaven" and the Government of Berlin as equal objects of veneration, and partly against my own family in which a number of clerical individuals and other enemies of mine have got a hold, and these struggles have undermined her health.[16]

This is a bitter note. The tension between pride and inferiority was high. Not only was his fighting spirit shown in the letter, but also his feelings against racial discrimination, against class distinction, against the state itself were clearly voiced. In fact, in this letter not only was Marx the young man photographed, but also Marx the communist foreshadowed.

Marx had already become a radical thinker and given up the idea of an official career before he graduated from the University. After he obtained his doctorate, he looked for a professorship, but in the stifling, reactionary atmosphere of the early nineteenth century, he had no hope for an academic post. He planned for the publication of a progressive journal, but was prevented from realization of his ambition in Germany. He contributed articles to the *Rheinische Zeitung* and to the *Deutsche Jahrbucher,* which articles were too radical and revolutionary for the Prussian state, and he was obliged to leave the country.

Through a whole series of social blockages, administered by the state and the upper classes, Marx was gradually driven to more and more radical views. He acquainted himself with French socialistic ideas and studied classical economics. Finally he entered upon a great battle against the capitalistic order, against the

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[13] Kretschmer, *The Psychology of Men of Genius;* p. 176.

[14] Jung, *Psychological Types;* p. 105.

[15] Henri-Frederic Amiel says: "Rousseau had been badly brought up, or rather had not been brought up at all." Quoted in Gottschalk, *The Era of the French Revolution;* p. 72.

[16] Mehring, Franz, *Karl Marx,* Tr. by Edward Fitzgerald; New York, Friede Covici, 1935 (xxv and 608 pp.). Page 83.

historic class state. He never retreated from his position, he never retired into the wilderness. With insight and courage, he looked far into the future and strived for a new world. Uncompromising and relentless, he fought the historic class state on the theoretical as well as the practical front. He turned Hegelianism right side up; carried Smithian economics to its logical extremes; administered intellectual "defeats" to Proudhon, Max Stirner, and many another. No wonder that he declared triumphantly: "Before the proletariat fights out its battle on the barricades, it announces the coming of its rule with a series of intellectual victories." [17]

Not only was Marx engaged in theoretical polemics, he was actually the leader of the Communist League, and later of the International. Appearing before many conferences of working men he lectured to them and urged them to unite in a class war against the capitalistic régime. He was a domineering personality, dictatorial and dogmatic. Bakunin said that it was impossible for any man to breathe freely in the company of Marx and that as a German and a Jew, Marx was authoritarian from head to heel.[18]

Throughout his life, Marx was struggling for self-assertion and self-pride. He was "over-powered by a perpetual urge toward the highest, the purest, the most ideal. It was not merely his ambition to be the most famous among those who have studied socialist literature, and the most learned of all the critics of economic science; he also wanted to be the most efficient revolutionist, and pre-eminent among the advocates of revolution." [19] He wanted to expound the purest economic theory, the completest historical synthesis, the most scientific principle of the most perfect human society. He wanted to be the greatest man in the International.

The man, who described his career as *"anti-religieuse, anti-propriétaire, anti-monarchique,"* was no less over-powered by an urge towards the greatest than Marx. It took an ego that was at once disproportionately inflated and profoundly wounded to declare the following:

> La propriété, c'est le vol! Dieu, c'est le mal! Le meilleur des gouvernements, c'est l'anarchie.

Not only was Proudhon a great enemy of the historic state, he was also among the greatest critics of all other human institutions.

From childhood, Proudhon had to fight against hunger and disgrace. For instance, once upon returning home, loaded with prizes he had won in school, Proudhon found there was nothing to eat in the house. Even as a boy, he felt humiliated to be forced to kneel in the church. The seeds of his anti-religious, anti-capitalist, and anti-state ideas were sown from his early life. The beginning of his anarchistic thought was best stated by Proudhon himself when he wrote to the Academy of Besancon, applying for the Suard pension:

> Born and reared in the midst of the working classes, to which I belong with my heart and affections and above all by the community of sufferings and aspirations, it will be my greatest joy, if I receive the approval of the Academy, to work unceasingly with the help of philosophy and science, and with the whole energy of my will and all my mental powers, for the physical, moral, intellectual improvement of those whom I call brothers and companions in order to sow amongst them the seeds of a doctrine which I consider as the law of the moral world, and hoping to succeed in my endeavors, to appear before you, gentlemen, as their representative.[20]

In this letter we note the beginning of the anarchistic theory. Here also are revealed his interest in the objective world, in the working class, and his progressive spirit in tackling social problems. His sympathy lay with the proletarian classes; his interest was externally rather than internally directed. He did not look backward to some childhood experience for guidance; he wanted to work unceasingly for the improvements of the proletariat in the future.

Both in intellectual polemics and in real politics, Proudhon was aggressive and uncompromising. His whole life was a con-

[17] *Ibid.;* p. 234.
[18] *Ibid.;* pp. 173 and 429.
[19] Ruhle, *Karl Marx;* p. 382.
[20] Zenker, *Anarchism;* p. 28.

stant fight against dogmatism in every form. He fought against social utopianism, against communism, against religion, against property, against political authority. He was fearless and relentlessly logical in his writings.[21] He was bold in style and vigorous in thinking and sought to formulate the most severely scientific and realistic form of socialism.[22]

Proudhon not only wanted to be the greatest theorist, but also the wisest and most influential proletarian leader. He organized the People's Bank; he represented the proletariat in the Assembly; he was extremely active in political struggle. Exiled, imprisoned, and persecuted by the rich and powerful, he had no restful moments in life. He was the arch enemy of the higher classes as well as of the other schools of socialism.

In Marx and Proudhon, we see two Prometheuses bound, dishonored, humiliated, yet untamable and indomitable. The Promethean egos refused to be chained permanently to the rock of destiny; they fought to flee from the realm of necessity to the kingdom of freedom. It is a great paradox that the more unceasingly and desperately Marx and Proudhon fought for human freedom, the more firmly they believed in certain dialectic laws of history, which were of necessary character. They recognized the cold, impersonal logic of history, yet they kindled and bore the torches of hope for the final emancipation of mankind, for the final stage of human evolution when true liberty and equality would become a fact.

The life of Marx, in both emotional and intellectual aspects, was identified with that of the proletariat. He felt himself and thought himself into the working class. He was only secondarily occupied with his own peace and security and with the well-being of his family. The same may be said of Proudhon. The affective and creative energies of Proudhon were concentrated in developing ideas and plans for the working classes. Most of the other great communist and anarchist leaders, such as Bakunin, Kropotkin, Lenin, and Trotsky, were also extraversively and progressively oriented.[23] They were not only intellectually but also emotionally identified with the proletarian classes. Their thoughts and sentiments were centered in the external world rather than in the internal, and in the future society rather than in the past. They were not inclined toward regression and autistic indulgence, as were in general the ancient antistatists.

The progression and extraversion of the communist or anarchist, on the psychological plane, are closely related to the metaphysical basis of communism or anarchism. With regard to this problem, Masaryk says: "From Hegel, Feuerbach advanced objectivistically toward socialism, desiring to reconcile the ego and the *tu*. Marx, on the other hand, conceiving historical objectivism in an absolute sense, went so far as positive elimination of the ego and his individual consciousness, extreme subjectivism thus evoking extreme objectivism." [24] The followers of Marx from Plehanov to Lenin were all in general opposed, both psychologically and metaphysically, to solipsistic and egoistic isolation. Plehanov sees in subjectivism a manifestation of decadence, of the degeneration of the lay and ecclesiastic aristocracy in the eighteenth century, and of the decay of the bourgeoisie in the nineteenth. To Lenin, subjectivism involves "the burial of the healthy human understanding with its belief in an objective world subordinated to the reign of law." [25] Objective materialism tends to deny the soundness and possibility of realizing the subjective ego utopia.

The anarchist denounces introversion no less than the communist. Bakunin proclaims that suicide is the logical outcome of solipsistic isolation. He asked,

[21] Marx considered Proudhon's *What Is Property?* as epoch-making in its new and bold way of saying everything and expressed himself as having been enraptured by Proudhon's vigorous musculature. See Ruhle, *op. cit.;* p. 74.

[22] Zenker, *op. cit.;* p. 76.

[23] There is one important exceptional case. The "mystical anarchism" of Tolstoi is rather introversive and subjective than extraversive and objective. To him, "the kingdom of God is within you," not outside of your consciousness. In the mystical anarchism of Tolstoi, we can trace the influence of Rousseau and of primitive Christianity.

[24] Masaryk, *The Spirit of Russia;* I, 213. Smith, *Beyond Conscience;* pp. 281-311.

[25] Masaryk, *op. cit.;* II, 35-51.

"Has modern reflection (introspection), this epidemic malady of our day, left any part of you truly alive; are you not utterly permeated by this malady, paralyzed by it, and broken?" Self-annihilation and the annihilation of any possible love for others are the natural consequence of extreme subjectivism.[26] Kropotkin too is opposed to solipsism, which to him is aristocratic. The anarchist, he argues, cannot ignore the fact that individuals exist side by side. Kropotkin and Bakunin reject solipsism from the point of view of humanitarianism and social life, while the communists oppose subjectivism from the point of view of objective materialism.

### 4. Summary

1. From the social point of view, antistatism generally emerges from a rising class that is blocked; from the personal point of view, antistatism generally emanates from an individual whose ego, self-esteem or self-pride, is wounded through deprivations or discriminations, through social blockages of one kind or another.

2. The personality of antistatist is best characterized by the way in which he meets social blockages on the psychological field. Four main forms of reaction toward blockages have been observed. They are regressive, progressive, introversive, and extraversive.

3. Laotzu, Zeno, and Rousseau were regressive and introversive. When they were thwarted by social blockages, they resorted to solitary contemplation and tended to regress to earlier stages of experiences, thereby arriving at a state of ego supremacy and independence in the internal world.

4. Marx and Proudhon and their followers in general were progressive and extraversive. When they were thwarted by social blockages, they strove ahead and externalized their energies in attempting to transform the world into an existence in which the blockages would be removed and the feeling of self-esteem would be redeemed.

[26] *Ibid.;* I, 444, and II, 474.

# Chapter X

## Résumé

In this essay the state is defined as a territorial society which exercises through its government a coercive power legally supreme over any individual or group within it for the purpose of maintaining a general hierarchy of social values and institutions. Antistatism is the theory that rejects the state as such and that suggests a society of liberty and equality. There are three factors to be considered. In the first place, antistatism opposes the coercive power of the state, the bureaucratization and militarization of social life, the compulsory or involuntary organization of society, and advocates a free society, a voluntary and spontaneous association of human beings, a society characterized by the absence of coercion and organized on the basis of consent. In the second place, antistatism opposes the hierarchical organization of society, the society divided into higher and lower classes, into superior and inferior ranks, and stands for an equalitarian society, a society based upon the principle of equality in property and in prestige. Finally, antistatism denies implicitly or explicitly the territorial basis of the state and suggests a universal or cosmopolitan realm transcending physical or national boundaries. Antistatism is not only a negation of the state as such, but also an affirmation of the anarchistic or stateless utopia.

This essay is divided into two parts, "philosophical" and "scientific." The first is concerned with what ought to be, the second with what is. The first part deals with the reasons why the historic state should be abolished and the anarchistic or stateless utopia established. The procedure is both analytical and synthetic, dividing the antistate theory into its component parts and combining them in an integrated whole. It treats antistatism as a moral system, a system of what ought to be, which consists of a series of rationally-formulated and logically-related principles. The second part of the essay deals with the classification of antistatism and with the social backgrounds and the psychological traits of the antistatists. The procedure is comparative and comprehensive, seeking to disclose certain fundamental similarities and differences among the several antistate systems.

Laotzu the Taoist and Zeno the Cynic-Stoic were the first well-known anarchists of antiquity. Laotzu opposes the interference and regulation of social life by the state through its instruments of law, war, taxation, and education. Zeno rejects the domination of the state over the individual, the class distinctions maintained by the state, the territorial or national basis of the state; he opposes law, education, and religion through which the state controls the people. The Taoist utopia is a natural and spontaneous society of more or less isolated individuals, among whom there is a minimum of intercourse, much less interference, a society that is governed by the law of nature, by Tao itself. The Cynic-Stoic utopia is a cosmopolitan régime of independent individuals, a régime that is in harmony with the law of nature.

The Taoist and the Cynic-Stoic were "the Rousseaus of antiquity." Rousseau rejects the historic state that sanctions or legalizes the hierarchical organization of society. He opposes the state in which there are "a few rich and powerful men on the pinnacle of fortune and grandeur while the crowd grovels in want and obscurity." Instead of the state, Rousseau conceives of two utopias, the natural society and the rational society: the former is almost identical with the Taoist or the Cynic-Stoic utopia and the latter is very similar to the communist ideal of the stateless society and the anarchist ideal

of the pure republic. In the natural society, man is a noble savage, happy and free. He possesses two natural instincts, self-respect and compassion, and is by nature good. There are no political relations in the original society. There is no private property; there is perfect liberty and equality. The original society is governed by the law of nature alone. In *The Social Contract,* Rousseau tries to construct a rational society. He describes how a free state (*état libre*) may be organized, with the individual remaining "as free as ever" and "his own sovereign." The free society is to be governed by the general will, the existence of which depends upon the realization of the principles of liberty and equality for all members of the society, and which is the consequence of the fundamental bond of social union. In the truly free society, the rational mandates of the general will are in harmony with the natural instincts of all its members. The rational man of the rational society becomes once more as free and as good as the natural man of the natural society.

The ultimate aims of Rousseauism, Marxism, and Proudhonism are the same, the establishment of the kingdom of liberty and equality. Marx opposes the state as the official form of class antagonisms, and proposes to bring about a classless and stateless society through revolutionary means. According to the communist, the bourgeois state will be transformed into the proletarian state, which in turn will give way to the classless society. In due course of time, the machinery of the state will become useless and the state itself will "wither away." Only when the condition of classlessness obtains, will men ascend from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom. Only then, the government of men will be replaced by the administration of things.

Proudhon opposes the hierarchical and compulsory organization of society, and rejects both the dictatorship of the majority and that of the minority. He proposes to bring about a free federation of human beings through a reorganization of society on the basis of justice, liberty and equality. When society is so reorganized, the state will "fall of itself by its very uselessness." The new society will be a positive anarchy or pure republic, in which the law of mutualism (Proudhon), of solidarity (Bakunin), of the mutual aid (Kropotkin) will reign. The law of mutualism, of solidarity, or of the mutual aid, like the principle of the general will, tends to the greatest common good, which is liberty and equality for all.

Antistatism may be classified from the points of view of goal and method, of whither and how. A pattern of antistatism consists of a goal and a method. The goal may be either retrospective or prospective, either some idealized era of remote antiquity or some rational society of posterity. The method may be either internalistic or externalistic, either some mental activity of the individual or some social program of the collectivity. From the point of view of goal, Laotzuism, Zenoism, and Rousseauism (as a doctrine of the state of nature) are of the retrospective pattern, which is characterized by yearnings for the lost paradise; Rousseauism (as a doctrine of the social contract), communism, and anarchism are of the prospective pattern, which is characterized by expectations of some new heaven. From the point of view of method, Laotzuism, Zenoism, and Rousseauism (as a doctrine of the state of nature) are of the internalistic pattern, which is characterized by some subjective and inward activity to realize the ego utopia; Rousseauism (as a doctrine of the social contract), communism, and anarchism are of the externalistic pattern, which is characterized by some collective program to bring about the free society. There is a close relationship between the retrospective goal and the internalistic method, and between the prospective goal and the externalistic method. The antistatist who looks backward to a lost paradise tends to resort to inward activity, while the antistatist who looks forward to a new heaven tends to propose some collective ways and means. These are some fundamental uniformities and differences among the several antistate systems. The classification is for the purpose of indicat-

ing certain abstract relationships among the different theories and offers a convenient scheme whereupon the antistate ideas may hang together. In no case should it be taken as categoric or inflexible.

As a social phenomenon, antistatism generally emanates from a zone of severe tension in society and spreads to other areas of strain throughout the social structure. Nearly always antistatism originates in a group of rising intellectuals, who are blocked from reaching higher strata in the social hierarchy by the rigidity of the social structure. Antistatism issues from where the blockage occurs. A study of the social milieus of the Taoist and the Cynic-Stoic system shows that the tensional zones lay between the exogenous groups and the indigenous populations. Practically all the leading members of the Taoist and the Cynic-Stoic schools were strangers or aliens, who were ambitious and intellectual persons but who were ridiculed and scorned by the native populations, including philosophers no less than imbeciles. From this comparative study, we come to an hypothesis, which may be stated formally: Other conditions remaining as they are, when an exogenous group is blocked in its attempt to climb the social ladder by the indigenous populations, it tends to reject the native state. A study of the social backgrounds of the liberal and the anarcho-communist systems shows that the tensional zones lay between the rising middle classes and the higher classes. Most of the liberal thinkers of the eighteenth century were great intellectuals and members of the middle classes, who wished to rise to the apex of the social pyramid but who were prevented by the two estates, the nobility and clergy. Most of the anarcho-communist leaders were not of the proletarian origin, but were malcontented members of the intelligentsia which as a class was not too firmly attached to any social stratum. They were masters of symbols and watch-words, great engineers of collective emotion and action. They wanted to rise to the apex of the social hierarchy, but were blocked by the plutocratic and aristocratic classes. From this comparative study, we may formulate another hypothesis, which is as follows: Other conditions remaining as they are, when a rising class is blocked in its attempt to climb the social ladder by the higher classes, it tends to reject the existing state. Antistatism originates neither at the zenith nor at the nadir of the social hierarchy, but somewhere in the middle thereof.

From the social point of view, antistatism generally emerges from a rising class that is blocked; from the psychological point of view, antistatism issues from an individual whose ego, whose self-esteem or self-pride, is wounded through the social blockage, through deprivation or discrimination. He is prevented from achieving a high level of aspiration which he sets for himself, thereby generating an inner tension between the feeling of self-importance and the consciousness of self-disparagement, between ego-maximization and ego-minimization, which tension keeps the personality high-strung and is a main spring of novel rearrangements of ideas. The personality of an antistatist is best characterized by the way in which he meets the social blockage on the psychological level. There are at least four main forms of reaction toward the blockage, regressive, progressive, introversive, and extraversive. Laotzu, Zeno, and Rousseau were inclined toward regression and introversion when they were thwarted by social blockages. They tended to resort to solitary contemplation or solipsistic indulgence and to regress to an earlier stage of existence, thereby arriving at a state of ego supremacy and independence in the internal world. Marx and Proudhon, and most of their followers were inclined toward progression and extraversion when they were blocked by external forces. Not only did they plan to break the blockage, they also attempted to carry out their constructive plans. They externalized their energies, thought and felt themselves into the proletarian classes, objectified their own consciousness into mere reflections or mirrors of social realities. These are some fundamental forms

of psychological reaction toward social blockages and correspond closely to the theoretical patterns of antistatism. This characterization of the antistate personality types shows some predominant traits of the antistatists. One must always remember that regression and progression are relative terms, and so are introversion and extraversion. Psychological characterization defeats its purpose, if it is taken as rigid and inflexible.

Having traversed the philosophical labyrinth of antistatism and having seen some aspects of the patterns and the social and psychological conditions of antistatism, we now come to the end of the essay. The aim of this study has been twofold: first to see antistatism as an integrated philosophical system, not merely as an isolated political theory; second to interpret antistatism as a natural phenomenon in the evolution of the state.

The study of a political theory is too often confined to the analysis of the political theory *per se,* and ignores the metaphysical or sociological doctrines or fictions upon which the political theory is based or by which it is fortified. While the value of such an "isolationist" approach cannot be doubted, its limitations must also be recognized. One of the basic assumptions of this essay is that the political thought of a man is integrally related to his view of the universe or his conception of history. All the ideas of a man, political, metaphysical, sociological, are systematized in one way or another, rationally or irrationally, consciously or unconsciously. For the student of human thought, illusional or delusional systematizations of ideas are as important and as fascinating as deliberate and logical combinations of ideas. From the point of view of political theory, one is mainly interested in seeing how metaphysical and sociological doctrines serve to buttress the political theory *per se.* Epistemology, ontology, dialectics, and economics as "pure thought" are supposed to be "non-political"; the state of nature and the social contract, as "pure or formal fictions," may also be "non-political." We have seen, however, that all these doctrines and fictions can be used for "political" purposes, for the rationalization of antistatism. Any political faith, antistatism or statism, seems to demand a cosmic assurance or an historic guarantee and therefore frequently projects a "political" conception of the universe or a "political" interpretation of history. It is one of the tasks of "the science of political theory" to study the "politicization of pure thought."

The "scientific" study of antistatism, such as we have attempted, is comparative and comprehensive. Through a classification of the patterns of antistatism and through comparisons among the different social milieus and psychological bases of the several patterns, one is able to estimate their resemblances and contrasts, their uniformities and irregularities, thereby arriving at some working hypotheses regarding the nature, the goal and method, of antistatism and regarding the emergence and propagation thereof. The laws of antistatism—and of statism—are not yet known; they are deeply rooted in the psychological recesses of man and intricately related to the complex and comprehensive phenomenon of society in its totality. As the evolution of human knowledge proceeds, what appears unknown or unknowable may some day be as clear as the June sky. Meanwhile, students of politics will search for new lights and insights that may from time to time uncover the profounder and more complicated aspects of political thought and action.

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